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ABSTRACT 
The role of parliament assumes great significance in view of the basic principles and 
assumptions associated with parliamentary democracy. The working of parliaments 
around the globe has transformed tremendously oyer the years. It is no more confined 
to enacting legislation only l)U^also emergetf §s multi-functional institutions. The 
efficient and effective fiinctioning of thH.Parliament is an important requirement for 
achieving the goals of democratic governance. The pivotal role it has to play in 
keeping a political system in a vibrant environment is v/ell-acknowledged as ensuring 
Executive accountability, law making, control over the Budget, constituent fiinctions, 
representational role, educational role, informational functions, training and 
recruitment of leadership, besides other miscellaneous functions. 
It is important to note that parliamentary institutions have endured in India for six 
decades and also become known as the depository of varied functions as delineated by 
the Constitution and, obviously, also of those powers and fiinctions which inherently 
and conventionally rest with parliaments. It is traditionally known as the political 
nerve centre of the country, acting as a mirror of the society, accommodating the 
needs of changing times, shouldering responsibilities and engaging itself fully in the 
process of running our parliamentary polity. 
The present study aims to comparatively analyse the working of Indian parliament in 
both pre-and post Nehru era. However, our argument in this is that the high esteem 
and prestige of parliamentary institutions in post-Nehruvian India is being seriously 
questioned. The traditionally enjoyed glory of parliament is declining and gradually 
moving towards making the parliament dysfunctional. It has now emerged as a 
devalued institution because of the falling standards in the conduct and quality of 
legislators, poor quality of debates, thin attendance, unruly behaviour of the members 
and the consequent chaos inside the houses of parliament. Meaningful debates have 
become things of the past due to utter rowdiness and disorderly behaviour of our, 
present day, parliamentarians. This decline in the working of parliament has been 
continuous since the passing away of the first prime minister of India- Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru. 
The question hour which is considered as the mirror of parliament has been de-shaped 
beyond recognition, the standard of questions-and their answers too, have come down 
drastically, poor participation of members in debates is alarming, the so called 'zero 
hour' has become a tool in the hands of the opposition that leaves no stone unturned 
to see that the proceedings of parliament are kept stalled for unending periods of time, 
adjournments and all other kinds of motions are resorted to just for the sake of it 
without an iota of relevance, speakers have become openly partisan and have often 
been seen on the verge of nervous break downs. On the contrary, we boast about the 
'majesty of parliament', we spend crores of rupees on every session, elections to the 
two Houses consume enormous amounts of money, both of the government and the 
contestants, we also talk about the excellent traditions of parliament's working but the 
actual position is quite contrary. The reasons for its decline have not been sudden. 
There has been a gradual and slow deterioration which has taken place before 
everyone's eyes. 
The present thesis come out with following suggestions to bring back the trust of the 
people, lost glory of our parliament and to ensure its efficient and effective 
functioning: 
First, the frequent amendments to our constitution have seriously affected the working 
of parliamentary democracy and our federal set-up. Therefore, the amendment 
procedure of our constitution should be made more stringent to stabilize the smooth 
functioning of our parliament. 
Secondly, the presiding officer and the leader of the House must work in unison to 
instill a sense of pride amongst the members of parliament and to make them realize 
the importance of parliamentary practices. 
Thirdly, a sincere and serious effort is required to curb the person of criminal 
background to be elected as a member of parliament. 
Fourthly, after each general election, members should be given compulsory training in 
the working of parliament by organizing mock parliamentary sessions, workshops on 
parliamentary procedures and practice, drafting of Bills or even the art of making 
speeches in parliament. 
Fifthly, law making is a serious business which involves many intricate and complex 
matters and procedures. It is, therefore, importeint for the success of our parliamentary 
system that our parliamentarians are to be able to understand the proceedings of the 
House to which they belong. In order to achieve this goal, some basic educational 
qualifications must be prescribed for those who want to contest elections of 
parliament. 
Sixthly, more teeth should be given to the presiding officers of both the Houses of 
parliament so that members whose only contribution to the proceedings is to disrupt 
them are dealt with sternly. Putting curbs on the unruly behaviour of the 
parliamentarians would mean improvement in the standards of debates and better 
decorum in the House creating conditions conductive for better control by the 
presiding officers. This can be done, however, only when the Speaker of the Lok 
Sabha follows the tradition of severing all his political ties with the party he belonged 
to before his election as Speaker and also the convention that a sitting Speaker is 
returned without a contest firom the constituency of his choice. 
Seventhly, the problem of scant attendance during debates in parliament should be 
dealt with urgently. Regular absentees from session should be identified and also 
those who come to parliament each day but prefer to stay in canteens and lobbies 
throughout shall be given a notice of nonperformance, warned and then suspended, 
either for a temporary period or for the entire duration of parliament. 
Eighthly, if a member does not take part in debates and seldom speaks, it should be 
tantamount to non-performance again for which he should be identified and his 
misdeeds publicized so that the members of his constituency consider his 
'qualification' at the next general election. 
Ninth, legitimacy of government and of representative institutions under the 
parliamentary system are inextricably linked to free and fair elections and to the 
system being able to bring to power persons who truly represented the people's will 
and had the necessary abilities to govern. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the 
electoral and party system before parliamentary reforms could be thought of 
Tenth, parliament is the communication link between the people and the government. 
It is necessary to establish a new rapport between the people and the parliament. The 
two must be brought closer to each other. Deliberate and concerted efforts are needed 
also at the professional level to rebuild parliament's image as the supreme institution 
of the people. The people should know what their representatives are doing for them. 
Better press and public relations job and image-building for parliament are legitimate 
£ind necessary and there should be no hesitation to use the latest tools and techniques 
for the purpose. The mass media - the radio, television, newspapers, films etc. -
should all be suitably harnessed to the service of parliament. These, particularly the 
print and electronic media, can play a vital role in building a healthy image of 
parliament. 
Eleventh, the quality and conduct of members is the most important variable in the 
working of any parliament inasmuch as a parliament would be what its members 
make of it. It is the primary duty of every member irrespective of his party 
affiliations to maintain and project a good image of parliament by his conduct both 
inside and outside the Houses of parliament. Members of important parliamentary 
committees need to lay down a strict code of conduct for themselves, never to ask the 
senior government officers appearing before the Committee for personal favours, 
avoid Committee tours unless necessary and never accept any gifts, dinners, free 
transport, five star hospitality and the like while on tours. 
Twelfth, the recent innovations of televising the Question Hour and other important 
debates would go a long way to bring parliament to the door-steps of the people. 
Even if the level of debate has not improved much, parliamentary politics has become 
more alive. Conscious of the fact of the people watching them, members find it 
difficult to be absent during the Question Hour. Also, they are better dressed and 
more carefiil about their behavior before the camera. But much remains to be done. 
To give a faithful and complete picture of what actually happens in the Houses of 
parliament, it is necessary to telecast nationally other important debates live. The 
edited version becomes stale, ceases to be newsworthy and remains suspect for having 
omitted the most 'interesting' parts of the proceedings. Care also has to be taken to 
see that televising of proceedings does not turn some members into demagogues and 
mountebanks playing more and more to the gallery and to the vast number of viewers 
and listeners all over the country. 
Plan of the Study 
The study consists of five chapters, taking up the problem in some detail, not only 
from constitutional angle but from the view point of an ordinary citizen who keeps 
and expects the parliament to provide leadership in order to solve the myriad of 
problems that people are facing today. 
The first chapter is devoted to tracing the origin of parliament which naturally takes 
us to Great Britain where the parliamentary type of democracy originated. No study 
on parliamentary set-up can be completed without first understanding how the system 
operates in United Kingdom. Starting from the Anglo-Saxons, and through a 
chequered evolution, parliamentary system was established and has functioned so 
smoothly and successfiilly in that country that all other parliamentary democracies 
look towards it for guidance and precedents. The history of parliament which is more 
than a thousand years old is traced chronologically within the constraints of space. It 
also includes parts of parliamentary procedure and practices, conventions and a little 
focus on parliamentary privileges has also been made. The making of parliament in 
Britain today which includes its composition, qualifications, powers, functions, 
committee system, officers of the two Houses, have all been mentioned to help 
understand its working in this country. 
The second chapter is again based on the historical method as we can understand the 
present only by leaming about our past. Parliamentary institutions were not entirely 
new to the people of India when British came to India as traders and stayed on as 
rulers. The history of parliamentary institutions has been traced fi-om the yedic period 
%^ 
to the present. Some focus has also been made on the Constituent Assembly debates 
which ultimately resulted in choosing parliamentary set-up in this country. 
The third chapter is a chronological account of constitutional provisions regarding 
the working of parliament. This chapter also includes various provisions about 
procedure of law making, passage of the budget in the two houses, officers of the two 
Houses and the provisions regarding the powers of the President in relation to the 
parliament. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the working of parliament during the Nehru era. 
This has been done deliberately so that we may find the reasons of the decline of 
parliament, if any, that may be found in the past. If the traditions established in the 
initial years after the inauguration of parliament were undesirable or at variance with 
the ones found in U.K. then we may lay the responsibility of the present quagmire on 
its leaders or if the well established rules of procedure are openly flouted to bring 
down the standards of parliamentary democracy, then we may identify them. 
The fifth chapter is an attempt to study the working of India's parliament in post-
Nehru era. Why there has been a decline in parliamentary debates, what is the position 
of various other devices of parliament like the question hour, the response of ministers 
to question asked, interruptions by members during debates in successive parliaments, 
the position of presiding officers in controlling the members and maintaining the 
decorum in the House and such other questions are all dealt in great detail. This 
chapter also includes the results of some studies that were made to analysis the loss of 
time of parliament due to forced adjourrmients and disruptions by unruly behaviour of 
the members. This chapter can help the scholars in the field to make microscopic 
studies, both political and social of specific instances of un-parliamentary behaviour 
of members. 
Lastly, the study contains concluding remarks. An analysis has been made of what 
make people think and discuss about replacing the present parliamentary system by 
any other alternative system as they believe that this system has failed in this country. 
People's grievances are no longer find redressal through parliament, nor it functions 
anymore as a forum for discussion and deliberations, it also fails to control the 
government and its authoritarian tendencies, so it is argued, that we must admit that 
parliament is no longer suited to the genius of the people of India. 
At the end, detailed suggestions have been given in order to find solutions to the 
problems that are encountered while running the Indian parliament. This nation 
carmot succeed unless we are able to have confidence in our law makers that they will 
leave no stone unturned to work for the benefit of the people. We must always 
remember that the country needs a vibrant, robust and lively democracy that can only 
be provided by a fiinctioning parliament. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In modem governments, importance of the legislative function has greatly increased 
in direct proportion to the rising tide of democracy. The modem conception of 
legislation, which results from the growing political consciousness of the mass of 
people in whose collective interest most laws are now passed, has given the legislative 
organ a new democratic significance and, at the same time, raised questions as to the 
best means of making it do its work with the active consent of citizens. By democracy 
we mean that form of government in which the ruling power of a state is legally 
vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the community as a whole. 
Most of the civilized world was either a parliamentary or a presidential democracy at 
the time when India became independent. Since India had almost 200 years long 
history of British raj in the country, some kind of affinity and familiarity with the 
political system of the colonial power was bound to influence the decision of the 
people in choosing the future political system for themselves. In fact, the 
parliamentary system was already in existence when this decision was made. The 
Government of India Act of 1909, 1919 and 1935 were nothing but slow and gradual 
doses of parliamentary democracy induced into the country. In fact, the new 
Constitution, for many people, was an extension of the Government of India Act of 
1935. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 provided that the Constituent Assembly 
of each of the two Dominions would have unlimited power to frame and adopt any 
constitution and even to supersede Indian Independence Act itself without the need 
for any further legislation on the part of the British Parliament. The power of the 
dominion legislatures included the 'power to repeal or amend any such Act, Order, 
Rule or Regulation' in so far as it was part of the law of the Dominion. In pursuance 
of the Indian Independence Act, the Government of India Act 1935 was modified and 
adopted by the Governor General to make it the provisional Constitution of the 
Dominion, until some other provision was made by the Constituent Assembly. The 
Indian Independence Act was thus remarkable for the degree to which it assured 
continuity in political institutions. 
Nehru had already made up his mind about the kind of poHty that would be most 
suited to India's prevailing circumstances at the time of independence; nature of 
society, background and needs. He envisaged a representative parliamentary 
democracy with ministerial responsibility to parliament and an indirectly elected 
President as a constitutional head. The ideas of Nehru about future government in 
India were very clear. He played an enormous role in preparing the blue print of 
India's future political system. The Committee on principles of the Union 
Constitution headed by Nehru had put his basic ideas in the shape of a draft of the 
Constitution. When the report of this Committee was considered on 28 and 31 July 
1947, there was a general agreement with its proposal for the adoption of the 
parliamentary form of executive. 
The Constitution of India, for the first time gave to the country a full-fledged 
responsible government through the system of parliamentary democracy. However, 
the fi-amers of the Constitution did not follow the Westminster model or any other 
model blindly. It was basically a reflection of India's ownti past experience and was 
expected to have an organic growth on the native soil. A full-blooded parliamentary 
democracy was, no doubt, quite a new experience for the nation as a whole. 
The parliamentary form of government laid down by the Constitution had all the 
features of representative and deliberative institutions. Every act of the government 
could be debated, discussed, questioned and adjudicated. 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, is revered and respected by all 
not only because he was a great statesman but also as a builder of institutions. He had 
firm belief in representative democracy to tackle the morass of problems the country, 
as big as India, was facing at independence. He felt that full potential of the individual 
could be realized only in a democracy that could truly represent the people. Nehru 
realized and expressed complete faith in the maturity of people, so vital for the 
successful working of parliamentary institutions. Nehru felt that, in the ultimate 
analysis, every institution flourished because the people, who were concerned with it, 
were mature enough and were able to use it to their best advantage. He expressed his 
opinion about the working of parliamentary democracy during first decade of his 
tenure as prime minister in the following words: "this system of parliamentary 
government has eminently succeeded in this country and has not only succeeded in 
the particular way it has been functioning here, but it is spreading out into the villages 
and the multitude of our people that live in this country. It has succeeded not merely 
by copying other methods. We have indeed adopted some methods of some countries, 
but essentially we have tried to make them our own, and we have adopted them with 
such variations as suited our own genius, thus making this system of parliamentary 
government our own, something fitting the genius of India and the long traditions of 
India." 
Since the beginning of an independent India, the country has earned worldwide 
acclaim for sustenance of a vibrant parliamentary democracy. Parliament has also, to 
some extent, performed its role of providing a forum to people, of all shades and 
opinions, reasonably well because it is through the law making body that the people in 
a representative democracy hold the executive accountable. It is, no doubt, the most 
significant feature of parliamentary system of government. Actually speaking, the 
very character of parliament in our political system, its vast powers, and the devices 
like, the question hour, the zero hour, the various kinds of adjournment motions, no-
confidence motions, the committee system, are all aimed at facilitating the parliament 
to discharge the most important duty of ensuring the accoimtability of government to 
the people through their elected representatives. 
In order to discharge its duties, it is imperative that parliament is run smoothly in 
accordance with rules of procedure that have been devised to make it possible in an 
orderly maimer. Members have to ventilate people's grievances, draw the attention of 
the government towards the problems of the people and to do so, it is also a corollary 
that they conduct themselves with a sense of absolute responsibility, dignity, grace 
and decorum. 
However, people of late, are raising doubts about the feasibility of parliamentary 
system's survival in this coimtry. Statesmen, scholars, leaders and the like, are raising 
doubts about the desirability of continuing with parliamentary system and hence, are 
suggesting replacement of this type of democracy with some other alternative. People 
are thoroughly getting disgruntled with the working of parliament due to its various 
shortcomings, most importantly, its weakness in controlling the government and the 
degradation in its working. After more than half a century of our independence, we 
have reached a stage when questions are being asked about the utility and relevance of 
parliament in our constitutional set-up. It is being argued that confrontationist politics 
has taken over the country making the parliament ineffective. In a parliamentary 
system, obviously, when the government or executive fails to live up to the 
expectations of people, it is the parliament that faces the severest attack and criticism. 
Many people have started losing confidence in the various parliamentary devices. 
Question hour, so important in a vibrant parliamentary set-up, is getting side lined and 
being regarded as an avoidable luxury. The Speaker is often forced to adjourn the 
House due to uncontrolled and unruly behaviour of members, thereby, blocking the 
opportunities of members to raise important issues. Many important policies of 
government that should invite a full discussion in parliament are simply ignored or are 
very important legislations with far reaching consequences are passed without a 
semblance of a discussion. There have been instances where even the budget that is 
prepared for more than a billion people was passed without discussion, whatsoever. A 
recent study indicates that the budget session of the 14"^  Lok Sabha lost 73 hour (34 
percent of its scheduled time) due to frequent disruptions. Lok Sabha also lost 40 
percent of its time in the monsoon session in 2007 and only 11 bills out of 25 slotted 
for the session could be taken up. People are justifiably disillusioned as each minute 
of the session of parliament costs the exchequer about Rs. 26000. 
We cannot, however, say that the situation has deteriorated all of a sudden. Even 
during Nehru's last days in parliament, people had already started talking about 
decline in the standards of debates in both the Houses and the behaviour of some 
members started attracting disparagement and disillusionment began to set in. If we 
make an analysis of post-Nehru era, we will find that this downward trend has been 
very gradual. Each passing year, new standards are set for lowering the prestige of 
parliamentary debates, violation of the rules of procedure, decorum of the House and 
the way its members carry themselves inside the Houses of the country's legislature. 
This work is primarily aimed at studying the working of parliament in the post Nehru 
era. The topic has been chosen in order to find out the differences in the functioning 
of parliament and its different institutional devices in the period post-Nehru period 
under both congress and non-congress leaders as prime ministers. In order to study the 
actual behaviour of members of parliament, it was necessary to sift through enormous 
amounts of parliamentary debates spanning long periods of time. A number of studies 
have been done of the Nehru period but the decline in the working of parliament has 
not really been studied much from the angle of how things have deteriorated after 
Nehru, so alarmingly. 
The study consists of five chapters, taking up the problem in some detail, not only 
from constitutional angle but also from the viewpoint of an ordinary citizen who 
keeps and expects the parliament to provide leadership in order to solve the myriad of 
problems that people are facing today. 
The first chapter is devoted to tracing the origin of parliament which naturally takes 
us to Great Britain where the parliamentary type of democracy originated. No study 
on parliamentary set-up can be completed without first understanding how the system 
grew and now operates in United Kingdom. Starting from the Anglo-Saxons, and 
through a chequered evolution, parliamentary system evolved and has flourished so 
successfully in that country that all other parliamentary democracies look towards it 
both for guideince and precedents. The history of parliament which is more than a 
thousand years old is traced chronologically keeping in view the constraints of space. 
It also includes parts of parliamentary procedure and practices, conventions and a 
little focus on parliamentary privileges has also been made. The making of parliament 
in Britain today which includes its composition, qualifications, powers, functions, 
committee system, officers of the two Houses, have all been mentioned to help 
understand its working in this country. 
The second chapter is again based on the historical method, as we can understand the 
present only by learning about our past. Parliamentary institutions were not entirely 
new to the people of India when British came to India as traders and stayed on as 
rulers. The history of parliamentary institutions has been traced from the vedic period 
to the present. Some light has also been thrown on the Constituent Assembly debates 
which ultimately resulted in choosing parliamentary set-up in this country. 
The third chapter is a chronological account of constitutional provisions regarding the 
working of parliament. This chapter also includes various provisions about procedure 
of law making, passage of the budget in the two houses, officers of the two Houses 
and the provisions regarding the powers of the President in relation to the parliament. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the working of parliament during the Nehru era. This 
has been done deliberately so that we may find the reasons of the decline of 
parliament, if any, that may be found in the past. If the traditions established in the 
initial years after the inauguration of parliament were undesirable or at variance with 
the ones found in the United Kingdom then we may lay the responsibility of the 
present quagmire on the leaders of that era or if the well established rules of 
procedure are openly flouted today which is the reason why there is a definite 
deterioration in the standards of parliamentary democracy, then we may identify the 
factors responsible for it. 
The fifth chapter is an attempt to study the working of India's parliament in post-
Nehru era. Why there has been a decline in parliamentary debates, what is the position 
of various other devices of parliament procedures like the question hour, the response 
of ministers to questions asked, interruptions by members during debates in 
successive parliaments, the position of presiding officers in controlling the members 
and maintaining the decorum in the House and such other questions are all dealt in 
great detail. This chapter also includes the results of some studies that were made to 
analysis the loss of time of parliament due to forced adjournments and disruptions by 
the unruly behaviour of the members. This chapter can help the scholars in the field to 
make microscopic studies, both political and social of specific instances of un-
parliamentary behaviour of members. 
Lastly, the study contains concluding remarks. An analysis has been made of what 
make people think and talk about replacing the present parliamentary system by any 
alternative system as they believe; the parliamentary has failed in this country. 
People's grievances are no longer finding redress through parliament, it does not 
function as a forum for discussion and deliberations, it fails to control the government 
and its authoritarian tendencies, so it is argued that we must admit that parliament is 
no longer suited to the genius of the people of India. 
At the end a few suggestions have been given in order to offer some solutions to the 
causes of the decline of parliament and the problems that are encountered while 
running it. This nation cannot succeed unless we are able to have some amount of 
confidence in our lawmakers that they will leave no stone unturned to work for the 
benefit of the people. We must always remember that the country needs a vibrant, 
robust and lively democracy that can only be provided by a functioning parliament. 
At the end of the thesis, a bibliography is provided which includes not only those 
books and material that were consulted during the course of the work but also the 
ones that exist but could not be consulted for a variety of reasons. Any bibliography, 
however exhaustive, would always remain incomplete as there is no dearth of 
material, especially on a topic as vibrant and popular as this, but it has been our 
endeavour to include whatever was possible within our limitations. 
We hope this work would throw some light on the working of parliamentary 
democracy in India and be useful for scholars in the field. 
In the end, I would like to say that this work has been the outcome of the efforts of a 
number of people but any mistakes or shortcomings in it are entirely mine. 

Chapter I 
PARLIAMENT: A BRITISH ORIGIN 
Among the most significant features of British political traditions has been the ability 
of the leaders to create and maintains the necessary political institutions that in turn 
became a model for the world. Of particular importance was the establishment of the 
parliamentary form of government that has the merits to be counted among the most 
recent framework of rule under which the country is governed, with a considerable 
measure of responsibility to the people of the country concerned. It is in this backdrop 
that this chapter primarily aims to deal with, specially, the origin and functioning of 
parliament in Britain in order to understand its true parliamentary legacies which 
extend back to more than two centuries in India and influenced its post-independence 
course in a number of complex ways. Therefore in this chapter, we shall sketch a brief 
historical sxorvey of the parliamentary practices in Great Britain, from which we 
proceed to second chapter to examine its implications for India. 
A fundamental question guiding our study is what do we exactly mean by parliament. 
Etymologically, the term parliament, derived from the French word-par/er, means to 
'speak' or 'parley', and more impressive Latin word- parliamentum was used loosely 
to denote a conversation, a parley, or an interview.' In this context parliament stands 
for a body or place where two opposite parties can interact and converse to each other 
on various issues. The thirteenth century French writer, de Jonesville (the knight who 
wrote a chronicle of his king, Louis IX), uses the parliament in three ways: of an 
informal gathering of the barons; of a judicial session of the king's court; and 
quaintly, even of a tryst between the young king and his queen Marguerite, which 
took place on a secluded stairway in the palace at Pontoise to escape the dominating 
presence of the Queen Mother Blanche!^ It was the noted English chronicler Matthew 
Paris of St. Albans who first applied the term to a great council of prelates, earls, and 
" Faith Thompson, A Short History of Parliament, 1295-1642 (University of Minnesota Press 1953) 
^ Cf., Ibid. 
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barons, in 1239 and again inl246.^ From that time onwards it was used increasingly, 
though not exclusively, for such an assembly. In contemporary usage parliament 
stands for an elected assembly, responsible for passing legislation and granting 
government the right to levy taxes. Typically, it combines the role of a legislature 
along with providing personnel to the government, thus fusing legislature and 
executive in a system of parliamentary government. The head of the government and 
members of the cabinet chosen from amongst the majority groupings in parliament are 
duly obliged to be accountable to parliament, accepting the principles of collective 
and individual responsibility which apply respectively to cabinet and ministers. How 
did parliament come into existence? On this question there are as many opinions as 
there are scholars. The distinctive features of its origin may be explained by reference 
to the development of the British parliament in varying historical context. In tracing 
the origin of parliament, we have to trace the steps by which these elements were 
introduced and probable reasons for the iimovation. 
Historical Roots of British Parliament: 
The evolution of parliament was complex and long. One may trace the origin of 
parliament to the times of the Anglo-Saxons. The Anglo-Saxon Kings were advised 
by a council known as the Witenagemot'', an aristocratic body whose foremost 
"members were the King, the eldermen or governors of shires, the king's thegns, the 
bishops, abbots, and generally the principes and sapientes of the kingdom^. The King 
still possessed ultimate authority, but laws were made only after seeking the advice 
(and, in later times, the consent) of the Witenagemot.*" The functions of the Witen 
were not clearly defined. It performed such functions as the king wished it to be. It 
could depose the king in case he acted arbitrarily and enthrone a king not related to 
royal family. The Witenagemot "was also the king's council and gave him advice on 
' Ibid. 
* "Witenagemot, the court of wise man, and the name undoubtedly indicates the principle of its 
composition. Its membership was not official nor designated in any way that we should call 
constitutional in the modem sense." See George B. Adams, Constitutional History of England, revised 
by Robert L. Schuyler, (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1953), p. 14 
' Theodore F. T. Plucknett, English Constitutional History: From the Teutonic Conquest to Present 
Time, Eleventh Edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1960), p. 18. 
* "....his power was subordinate to the customs of his people, he could touch no freeman's heritage or 
life without a process at law, which gave the freeman the right of defending his cause before his fellow 
freeman; he could make no law without his people's deliberate consent; he habitually acted by the 
advice of his counselors and Wiseman, who formed his privy council as it were." See Ibid., p.l 1 
questions of policy and of action in particular cases, like a modern cabinet council, 
thuogh without independent power of decision unless there was no king or a 
powerless king"7 It cosciously represented the nation in any action which it took, is 
highly improbable. "It spoke for itself, for the class which its members constituted, 
and there was no one else in the nation whose opuiion was of any consequence."* It is 
in this sense its voice was the voice of the nation. Although it "was not a 
representative body in the modem sense, it was unquestionably looked upon as 
representing in some sort the whole people, and consequently the national will"'. 
Thus, it can be rightly said that the Witenagemot had the merit to be regarded as the 
prototype of modem parliament. 
The entire Anglo-Saxon body politic was reformed when William of Normandy 
conquered England in 1066. In this period, the king was weak so the first task which 
had been taken up by William to make the king the real master was that he brought to 
England the feudal system he was accustomed to in his native France. Thus, he 
granted land to his most important military supporters, who in turn granted land to 
their supporters, thus creating a feudal hierarchy. Those who held lands directly from 
the King were known as tenants-in-chief, and the territories they held were called 
manors'°. William I was an absolute mler, but, as a matter of course, he summoned 
the Curia Regis thrice a year at regular intervals to seek their advice before making 
laws. Although these meetings bore a close resemblance to those of the national 
assembly of the Anglo-Saxon period, they were in fact essentially different. "The term 
Curia Regis, in its widest signification, seems to have denoted the National, Common, 
or Great Council of the Realm-the Witenagemot in its feudalized form-at the three 
fold sessions of which the bishops and earls and all tenants-in-chief had the right of 
attending.'^ The principle of elective membership was not being followed. In addition 
to its political function of giving "counsel and consent" to legislative changes and 
other acts of national import, the Curia, in its judicial aspect, was invested with the 
'ibid., p. 15 
' Ibid. 
' Theodore F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., p.l8 
10 
For more details see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_the_United_Kingdom 
" See Plucknett, op.cit., p. 41 
'^  See Coleman Phillipson, English Constitutional History: From the Teutonic Conquest to Present 
Time, Eighth Edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1919), p. 132. 
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old appellate jurisdiction of the Witenagemot, and with a direct jurisdiction as the 
feudal court of the king's vassala, in all disputes between the tenants in capite.'^ 
It is evident that in "the first half of John's reign the country was decently governed. 
But then John casts off all restraints, becomes involved in a great quarrel with the 
church, in another with the baronage, unites the whole nation against him"''', and at 
length on June 15, 1215, they forced him to grant the great charter popularly known as 
the Magna Carta. From the view point of the evolution of the British parliament, the 
Magna Carta is a document of utmost importance. It was certainly "the first attempt 
ever made in history to put into constitutional form the principle that the government 
must obey the fundamental laws of the state..."'^ On the whole, the Great Charter laid 
down two fundamental principles which have an all time relevence. First that there 
exist in the state certain laws so necessarily at the basis of the political organisation of 
the time that the king, or we should say today the government, must obey them; and 
second that, if the government refuses to obey these laws, the nation has the right to 
force it to do so, even to the point of overthrowing the government and putting 
another in its place'^. Gradually, the idea of what the national assembly should be was 
undergoing a change. It was ceasing to be that of a feudal assemly of barons, it was 
becoming that of an assembly of the three estates of the realm-clergy, lords and 
commons; the summoning of knights of the shire in 1254, and of representative 
burgesses in 1264 were the greatest landmark'^. Meanwhile the representative 
principle was growing. But representation does not necessarily imply election by the 
represented; representatives may be chosen by a public officer or by lots.'^ 
It is generally considered that the first step in the continuous evolution of parliament 
was taken in 1254.The king had gone to Gascony and was in sore need of money; the 
regents, his wife and brother, summoned a great council to Wesminster. 
Representatives of the counties, representatives elected by the counties are summoned 
not merely to asses, but to grant an aid; there is to be no dealing with each county 
'^  Ibid. 
' ' 'F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1955), p. 14. 
'^  George Burton Adams, Constitutional History of England, revised and reprinted, Robert L. Schuyler, 
1951 (London: Thirty Bedford Square), p. 138 
"*Ibid. 
'^' F.W. Maitland, op.cit., p.l7 
"lbid.p.71 
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separetely; all are to meet together arid to provide together.'' Here we must reckon 
this case as a step in the formation of parliament. The next advance in this direction 
was taken by Simon de Montfort, 6th Earl of Leicester, in 1264 and 1265. He called 
the famous parliament of 1265 which contained all the constituent elements of the 
historical English parliament, lords, county members, and borough members.'^ ^ The 
iimovation of Simon de Montfort in "calling to the central assembly elected 
representatives of boroughs, completed the formation of the national parliament on 
substantially the basis which it has ever since retained."'^' De Montfort's scheme was 
formally adopted by Edward I in the so-called "Model Parliament" of 1295. 
Undoubtedly, it was the culmination of past thirty five years progress. It was however 
an unusually complete representation of all classes in the nation. At first, each estate 
debated independently; by the reign of Edward III, however, parliament had been 
separated into two Houses: one, included the nobility and higher clergy, the other, 
included the knights and burgesses. The authority of parliament grew under Edward 
III; it was established that no law could be made, nor any tax levied, without the 
consent of both Houses as well as of the Sovereign^^. 
It is important to note here that the long period of sixty year reigns from Henry IV to 
Henry VI, parliament's authority was unquestioned. Their natural inclination seemed 
to be, so far as we can judge it, to rule in harmony with parliament. It was a period of 
unbroken constitutional government. The operation of constitutional government, 
the supremacy of parliament, the doing of all sort of things by parliamentary action 
became, to a degree in so long a period, things of habit, and this habit of 
parliamentary authority, formed a solid substratum of constitutional right underlying 
all the superficial reaction of the next century. It was therefore, parliament from 
1399 to 1460 was busy about the establishment of the so-called privileges of 
parliament: freedom of debate; the freedom of members from arrest; the rights of the 
house of commons as distinguished from the upper house to originate taxation, to 
determine the qualifications of members, and to discipline and punish members and 
" See Ibid, p.72 
"^ G.B. Adams, op.cit., pp. 177-179 
'^ F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., p.l35 
^^  For more details see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_the_United_Kingdom 
^^  G.B. Adams, op.cit., p. 218 
^* Ibid., p.222 
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disrespectful outsiders; the regulation of the right of suffrage in the counties; the 
extention of the principle of appropriations ; and improvement of the process of 
legislation.^^ 
Parliamentary Developments under the Tudors 
The Tudor period is almost synchronous with the sixteenth century, an age 
remarkable for its material prosperity, and for its intellectual and religious activity. 
Medieval conditions had passed away. It is no wonder that in sixteenth century, the 
growth of constitution and the limited monarchy was practically suspended. The 
parliamentary institutions passed through a season of trial. But why they did not 
perish here was partly due to the Lancastrian tradition which the Tudors to some 
extent inherited. The Tudor sovereign found it easier to get what he wanted done with 
the help of parliament than do away with parliament. At other times, especially 
towards the beginning of the period, parliament was thrown somewhat into the 
background and long intervals were allowed to pass between its sessions. But under 
these entire varying conditions parliament was used. Tlje constitution in the matter of 
parliamentary powers and functions at least was kept in operation.^* 
Although some essential features of parliament remained the same, as the sixteenth 
century wore on, changes and adaptations there were, for the most part of a gradual 
evolutionary character: (1) Changes in membership-the reduction of the number of 
spiritual lords in the upper House, due of course to the dissolution of monastries 
(1536-1539), and in the Commons a great increase in numbers, and secondly 
"quality". (2) A change in the relative importance of the two Houses. The House of 
Lords never recovered the relative importance in parliament which it lost during the 
fourteenth century. (3) A change in effective leadership by King and Council. The 
Tudor Councils were better staffed and organised, and engaged in more activities-
figuratively they had a finger in every pie. (4) An elaborations of the rules of 
procedure and debate, with Journals for recording day-to-day procedure in both the 
Houses. (5) And lastly, more modem theories as to parliament's powers and 
^' Ibid.; for more details see J.E.A.JoUiffe, The Constitutional History of Medieval England: From the 
English Settlement to 1485, 3"* ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1954), pp. 430-495 
*^ Ibid., pp. 240-243 
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privileges, supplied, in part by the lawyers and writers of treatises, in part by Puritan 
zeal." 
Parliaments continued to behave submissively under the Tudor monarchs who 
followed Henry VII, but began to display an unusual sense of independence under 
Elizabeth I. The reign of Elizabeth I is marked by conflict between royal supremacy 
and parliamentary assertions. Despite the fact, "the House set up an enlarged 
conception of its freedom of speech, which it construed as meaning a freedom to 
initiate debates and to propose legislation on any matter what so ever."^* The reviving 
"independence of the House of Commons under the Tudor sovereign, especially 
during the reign of Elizabeth, is further evidenced in the case with which the peculiar 
privileges and immunities of parliament were from time to time vindicated."^^ 
Elizabeth won practical victories at the expense of recognising theoretical powers and 
privileges of her parliaments. 
Long ago parliament had taken the shape familiar to us, an assembly consisting of two 
Houses which sit, debate, and vote apart—the one containing the Lords, spiritual and 
temporal, the other all the representatives of Commons. 
Composition of the Lords: 
Over the composition of parliament, the Crovvnn exerted increasing influence. The lay 
lords, a group of hereditary peers, normally fluctuated around fifty. There were a few 
new creations by letters patent, but on a modest scale. Henry VII created only five, 
Henry VIII about twenty in the first thirty years of his reign. The chief change was the 
reduction in the number of spiritual lords, due of course to the dissolution of the 
monastries (1536-1539)—no monastry, no abbot.'' This left the two archbishops and 
the eighteen bishops, raised to twenty four by the creation of new bishoperics. The 
number of abbots had sunk to 27. The inferior clergy were summoned by means of the 
praemunientes clause, but they had systematically refrained from attending.^' With 
the disappearence of the abbots, the bishop became more important for they had long 
been in substance, royal nominees. 
^' See for more details Faith Thompson, op.cit., pp.142-155; G.B. Adams, op.cit., pp.240-264; F.T. 
Plucknett, op.cit., pp. 228-255 
*^ F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., p. 312 
^'Ibid., p. 319 
'" See Faith Thompson, op.cit., pp. 145-146 
" See for more details Maitland, op.cit., p. 166 
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The lords temporal were now divided into various ranks. It included earls and barons; 
and above the earls there were marquesses and dukes, and between the earls and 
barons there were viscounts. These titles were at first used in order to give some 
nobleman precedence over his fellows. Though these diginities were legally 
unimportant, but had an important effect on the usual mode of creating peers. 
Originally pares only meant equals. A new significance was given to the term by a 
principle, namely, that a man's pares were those who, standing on the same level with 
him, were competent to be his judges-the body of judges was the pares curiae, the 
body of peers which sat in the court in question. Ultimately the lords got a right to 
trial by lords in case of treason and felony; if they are to be tried for any lesser crime, 
any misdemeaner, the king's justice shall try them, and all there civil litigation came 
before the king's justices. It was not the only privilege of peerage. They had enjoyed 
the freedom from arrest in the case of debt. The sons and daughters of lords had the 
first been commoners during their father's life time, and on his death only his hier 
became entitled to any legal privileges.^^ 
Composition of the Commons: 
In the composition of the Commons, changes were two fold: (1) a great increase in 
numbers, and (2) in the type of member a virtual reversal in the proportion of true 
burgesses to country gentlemen. HenryVIII's first House of Commons numbered 298 
members; Elizabeth's first, 398; and at the accession of James I the number was 467. 
Twenty- seven of the newcomers are accounted for by Henry VIII's grant of 
representation to Wales and to the border shires of Monmouth and Chester, their two 
knights each. The rest came from the newly created parliamentary boroughs. In 
Tudor England, the shire, or the county as it was more commonly called, was the unit 
of local government. By statute the sheriff must hold an election^^ at the first county 
court after receipt of the parliamentary writ. Here, the representatives were to be 
elected in the full county court. There were 37 counties returning two members 
^^  Ibid. pp. 166-172 
' ' See Faith Thompson, op.cit., p. 146 
^* "Henry VIII added 14 borough seats (besides the Welsh ones), Edward VI's advisers 34, Mary 25 
and Elizabeth 62. Thus the 224 borough members of Henry VIII's first parliament became the 308 of 
Elizabeth's first and the 372 of her last, and by the close of the century the House was half as large 
again as it had been at the beginning." See S. T .Bindoff, Tudor England, (Pelican books, 1950), p. 215 
' See for account of electors, elected and election in this period J. E. Neale, Elizabethan House of 
Commons, (London, 1949) 
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apiece. From 1430 to the next four centuries, the electors were to be persons resident 
in the county, each of whom should have free hold to the value of 40 shillings per 
annum, at the least, above all charges. Generally the persons identified to be chosen 
were the knights of the shire or notable squires, gentlemen of birth, capable of 
becoming knights; no man of the degree of yeoman or below was to be elected. The 
number of knights of the shire was constant, that of the citizens and burgesses 
fluctuated, and diminishing pretty steadily as time went on.'^ ^ The interference of the 
Crown in elections was exerted in the most open manner. In 1553 Edward VI directed 
a circular letter to all sheriffs, "that our pleasure and commandment is, that they shall 
choose and appoint, as nigh as they possibly may, men of knowledge and experience 
within their counties, cities, and boroughs." In the third election of parliament in 
1554, Queen Mary did writs to the sheriffs include the admonition to choose men "of 
T O 
the, grave, and Catholic sort." 
The Speakers: 
The Speakers of the Commons during this period continued to rise in importance. As 
we have seen in earlier days, it was an advantage to the House to have a Speaker 
acceptable to the monarch and not impossible to secure on like Sir Arnold Savage, 
persona grata, to both Crown and Commons. By an Act of 1515 members of the 
Commons were forbidden to depart "except they have licence of the Speaker and 
Commons in the said parliament assembled ..." It could hereby noted, the beginning 
of that characteristic relationship whereby the Commons controlled their own 
members through the Speaker. It could hardly have been foreseen in 1515 that in the 
end the Speaker would cease to be a royal supervisor and become in effect the 
impersonation of the House's independence. 
Frequency and Duration of Parliaments: 
Such then was the parliament, but had parliaments been frequently and regularly 
held? Here, the frequency of parliaments was practically secured by the king's need of 
money. Notwithstanding, for the last two centuries parliaments had, as a matter of 
*^ See for more details Maitland, op.cit., pp. 172-177 
" Cf Plucknett, op.cit., p. 244 
•** Cf Faith Thompsoa op.cit., p. 147 
" F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., p. 246 
*" Ibid., pp. 245-247 
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fact, been very frequent, though their frequency had somewhat decreased of late 
years. Throughout his reign of twenty-four years Henry VII summoned parliament 
only seven times, and during the last thirteen years only once, in 1504. To obtain 
money was the object on each occasion."*' In a reign of nearly thirty-eight years Henry 
VIII svmimoned nine parliaments. The first sat for only a month and the sixth for 
nearly six weeks; the others held two or three sessions lasting about a month or six 
weeks each. The Reformation Parliament was exceptional in having eight sessions 
between its assembly on November 4, 1529, and its dissolution on April 14, 1536 
(although there was no session in the years 1530 and 1535). Its nearest rival in 
longevity so far was the long parliament of Edward IV whose seven sessions extented 
from October 1472 to November 1475. There were numerous instances of a whole 
year passing without a parliamentry session. Edward VI had annual sessions of his 
first parliament (save for one interval of nearly two years), and Mary's looks almost 
medieval with its five parliaments holding seven sessions in a reign of five years. 
Elizabeth reverted to the practice of Henry VIII.''^ In this context, Maitland rightly 
argues, that "the long parliaments of Henry VIII, Elizabeth I and James I, no doubt 
had very important results-not only did they educate the Commons to act together, 
but they familiarised the nation with the notion of parliament as of a permanent entity, 
in which the sovereignty of the realm might be vested."'*^ The principles which at the 
present day make it indispensably necessary that parliament should sit in every year 
were not in force. 
Parliamentary Procedure: 
It is during the period with which we are now dealing that the great outline of 
parliamentary procedure as we now know them, were drawn- practice of reading bills 
three times, and the like. The classification of bills remained unchanged. There were 
public bills, those general in application and "serving the commonwealth as a whole"; 
subsidy bills (called indentures or indentured schedules); and general pardons. Private 
bills were, as in earlier days, concemed with individual or sectional interests—the 
bills of singular persons, guilds and companies, cities and boroughs. Public bills could 
originate with the government, with individual members, or with committees 
'^ Ibid., p. 228 
"^  Ibid. pp. 242-243 
"' F.W. Maitland, op.cit., p. 250 
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appoined by the House as the result of a motion. Private bills were too handled as 
were public bills and consumed much time. The Crown, of cource, could still assent 
to or refuse bills at will, but could no longer add provisoes. Legislative procedure was 
becoming more precise. The Speaker determined the order in which bills were read. 
The practice of three readings, established in the course of Elizabeth's reign worked 
as follows. There was usually no debate on the first reading; it was the means by 
which the contents of the bill were disclosed to the House. Two or three days elapsed 
to permit time to digest and reflect. The second reading, followed by debate, might 
lead to immediate acceptance and rejection, or more likely reference to a committee. 
The report from committee, together with amendments, was brought back to the 
House for the second reading, and if passed, engrossment. Final passage followed two 
or three days later on the third reading. Bills originating in the Lords passed through 
the same process. The differences between the Houses were compromised in joint 
conferences.'*'' Each House had to manage its own affairs; there was no legislation as 
to its procedure, but gradually precedents were formed and respected and a mass of 
traditional rules was the outcome. In the sixteenth century, it had become the rule that 
the proxy must himself be a member of the House. In the House of Lords proxies 
were admitted. This privilege of appointig a proxy seems never to have been extended 
to members of the lower House. Another, the practice of Lords dissent from the action 
of the House exercised the right of entering formal protest upon its Journals. Thre was 
no similer practice in the Commons being identified. Each House conducted its 
business in privacy; the king, however, occasionally visited the House of Lords, and 
made speeches there; a throne was set for him there, but his presence was not 
necessary, and in practice had become a somewhat rare event.''^ 
Parliamentary Privileges: 
The right of each House to debate freely and without interference from the king or 
fi-om the other house had been admitted and observed"^. Another privilege of 
parliament that despite the freedom of arrest for words spoken in the House, they 
claimed a general immunity from the ordinary law.''^  Connected with these matters 
** See for more details Faith Thompson, op.cit., pp. 148-150 
••'See F.W. Maitland, op.cit., p. 248 
*^ See for more details F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., pp. 247-249 
"' Ibid. pp.249-250;pp. 319-322 
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was the power of each House to punish persons (whether they be members of it or 
not) for a contempt.'** Judicial functions continued to belong to the House of Lords. 
Representatives of the Commons never gained a share in the judicial work of the 
parliament. Under Elizabeth and James the Lords and commons were said to grant the 
money-more frequently the commons were said to grants with the consent of the 
Lords. In the first parliament of Charles I we get the formula that an act was passed 
which recited that the commons had granted a tax, and then it was enacted by the 
king, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal in 
parliament assembled and by the authority of the same, that the tax be imposed. It was 
not until after the restoration that the commons began to contend that the lords can 
make no alteration in a money bill, but must simply accept it, or simply reject it. It 
was in 1586 the commons, in opposition to the Queen, definitely insisted that it was 
for them to inquire into the circumtances of a disputed election-and from this time 
forward they frequently exercised this function. 
Relation of the King to Parliament: 
We now look at the relation of the king to the parliament in this period. Here, there is 
no doubt that the parliaments of the Tudor reigns, more specially those of Henry 
VIII's reign, were extremely submissive, practically Henry could get them to do what 
he wanted. It is only towards the end of our period that parliament again begins to act 
as an independent check upon the king, to assert a will of its ovm; the parliaments of 
the Elizabeth grumble, the parliaments of James I more than once resist him and 
defeat him. How it came about that the earlier parliaments had been so very tractable, 
it is hardly for us to inquire, for this question lies beyond the legal domain. But what 
does demand our notice is that this very tractability of parliaments serves in the end to 
save and to strengthen the parliamentary constitution; parliament is so tractable that 
the king is very willing that king in parliament should be recognised as supreme-it 
strengthens his hands that what he does should be the act of whole nation. Now look 
at the royal succession. Thrice over during Henry's reign was the succession arranged 
by the act of parliament. Thus there were important precedents that the parliament had 
repeatedly and successfully regulated the succession to the throne. Another 
"" Ibid. pp. 322-323 
"' See F.W. Maitland, op.cit., pp. 240-248 
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tractability of parliaments and theocratic supremacy of king in parliament is afforded 
by an act of parliament of 1539, which has been called the Lex Regia of England. It is 
by this act power was given to the kings to make proclamations with the advice of his 
coimcil to make proclamations which should have the force of statutes. This act was 
repealed in the first year of Edward VI. Its enactment and repeal distinctly confirm 
the doctrine that the king is not supreme, king and parliament are supreme ; statute is 
distinctly above ordinance or proclamations ; statute may give to the king a 
subordinate legislative power, and what one statute has given another statute may take 
away^° 
The greatest contribution of the sixteenth century and Tudor reign was thus the 
parliament and its position in the state. As a contemporary estimate of the place of 
parliament, a passage from Sir Thomas Smith's Commonwealth of England, published 
in 1589, to which special attention has been called by Maitland, may be quoted: "The 
most high and absolute power of the realm of England consisteth in the 
parliament....That which is done by this consent is called firm, stable and sanctum, 
and is taken for law. The parliament abrogateth old laws, maketh new, giveth orders 
for things past and for things hereafter to be followed, changeth rights and possessions 
of private men, legitimateth bastards, establisheth forms of religion, altereth weights 
and measures, giveth forms of succession to the crown, defmeth of doubtful rights, 
whereof is no law already made, appointeth subsidies, tailes, taxes, and impositions, 
giveth most free pardons and absolutions, restoreth in blood and name as the hieghest 
court, condemneth or absolveth them whom the prince will put to that trial. And to be 
short, all that ever the people of Rome might do either in centuriatis comitiis or 
tributis, the same may be done by the parliament of England which representeth and 
hath the power of the whole realm, both the head and body. For every Englishman is 
intented to be there present, either in person or by procuration and attorneys, of what 
preeminence, state, diginity or quality soever he be, from the prince, be he king or 
queen to the lowest person of the England. And the consent of the parliament is taken 
to be every man's consent."^' 
'"ibid., pp. 251-256 
" Ibid. p. 255 
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Parliamentary Developments under the Stuarts 
We move on to an exciting phase to the Stuarts period, from James I to the sombre 
accession of Queen Arme, to trace the developments in the evolution of British 
parliament. This period is marked by the chronological sequence of great events-
Rebellion, Restoration and Revolution. The basic aim is not to deal with these great 
events, but to trace consequences of these great events in the context of the evolution 
of British parliament. Although parliament was fettered, it was nevertheless a 
vigorous and living institution, which all through the eighteenth century maintained a 
genuine political activity, of which no better proof can be found than the numerous 
occasions upon which it attempted to reform itself. In the early seventeenth century 
parliament was less an institution than an event: it was convened when the king 
sought the aid of his subjects in the process of creating new laws or to provide 
extraordinary revenue. Like everything else in English society, parliament was 
constitued in a hierarchy, composed of king, lords and commons. Every peer of the 
realm was personally summoned to sit in House of Lords, which was dominated by 
the greatest of the king's officers. The lower House was composed of representatives 
selected from the counties and boroughs of the nation. The House of Commons was 
growing as local communities petitioned for the right to be represented in parliament 
and local gentry scrambled for the prestige of being chosen. It had 464 members in 
1604 and 507, forty years later. Although there were elaborate regulations governing 
as to who could choose and who could be chosen, in fact very few members of the 
House of Commons were selected competitively. Contests for places were 
uncommon, and elections in which individual votes were cast were extremely rare. 
Members of parliament served the dual function of representing the views of the king 
to the localities. Most were members of royal government, either at court or in their 
local communities, and nearly all had responsility for enforcing the laws that were 
created at Westminster. Most parliaments were summoned to provide revenue in 
times of emergency, usually for defence, and most members were willing to provide it 
within appropriate limits. They came to parliament to do the king's business, the 
business of their communities, and their own personal business in London. Such 
conflicting obligations were not always easily resolved, but parliament was not 
'^ See The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol.29,1993. p. 54 
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perceived as an institution in opposition to the king any more than the stomach was 
seen as opposing the head of the body. Upsets there were, and increasingly during the 
seventeenth century king and parliament clashed over specific issues, but untill the 
middle of the century they were part of one system of royal government." 
Frequency and Duration of Parliament: 
The duration and intermission of parliament has been the subject of important 
legislative enactments in the period since the Revolution. Let us now deal with the 
frequency of parliaments in this period. It is important first to notice certain features, 
commonplace today but novel in that age: the emergence of political parties; a virtual 
party caucus between parliaments; an electioneering campaign; the scene of London 
as "the workshop of the Revolution"; and, with London's help, the manipulation of 
forces.^ "* Under the twenty-two years reign of James I (1603-1625), parliamentary 
elections were held four times. The first parliament, by the device of proroguing, met 
in five sessions, 1604-1611. The second was the futile assembly of 1614, aptly named 
the Addled Parliament. Then followed six years of no parliaments in which James 
tried his preference for one-man government and king craft. The third parliament met 
in two sessions, 1621, and the last in 1624.^^The first fifteen months of Charles I's 
reign saw two parliaments successively summoned and abruptly dissolved. The first 
parliament of Charles I met in 1625, the second in 1626, and the third in 1628. The 
third parliament sat a second time in 1629.^ ^ To its first session we owe the Petition of 
Rights.^'' Then for hard on eleven years there is no parliament. The fourth parliament 
met in 1640 and was dissolved in less than a month. On 24 September 1640 Charles 
had recourse to a magnum concilium of peers held at York. The king got nothing from 
it, save advice to summon a parliament. At the end of 1640 a parliament was 
CO 
summoned which is popularly known as Long parliament. The Long parliament 
remained in legal being for twenty years that it was never lawfully dissolved until in 
1660 a statute of the Convention Parliament of Charles II declared its dissolution. It 
was a parliament with a rich and varied heritage of practices, privileges, and 
" Ibid. pp. 54-55 
'"Faith Thompson, op.cit., p. 259 
" Ibid., p. 205 
'* Ibid., pp. 241-253 
" Ibid., p. 248 
' ' Ibid., pp. 254-269; F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., pp. 393-420 
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precedents. Charles's second parliament met in 1661 and was dissolved in 1678, 
having thus sat between seventeen and eighteen years. During this time it held sixteen 
sessions. Charles's third and fourth parliament held in the year of 1679. The fifth and 
last is the Oxford parliament sat in 1681 for a week and was then dissolved.^' Having 
dissolved the Oxford parliament in 1681, Charles ruled for the remainder of his reign 
without a parliament, in spite of the Triennial Act. James II held but one parliament in 
1685 and was prorogued in the same year but was not dissolved until 1687. The 
Convention of 1689, become the first parliament of the William and Mary. One of the 
clauses of the Declaration of Rights^" incorporated in the Bill of Rights declared that 
for redress of grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of the 
laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently. The second parliament met on 20 May 
1690, held six sessions, and was dissolved in the autumn of 1695. Meanwhile it had 
passed Triennial Act. This act repeated what was already law, namely, that a 
parliament shall be holding once in three years at least, but against long parliaments; 
no parliament is to endure for more than three years.^' William had rejected this 
Triennial Act in 1693. This is one of the last instances of the royal assent being 
withholding. It remained in force until the Septennial Act was passed in 1716.^ ^ 
William's third parliament sat in 1695 and continued to 1700. A fourth met in 1701, 
and was in existence on 3 March 1702, when the king died. Shortly before William's 
death in 1696, an act had been passed which described that if the present king dies 
when there is a parliament, it is to continue in existence for six months, unless sooner 
dissolved by his successor; if there is no parliament when he dies, the last parliament 
is to come together and be again a parliament. It applied only to the case of King 
William. In 1707 the rule was generalized. In 1867, it was enacted that the demise of 
the Crown should have no effect on the duration of parliament and thus the rule as to 
six months was abolished. Thus, the one of the great results of the period that is now 
under our consideration, the principle that parliament shall sit in every year. 
' ' ' ' For more details on the parliaments held during Charles II see F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., pp. 421-435 
^ Ibid., pp. 447-448 & 449-452 
*'Ibid., p. 526 
" Ibid., pp. 526-527 
" For more details, see F.W. Maitland, op.cit., pp. 292-297 
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The Commons and the Lords: 
With regard to the composition of parliament, there was some increase in the numbers 
in the Commons and considerable in the Lords. The number of the lords spiritual, the 
mode of their appointment, had not been changed. But they became a small minority 
in the House of Lords. The number of temporal peers had greatly increased. The grant 
of a peerage had been used now as a political reward. Peerages were no longer bound 
up with the possession of a tract of land. They were conferred a hereditary peerage. 
To the parliament of 1661, they were 142. To that of 1685 parliament, their number 
fiirther increased to 145. It has now become the quite definite rule that a summons by 
name to parliament, followed by an actual sitting, confers a hereditary peerage. The 
number of the peerage at the Revolution of 1688 actually stood at about 150, which 
was raised by William and Anne to 168. 
The number of the members of the House of Commons in the first parliament of the 
James I was 467. In the Long parliament of 1640, they were 504. In the parliament of 
1661 there were 507 and in 1679, their number reached to 513. Under Anne, 45 
Scottish members were added, and the 100 Irish members added under George III, 
brought up the total to 658. This was the number in 1832. The representation of the 
counties remained unaltered. James I gave the right to be represented by two members 
to each of the two universities. Charles I added eighteen borough members. The 
electoral qualifications remained what they had been. In the counties the electors were 
still the fourty-shilling freeholders. In the borough there was the utmost variety. On 
the whole, the tendency had been toward vesting the right to elect representatives in 
an oligarchic governing body. The power of determinig all questions as to contested 
elections, the House of Commons had now got into its own hand and it jeolously 
resents any interference by the king, the House of Lords, or the courts of law. As to 
the qualification of those elected, it requires that the knights and burgesses shall be 
resident in the shires and towns that they represent.^^ 
Privileges of Parliament: 
There was a severe fighting over the privileges of parliament in this period of time. 
With regard to the privilege of freedom of speech, Eliot, Holies and Valentine's cases 
^ For the details of what follows, see F.T. Plucknett, op.cit., p.539 
"See Maitland, op.cit., pp. 288-292 
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are very important.^^ A point to be noted here that since the Restoration, tiiere has not 
been any attempt made by any court of law to punish a member for words spoken in 
the House. The Declaration and the Bill of Rights proclaim that the freedom of speech 
and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be impeached or to be 
questioned in any court or place out of parliament. After the Restoration members of 
the parliament enjoyed the privilege of freedom from arrest in all civil cases. As to the 
power of punishing persons for contempt, the two Houses vied with each other in 
extending its limits. It was freely exercised to protect the members of the House from 
assault and insult. During the latter half of the eighteenth century the Houses 
gradually abandoned their claim to avenge all maimer of wrongs done to their 
members. A more justifiable use of the power of the House constituted in the 
punishment of attacks directed not against individual members but against the House 
as a body. But even in this sphere the power was intemperately used. A settled 
doctrine that emerged in 1701 that the House of Commons could not imprison a 
person save during the session, so that a prorogation would set its prisoners free. On 
the other hand, the House of Lords has imposed fines and committed persons for a 
term of months or of years. Each of the Houses gained a power of arbitrary 
imprisonment that had been denied to the Court of Star Chambers. If either House 
commits a man, whether he be a member or no, for contempt, there is no tribunal in 
which he can raise by writ of habeas corpus the question whether contempt has really 
been committed. ' 
British Parliament since Early Eighteenth Century 
By the end of Stuart period, the old struggle between the limited and absolute 
monarchy, which had dominated more or less openly every epoch of British history, 
was finally settled. The position of the Crown was now firmly placed in its modem 
setting. The most striking feature of the new epoch was the emergence of cabinet 
system of government. The cabinet as not only the institution but as controlled by the 
modem doctrine with practice of ministerial responsibility to parliament. 
** For move details on \he Eliot, Holies and Valentine's cases, see Plutknetl, op.cil., pp. 376-31S; 
Adams, op.cit., pp. 297-298 
"For more details on the privileges of parliament in this period, see Maitland, op.cit., pp. 320-324 
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The House of Lords: 
Since the Revolution, the House of Lords had undergone changes in its numbers, 
composition, and political weight and influence. It consisted of about 540 members, 
ten times as large as under the Tudors. The statutory rule now was that the two 
archbishops, the bishops of London, Durham and Winchester, and twenty-one other 
bishops—^the first in order of seniority—had seat in the House of Lords. Between 
1801 and 1869 under the Act of Union the Irish Church was represented by one 
archbishop and three bishops, who sat there according to a scheme of rotation. The 
mode of making bishops remained just what it was in Elizabeth's time. ^^  The vast 
increase that had taken place in the House of Lords was therefore an increase in the 
number of temporal peers. A year now seldom passed by without the creation of-a-
dozan new peers. The power of creating new peers was now exercised by the minister. 
The House of Lords was increased in 1707, on the passing of the Act of Union with 
Scotland, by the addition of sixteen representative peers from that kingdom, elected at 
the commencement of every parliament. At the end of George Ill's long reign of sixty 
years the actual number of peerage conferred by that king (including some promotions 
of existing peers to a higher rank) amounted to the enormous number of 388. The 
House of Lords was further augmented on the union with Ireland in 1801, by the 
addition of twenty-eight Irish representative peers, elected, not for each parliament 
only like the Scottish representative peers, but for life. In the first twenty years of 
Queen Victoria's reign there was no increase in numbers, one peerage becoming 
extinct for evey new created. The largely increased numbers of the House of Lords, 
and the more representative character which it had acquired through the changes in its 
composition, had enabled it to preserve very much of its ancient authority and 
political influence. But it had nevertheless tended to decline more and more from the 
position of the co-ordinate legislative power, and to become simply a revising and 
suspending House—altering and modifying bills sent up from the commons, rejecting 
them sometimes when the mind of the nation was not throughly made up in their 
favour, but yeilding to the national will whenever unequivocally expressed.^^ In 1876 
a new class of peers was created, namely Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. The persons to 
be appointed were to have certain qualifications, namely to have held certain high 
^' Ibid. p. 347 
^' See for more details Plucknett, op.cit., pp. 539-545 
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judicial offices or been barristers or advocates for a certain number of years. Under 
the act of 1876, they were not to be Hfe peers, but official peers. However under the 
act of 1887, these peerages had become rather life peerages than official peerages.^° 
Creations have been frequently made in recent times. The House numbered 591 at the 
accession of Edward VII, and 623 at that of George V. It numbered 698 in 1919."" 
The House of Commons: 
Like the House of Lords, the House of Commons had also undergone very important 
changes in its numbers, its compositions, and its political influence. At the date of the 
union with Scotland the number of the members of the House of Commons was 513. 
The Act of Union added forty-five representatives of that Kingdom; and the Act of 
Union with Ireland in 1800 made a further addition to the House of 100 Irish 
members. The Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885 made a new division of the United 
Kingdom into county and borough constitugpcies, and raised the number of members 
of parliament to 670. The proportionate representation of the three kingdoms had 
since been a little varied, England (including Wales) having 495 members, Scotland 
72 and Ireland 103.''^ 
So far as the qualifications of the voters in counties and boroughs were concerned, the 
law which had been almost unaltered for a period of four centuries had been radically 
reformed by the Reform Act of 1832, and the Representation of the People Acts of 
1867 and 1884. By the Reform Act of 1832, all narrow rights of election were set 
aside in boroughs, and a £ 10 householder qualification (subject to conditions as to 
residence and payment of rates) was established instead, while the county franchise 
was extended by the addition to the old forty-shilling frreholders of copyholders and 
leaseholders for terms of years, and of tenants-at-will paying a rent of £50 a year. '^' 
By the Reform Act of 1867, a fiirther extension of the electoral franchise in England 
and Wales was introduced scarcely less important than that conceded by the Reform 
Act of 1832. The borough firanchise was extended to all householders (subject to one 
year's residence and payment of poor rates) as well as to lodgers occupying lodgings 
™ See Maitland, op.cit., pp. 350-351 
"See Adams, op.cit., pp. 473-474 
^^  See for more details Maitland, op.cit., pp. 351-352; Plucknett, op.cit., pp. 560-561 
^' See Plucknett, op.cit., p. 572 
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of the annual value of £10. The county occupation franchise was reduced to £12. '^' 
The Ballot Act of 1872 established the tradition of voting through secret ballot.^' The 
Representation of the People Act of 1884, by assimilating the county to the borough 
franchise, gave the vote to rural labourers and to a large number of industrial workers, 
especially miners, who lived outside the limits of a parliamentary borough. The old 
system of two-member constituencies was abondened, and the other boroughs and the 
counties were divided into single-member constituencies. 
Notwithstanding the qualification of the voters, there were also classes who were 
disqulified. They were women, infants, peers (not being Irish peers with seats in the 
House of Commons), returning officers and persons concerned in the election as 
agents, clerks, messengers or the like, aliens, persons of unsound mind, persons 
convicted of treason and felony until they had served their terms of punishment or 
been pardoned, and persons convicted of certain electoral malpractices, persons in 
77 
receipt of parochial relief or other alms. 
A member of the House of Commons ceased to be a member by death, by a resolution 
of the House declared him insane, by virtue of disqualification as we have noticed 
earlier, by remaining bankrupt for six months, by acceptence of office. A member had 
no right to resign his seat. During seventeenth century, when the House expelled a 
member, it often declared him incapable of being re-elected. By 1769, the House 
resolved that having been expelled he was incapable of sitting during the present 
parliament, and declared the re-election void. But in 1782 the resolution of 1769 was 
expunged and declared that the House had no power to declare a man ineligible.^* 
Privileges of Parliament: 
(1) Freedom of Speech for the members of parliament against the Crown was secured 
after the Revolution. Since then there had been no legal proceedings by the Crown 
against members for words uttered in the House. By this time, this freedom of speech 
held good not only against the Crown, but against private individuals also. A member 
speaking in either House was quite outside the law of slander. The House at any time 
'" Ibid., pp. 573-574 
" Ibid., p. 574 
'^ Ibid., p. 576 
" See Maitland, op.cit., pp. 363-364 
"Ibid., pp. 371-372 
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could order strangers to withdraw. And the House could at any time resolve that its 
proceedings shall not be reported, and commit to prison as for contempt all those who 
reported them.^' 
(2) The freedom from arrest was now not a very important matter, because this 
immunity did not extend to imprisonment on the charges of an indictable offence, and 
in 1869 imprisomnent for debt was also abolished. In the case of the members of the 
House of Commons this privilege was enjoyed during the session of parliament, and 
for 40 days on each side of the session. On the other hand, a peer enjoyed this 
immunity at all times.*" But unlike the past, the privilege was reduced to its ancient 
dimensions, protection from arrest for the persons of member only, leaving the course 
of justice as to their property and their servants entirely free.*' 
(3) With regard to the power of punishing for contempt, the House of Lords had had 
the authority to fine and to imprison. It could imprison for a specified term which 
might endure beyond the duration of the session. On the other hand, the House of 
Commons could not impose a fine or any imprisoimient that it inflicted comes to an 
end with the end of the session. It was the power of the House to inflict punishment of 
imprisonment in quite an arbitrary way. Thus, the House had a legal power to turn 
into a contempt just when it pleases. The power of expelling or suspending its own 
members has already been discussed earlier. 
The Making of Cabinet: 
As we know that in the past the king had Privy Council which continued to be the 
constitutional body of advisers of the king, it was believed that by the laws and 
customs of the realm the king was bound to seek the advice of his councillors, but that 
was only a political sentiment than a legal fact. At the Restoration, the Privy Council 
was an active working body, transacting a large mass of business, great and small, 
political and administrative. But Charles II did not seek the advice of his councillors 
on all occasions. He formed an inner circle of advisers known as 'cabal' or cabinet 
coimcil that consisted of a small number of ministers, where all matters of 
consequence were debated and resolved, and then brought to the Privy Council to be 
' ' Ibid., pp. 375-376 
'"ibid., p. 377 
" See Plucknett, op.cit., p. 580 
*^  See Maitland, op.cit, pp. 377-380 
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confirmed.*^ The word "cabal" with the meaning of "club" or "association of 
intriguers" had been popularly applied to the secret councillors of the king even under 
James I, and the accidental coincidence that, in 1671, the cabinet consisted of five 
ministers, Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, and Lauderdale, the initials of 
whose names made up the word "cabal", caused the latter designation to be used for 
some years as synonymous with cabinet. Accordingly, in 1679, an attempt by Sir 
William Temple to reform and restore the Privy Council to its former position was 
quickly broken down. William III continued the tradition established by the Charles 
II. A similar situation persisted under the reign of Anne, although the nomenclature 
continued to be unsettled. The composition of the body, whatever its name, was 
becoming more settled, however, came to be known in the political circles.^^ 
The above summary denotes that the major factor in the formation of the cabinet as an 
institution was the crown. In its essentials a cabinet was small body and confidential 
group of advisers whom the sovereign consulted at his discretion. There was no rule 
of law requiring the crown's act to be fortified with advice or consent, save only in 
the case of legislation. It still remained a task for the future to determine the 
relationship between the cabinet and parliament and other ministers. 
The accession of George I marked the beginning of an epoch as formative in the 
development of cabinet government. He began his reign by appointing a cabinet of 
fifteen members, those most constantly attending being the secretaries of state, the 
first lord of treasury, the chancellor, lord president of the council, lord privy seal and 
first lord of admiralty. It was, however, under the first two kings of the House of 
Hanover, the accession of whose dynasty was to have marked the extinction of the 
cabinet system, that parliamentary government by means of the ministry, was fully 
and finally established. This was due, in a great measure, to the personal character of 
George I and George II, who, aliens in blood, in language and in political sympathies, 
clung fondly to their beloved Hanover, and seemed to regard the kingship of Great 
Britain as an appendage to their small German electorates. They rarely attended 
cabinet meetings. This indifference of the first two George to everything not affecting 
the interset of their continental dominions had most important and benificial effects. It 
'^  See Plucknett, op.cit., p. 612 
*" Ibid., pp. 612-613 
*' Ibid., p. 613 
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allowed the English constituion to develop freely under the kingship from which the 
element of personal royal power was for the time practically eliminated. Then again, 
having ceased to meet the cabinet as a group of contending politicians, they came to 
rely upon the incipient "prime minister" who necessarily derived much enhanced 
importance from the fact that he was the spokesman of the cabinet to the king, and of 
the king to the cabinet. George III strove hard throughout his reign to recover the 
ground lost under his two immediate predecessors; but the system of ministirial 
govenmient with collective reponsibility to the House of Commons was to firmly 
establish to be overthrown, and is now regarded as a part of one polity almost as 
essential as the parliament itself 
It is in this course of time cerain rules and principles gradually developed which of 
course had no sanction of law: (1) It was now considered that the king ought to 
choose all his ministers from one of the two great parties—Whig or Tory. The Whig 
administration of Sir Robert Walpole set the precedent for party ministries, and 
thenceforward, the bonds of party were drawn tighter. (2) Coimected with this was the 
principle of common responsibility to parliament, if ministry gets defeated, it will 
have to resign in body. (3) Gradually, it was acknowledged, not by law, but by 
parliamentary practice that there is among the ministers a prime minister, one who has 
a certain ammount of authority over his fellows, one who, to a certain extent, stands 
between them and the king. Still, before the end of the eighteenth century 
constitutional practice required that there shall be a Prime Minister, and in the late 
nineteenth century his ascendancy had become still more marked. Then again, we 
have to notice the growth of the principles that the king was bound to act on the 
advice of his ministers, and that he must choose his ministers, or rather his first 
minister, in accordance with the will of the House of Commons. Thus parliament, and 
in particular the House of Commons, had a most efficient check upon the king's 
action. The most important choice that a king could have to make was now the choice 
of a prime minister; the other ministers were practically chosen for him by the prime 
minister. It was even laid down as constitutional practice, that when a ministry 
*'Ibid., pp. 615-617, 625-626 
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resigns, the king ought to offer the premiership to the person named by the outgoing 
minster.*^ 
British Parliament as of Today 
After a historical survey of British parliament, we can say that, the bicameral 
parliament of today is the direct descendent of the old assemblies of the king's court 
which medieval monarch summoned for the purpose of discussing affairs of the state. 
The British parliament as of now, the supreme legisltive institution of United 
Kingdom, the omnicompetent authority of parliament finds its traditional 
constitutional expression in the idea of its legislative supremacy.^* So far as its 
constituents are concerned, at its head is the Sovereign; it also includes an Upper 
House, called the House of Lords, and a Lower House, called the House of Commons. 
The House of Lords and the House of Commons meet in the Palace of Westminster, 
sometimes known as the "Houses of Parliament." In theory, power is vested not in 
Parliament, but in the "Queen-in-Parliament" (or "King-in-Parliament"). The Queen-
in-Parliament is often said to be a completely sovereign authority, though such a 
position is debatable. In modem times, real power is vested in the democratically 
elected House of Commons. As we have already indicated, the Sovereign acts only as 
a figurehead and the powers of the House of Lords are greatly limited. The British 
Parliament is often called the "Mother of Parliaments," as the legislative bodies of 
many nations—most notably, those of the members of the Commonwealth—are 
modeled on it. When we look at the constitution of parliament, it is most convenient 
to look at the House of Commons and the House of Lords separately. 
The Lower House 
The House of Commons evolved at some point during the fourteenth century and has 
been in continuous existence since. The House of Commons (the "Lower House") 
was once far less powerftil than the House of Lords (the "Upper House"), but is now 
by far the dominant branch of parliament. Moreover, the Government of the United 
Kingdom is answerable to the House of Commons. It is a necessary condition of a 
'^ See Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, op.cit., pp. 387-421 
*' See Ian Harden and Norman Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1986), p. 84 
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government's survival that it can win votes of confidence in the Commons.*' The full, 
formal style of the House of Commons is "The Right Honourable The Commons of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament Assembled." 
The term "Commons" derives from the Norman French word communes, meaning 
"localities." It is often misunderstood that "Commons" is a shortening of the word 
"commoners" (as opposed to "Lords" in the case of the other House) but this 
explanation is ahistorical. The House of Commons, like the House of Lords, meets in 
the Palace of Westminster. It is a democratically elected body, consisting of 646 
members, who are known as "Members of Parliament" or "MPs."'° Members are 
elected by a relative majority vote of the adult inhabitants of a geographical division 
of the coimtry known as constituency for limited terms, holding office until 
parliament is dissolved. The maximum life of the House of Commons is now five 
91 
years. 
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Membership and Elections 
Each member of parliament represents a single constituency. Each constituency now 
elects only one member of parliament. Four permanent and independent Boundary 
Commissions determine the boundaries of the constituencies, one each for England, 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The number of constituencies assigned to the 
four parts of the United Kingdom is based roughly on population, but subject to 
certain statutory regulations. Currently the United Kingdom is divided into 646 
constituencies, with 529 in England, 40 in Wales, 59 in Scotland and 18 in Northern 
Ireland. The average size of a constituency electorate is approximately 68,500. More 
rural constituencies are known as 'county constituencies' and more urban 
constituencies are known as 'borough constituencies. 
The parliament Act of 1911 provides for a maximum five year interval between 
general election subjects to prolong only in the wartime. Accepted usage, supported 
by many precedents, allows the prime minister to advise the Queen to dissolve 
" See Harden and Lewis, op.cit., p. 81; Adams, op.cit., pp. 446-447 
^ See http://www.parliament.uk/works/elections.cfm 
" Ibid. 
^ For details, see the 'Parliamentary Education Unit Booklet' issued during parliamentary elections, 
2006. The booWet is explored from the foHowing website on 24* October, 2001. 
http://www.explore.parliament.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/teacherses01.pdf 
'^ Ibid. 
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parliament at any time.^ '* Each candidate must submit nomination papers signed by 
ten registered voters from the constituency, and pay a deposit of £500, which is 
refunded only if the candidate wins at least five per cent of the vote. The deposit seeks 
to discourage frivolous candidates.'^ Each constituency returns one member; the First-
Past-the-Post electoral system, under which the candidate with a plurality of votes 
wins, is used. Amongst those disqualified are minors, members of the House of Lords, 
prisoners, and insane persons. In order to vote, one must be a resident of the United 
Kingdom as well as a citizen of the United Kingdom, of a British overseas territory, 
of the Republic of Ireland, or of a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Also, 
British citizens living abroad are allowed to vote for twenty years after moving from 
the United Kingdom. No voter may vote in more than one constituency. '^If a member 
dies, resigns, or becomes a peer, bye election is held to fill his seat. "The Speaker 
issues his warrant to the clerk of the Crown for a new writ for the place represented 
07 
by the member whose seat is thus vacated" 
Qualifications'* 
There are numerous qualifications'' that apply to members of parliament. Most 
importantly, one must be aged at least eighteen years' °, and must be a citizen of the 
United Kingdom, of a British overseas territory, of the Republic of Ireland, or of a 
member of the Commonwealth of Nations, in order to be eligible.'°' Members of the 
House of Lords may not serve in the House of Commons. A person may not sit in the 
House of Commons if he or she is the subject of a Bankruptcy Restrictions Order 
(applicable in England and Wales only), or adjudged bankrupt (in Northern Ireland), 
or if his or her estate is sequestered (in Scotland). Also, lunatics are ineligible to sit in 
''' See Peter Bromhead, op.cit., pp. 182-188 
" See 'Parliamentary Education Unit Booklet' issued during parliamentary elections, 2006. The 
booklet is explored from the following website on 24* October, 2007. 
http://www.explore.parliament.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/teacherses01.pdf 
" Ibid. 
'^ T. Erskine May, Parliamentary Practices, (Butterworth, 1971), p. 176 
For details, see 'Parliamentary Education Unit Booklet' issued during parliamentary elections, 2006. 
The booklet is explored from the following website on 24* October, 2007. 
http://www.explore.parliament.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/teacherses01.pdf 
" See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_House_of_Commons 
"* See Electoral Administration Act 2006, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_Administration_Act_2006. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'"' These resfrictions were introduced by the British Nationality Act 1981. 
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the House of Commons.'"^Anyone found guilty of high treason may not sit in 
parliament until he or she has either completed the term of imprisonment, or received 
a full pardon from the Crown. Moreover, anyone serving a prison sentence of one 
year or more is ineligible. Finally, the Representation of the People Act 1983 
disqualifies those found guilty of certain election-related offences for ten years. 
Several other disqualifications are established by the House of Commons 
Disqualification Act 1975. Holders of high judicial offices, civil servants, members of 
the regular armed forces, members of foreign legislatures (excluding members of the 
legislatures of the Republic of Ireland and Commonwealth countries), and holders of 
several Crown offices listed in the Act are all disqualified. Ministers, even though 
they are paid officers of the Crovm, are not disqualified. There is no provision for a 
member of parliament to resign his seat. However, effective resignation is possible. A 
member may ask to be given one of a number of sinecure offices of profit, and having 
been appointed to one of these he is automatically disqualified fi-om membership. His 
seat is then vacant.'"^ The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for making the 
appointment, and, by convention, never refuses to do so when asked by a member 
who desires to leave the House of Commons. 
Officers'"'' 
The House of Commons elects a presiding officer, known as the Speaker, at the 
beginning of each new parliamentary term, and also whenever a vacancy arises. If the 
incumbent Speaker seeks a new term, the House may re-elect him or her merely by 
passing a motion; otherwise, a secret ballot is held. A Speaker-elect cannot take office 
until the Sovereign has approved him or her; the granting of the royal approbation, 
however, is a mere formality. The Speaker has three deputies who take tums at 
presiding over committees of the whole House and who also take tums with the 
Speaker himself in presiding over sittings of the House.'°^ The Speaker and the 
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Under the Mental Health Act 1959, two specialists must report to the Speaker that a Member is 
suffering from mental illness before a seat can be declared vacant. There also exists a common law 
precedent from the eighteenth century that the "deaf and dumb" are ineligible to sit in the Lower 
House. This precedent, however, has not been tested in recent years, and is highly unlikely to be 
upheld by the courts. 
' ^ See Peter Bromhead, op.cit., p. 168 
'"* For details on the Speaker of the House of Commons, see 
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'"' See Peter Bromhead, op.cit., p. 105 
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Deputy Speakers are always members of the House of Commons. The Speaker 
oversees the day-to-day running of the House, and controls debates by calling on 
members to speak. If a member believes that a rule (or Standing Order) has been 
breached, he or she may raise a "point of order," on which the Speaker makes a ruling 
that is not subject to any appeal. The Speaker may discipline members who fail to 
observe the rules of the House. Thus, the Speaker is far more powerful than his Lords 
counterpart, the Lord Chancellor, who has no disciplinary powers at all. Customarily, 
the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers are non-partisan; they normally do not vote, or 
participate in the affairs of any political party. By convention, a Speaker seeking re-
election is not opposed in his or her constituency by any of the major parties. The lack 
of partisanship continues even after the Speaker leaves the House of Commons.'°^ 
Another officer of the body is the Leader of the House of Commons, a member of 
parliament selected by the prime minister. The Leader is responsible for steering 
government bills through the House of Commons, and is a member of the Cabinet. On 
behalf of the Government, the Leader manages the schedule of the House of 
Commons, and makes announcements relating to the timing of recesses, bills, and 
107 
important events. 
The Clerk of the House is the chief clerk and officer of the House of Commons (but is 
not a member of the House itself). The Clerk advises the Speaker on the rules and 
procedure of the House, signs orders and official communications, and signs and 
endorses bills. The Clerk's deputy is known as the Clerk Assistant. Another officer of 
the House is the Serjeant-at-Arms, whose duties include the maintenance of law, 
1 OR 
order, and security on the House's premises. 
Procedure 
The role of the House of Commons in the constitution is highly depended on first 
institutional framework of rules and their interpretations, and on practices and 
conventions in the management of business in accordance with the rules. The rules are 
set in standing orders, as interpreted by successive Speakers. Within the rules and 
'"* For details on the Speaker of the House of Commons , see 
http://www.parliament.uk/works/speaker.cfm 
'"' For details on the Leader of the House of Commons, see 
http://www.commonsleader.gov.uk/output/Page 1 .asp 
'"* See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_House_of_Commons 
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interpretations business is managed for the government by a minister, the Leader of 
the House, in conjunction with party whips. 
Like the House of Lords, the House of Commons meets in the Palace of Westminster 
in London. Just as the physical shape of the Commons Chamber expresses the 
function of parliament, with the party leaders facing each other across the clerk's 
table, and their party supporters on the benches behind them (all called back benches, 
including the two which are in front), so the order of debate expresses the balance 
between the straight opposition of the parties and the contribution of ordinary 
members. A typical full day's debate on a single topic takes about six hours-the first 
hour and the last hour being each divided between government and opposition front-
bench spokesmen. About four hours in between are left for others. Ministers 
explaining the policies they have formed to give effect to their political objectives use 
a little more than a tenth of government time; another tenth is used for their replies to 
debates. Opposition spokesmen expressing their party's views use an equal amount of 
time.'°^ 
The distribution of time is prescribed in part by standing orders, in part by week-to-
week and day-to-day decisions, in which the goverrunent has the last word. A session, 
lasting a year, provides about 32 weeks for business; about 160 or 170 days, of which 
about 32 are short sittings before weekends or holidays, allowing members to get back 
to constituencies or to other places where they may have engagements. An annual 
session has some fixed elements: the opening five days on the Queen's speech, 
discussing the government's programme for the year; the twenty-nine supply days, 
guaranteed as days on which the opposition chooses the subject of debate; the Budget 
and Finance Bill debates; the twenty to twenty-four private members' days when beck 
benchers, chosen by ballot, decide the subject of debate."° 
Sittings in the Chamber are held each day from Monday to Thursday, and also on 
some Fridays. During times of national emergency, the House may also sit on 
Saturdays. Within each day there are fixed points provided for by standing order. The 
House meets at 2.30 p.m. and proceeds after five to ten minutes to question-time 
which ends at 3.30 p.m. After this any of several topics may occupy a little time, most 
"" See Peter Bromhead, Britain's Developing Constitution, op.cit., pp. p. 111 
""Ibid. 
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notably ministers' statements and questions about them, or questions of privilege or 
personal statements, and every Thursday the announcement of the next week's 
business, which may produce a brief discussion. After all this, at 3.35, 4, or 4.30 p.m. 
as the case may be, the main debate on the motion begins. It must end at 10 p.m. 
unless the House has decided by vote, at the begirming of the main business, to allow 
an extension beyond that time.'" Sittings of the House are open to the public, but the 
House may at any time vote to sit in private. A member seeking that the House sit in 
private must make a formal motion to that effect. Public debates are broadcast on the 
radio, and on television by BBC parliament, and are recorded in Hansard."^ 
By a custom which has been strictly maintained since 1642, no monarch has sought to 
set foot in the Commons Chamber. Another tradition that arose from Charles I actions 
involves the State Opening of parliament, an annual ceremony in the Lords Chamber 
during which the Sovereign, in the presence of members of both Houses, delivers an 
address on the government's legislative agenda. The Gentleman Usher of the Black 
Rod (a Lords official) is responsible for summoning the Commons to the Lords 
Chamber; when he arrives to deliver his summons, the doors of the Commons 
Chamber are shut, symbolizing the right of the Lower House to debate without 
interference. The Gentleman Usher knocks on the door thrice with his Black Rod, and 
only then is he granted admittance."'' 
During debates, members may only speak if called upon by the Speaker (or the 
Deputy Speaker, if the Speaker is not presiding). Traditionally, the presiding officer 
alternates between calling members from the government and opposition. The prime 
minister, the leader of the opposition, and other leaders from both sides are normally 
given priority when more than one member rises to speak at the same time. Speeches 
are addressed to the presiding officer, using the words "Mr Speaker," "Madam 
Speaker," "Mr Deputy Speaker," or "Madam Deputy Speaker." Only the presiding 
officer may be directly addressed in speeches; other Members must be referred to in 
the third person. Traditionally, Members do not refer to each other by name, but by 
constituency, using forms such as "the Honourable Member for [constituency]," or, in 
' " Ibid. 
112 Hansard is an official site which provides transcripts of debates and questions in the United 
Kingdom's House of Commons. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
' " See http://en.wiicipedia.org/wiki/British_House_of_Commons. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
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the case of Privy Counsellors, "the Right Honourable Member for [constituency]." 
The Speaker enforces the rules of the House, and may warn and punish members who 
deviate from them. Disregarding the Speaker's instructions is considered a severe 
breach of the rules of the House, and may result in the suspension of the offender 
from the House. In the case of grave disorder, the Speaker may adjourn the House 
without taking a vote.""* 
The Standing Orders of the House of Commons do not establish any formal time 
limits for debates. The Speaker may, however, order a member who persists in 
making a tediously repetitive or irrelevEint speech to stop speaking. The time set aside 
for debate on a particular motion is, however, often limited by informal agreements 
between the parties. Debate may, however, be restricted by the passage of "Allocation 
of Time Motions," which are more commonly known as "Guillotine Motions." 
Alternatively, the House may put an immediate end to a debate by passing a motion to 
invoke the Closure. The Speaker is allowed to deny the motion if he or she believes 
that it infringes upon the rights of the minority. '^ ^ 
When debates conclude, or when the Closure is invoked, the motion in question is put 
to a vote. The House first votes by voice vote; the Speaker or Deputy Speaker puts the 
question, and members respond either "Aye" (in favour of the motion) or "No" 
(against the motion). The presiding officer then annoimces the result of the voice vote, 
but if any member challenges his or her assessment, a recorded vote known as a 
division follows. (The presiding officer, if he or she believes that the result of the 
voice vote is so clear that a division is not necessary, may reject the challenge.) If a 
division does occur, members enter one of two lobbies (the "Aye" lobby or the "No" 
lobby) on either side of the Chamber, where clerks record their names. At each lobby, 
there are two Tellers (themselves members of the House) who count the votes of the 
members. Once the division concludes, the Tellers provide the results to the presiding 
officer, who then announces them to the House. If there is an equality of votes, the 
Speaker or Deputy Speaker has a casting vote. The quorum of the House of Commons 
""Ibid. 
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is forty members for any vote; if fewer than forty members have participated, the 
division is invalid."^ 
The outcome of most votes is largely known beforehand, since political parties 
normally instruct members on how to vote. A party normally entrusts some members 
of parliament, known as whips, with the task of ensuring that all party members vote 
as desired, members of parliament do not tend to vote against such instructions, since 
those who do so are unlikely to reach higher political ranks in their parties. Errant 
members may be deselected as official party candidates during future elections, and, 
in serious cases, may be expelled from their parties outright. Thus, the independence 
of members of parliament tends to be extremely low, and "backbench rebellions" by 
members discontent with their party's policies rare. In some circumstances, however, 
parties announce "free votes", allowing members to vote as they please. Votes relating 
to issues of conscience such as abortion and capital punishment are typically free 
votes. "^ 
Legislative Functions 
The supremacy of the Commons in legislative matters is assured by the parliament 
Acts, under which certain types of bills may be presented for the Royal Assent 
without the consent of the House of Lords. The Lords may not delay a money bill (a 
bill that, in the view of the Speaker of the House of Commons, solely concerns 
national taxation or public funds) for more than one month. Moreover, the Lords may 
not delay most other public bills for more than two parliamentary sessions, or one 
calendar year. These provisions, however, only apply to public bills that originate in 
the House of Commons. Moreover, a bill that seeks to extend a parliamentary term 
beyond five years requires the consent of the House of Lords. 
By a custom that prevailed even before the parliament Acts, the superiority of the 
House of Commons is ensured insofar as financial matters are concerned. Only the 
House of Commons may originate bills concerning taxation or Supply; furthermore, 
Supply bills passed by the House of Commons are immune to amendments in the 
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House of Lords. In addition, the House of Lords is barred from amending a bill so as 
to insert a taxation or Supply-related provision, but the House of Commons often 
waives its privileges and allows the Lords to make amendments with financial 
implications. Under a separate convention, known as the Salisbury Convention, the 
House of Lords does not seek to oppose legislation promised in the government's 
election manifesto. Hence, as the power of the House of Lords has been severely 
curtailed by statute and by practice, the House of Commons is clearly the more 
powerful branch of parliament. 
Committees 
Because of the dominant role of the Cabinet, the House of Commons did not have 
specialized committees, in the style of the Congress of the United States, until 
recently. Beginning in 1979, however, a pattern of conunittees specialized in fianction 
has emerged. These committees provide detailed debate and consideration rather than 
only general review and approval, and have come to play an increasingly important 
role in the functioning of parliament. 
The parliament of the United Kingdom uses committees for a variety of purposes; one 
common use is for the review of bills. Committees consider bills in detail, and may 
make amendments. Bills of great constitutional importance, as well as some important 
financial measures, are usually sent to the Committee of the Whole House, a body 
that, as its name suggests, includes all members of the House of Commons. Instead of 
the Speaker, the Chairman or a Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means presides. The 
Committee meets in the House of Commons Chamber.'^' 
Most bills are considered by Standing Committees , which consist of between 
sixteen and fifty members each. The membership of each Standing Committee 
roughly reflects the standing of the parties in the whole House. Though "standing" 
may imply permanence, the membership of Standing Committees changes constantly; 
' " For more details, see http://www.parliament.uk 
'^ '' See "United Kingdom", Microsoft® Encarta® 2006 [CD]. Microsoft Corporation, 2005. 
'^' See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_House_of_Commons. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'^ ^ From the start of the 2006-2007 parliamentary session, Standing Committees have been renamed 
'General Committees'. Standing Committees on Bills are now called 'Public Bill Committees' and will 
have the power to take evidence from officials and experts outside of Parliament. 
See http-.Z/wviTw.pariiament.uk/about/how/committees.cfin. For more details on General Committees 
(including Public Bill Committees, see http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/general.cfm. 
Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
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new Members are assigned each time the Committee considers a new bill. There is no 
formal limit on the number of Standing Committees, but there are usually only ten. 
Rarely, a bill may be committed to a Special Standing Committee, which operates 
much like a Standing Committee, but also investigates and holds hearings on the 
issues raised by the bill. 
The House of Commons also has several Departmental Select Committees'^''. The 
membership of these bodies, like that of the Standing Committees, reflects the 
strength of the parties in the House of Commons. Each committee elects its own 
Chairman. The primary function of a Departmental Select Committee is to scrutinize 
and investigate the activities of a particular government Department; to fulfill these 
aims, it is permitted to hold hearings and collect evidence. Bills may be referred to 
Departmental Select Committees, but such a procedure is very seldom used. A 
separate type of Select Committee is the Domestic Committee. Domestic Committees 
oversee the administration of the House and the services provided to membe'rs.'^ ^ 
Other committees of the House of Commons include Joint Committees (which also 
include members of the House of Lords) , the Committee on Standards and 
Privileges (which considers questions of parliamentary privilege, as well as matters 
relating to the conduct of the members), and the Committee of Selection (which 
determines the membership of other committees).'^^ 
Relationship with the Government 
Though it does not elect the prime minister, the House of Commons indirectly control 
the premiership. By convention, the prime minister is answerable to, and must 
maintain the support of, the House of Commons. Thus, whenever the office of prime 
minister falls vacant, the Sovereign appoints the person most likely to command the 
support of the House—normally, the leader of the largest party in the Lower House. 
(The leader of the second-largest party becomes the Leader of the Opposition.) 
' " Ibid. 
'^ '' For more details on Select Committees, see 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/seiect.cfm. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
' " Ibid. 
'^ ^ For Joint Committees, see http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/joint.cfm. Retrieved on 
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Moreover, the prime minister is, by unwritten convention, a member of the House of 
Commons, rather than the House of Lords.'^* 
The prime minister may only stay in office as long as he or she retains the confidence 
of the House of Commons. The Lower House may indicate its lack of support for the 
government by rejecting a Motion of Confidence, or by passing a Motion of No 
Confidence. Confidence and No Confidence Motions are sometimes phrased 
explicitly, for instance: "That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's 
Government." Many other motions are considered confidence issues, even though not 
explicitly phrased as such. In particular, important bills that form a part of the 
government's agenda are generally considered matters of confidence, as is the annual 
Budget. When a government has lost the confidence of the House of Commons, the 
prime minister is obliged to either resign, or request the monarch to dissolve 
parliament, thereby precipitating a general election.'^^ 
Except when compelled to do so by an adverse vote on a confidence issue, the prime 
minister is allowed to choose the timing of dissolutions, and consequently the timing 
of general elections. The timing reflects political considerations, and is generally most 
opportune for the prime minister's party. However, no parliamentary term can last for 
more than five years; dissolution is automatic upon the expiry of this period, 
parliament is almost never permitted to sit for the maximum possible term, with 
dissolutions customarily being requested earlier.'^" 
Whatever the reason— t^he expiry of parliament's five year term, the choice of the 
prime minister, or a government defeat in the House of Commons—a dissolution is 
followed by general elections. If the prime minister's party retains its majority in the 
House of Commons, then the prime minister may remain in power. On the other hand, 
if his or her party has lost its majority, the prime minister is compelled to resign, 
allowing the Sovereign to appoint a new prime minister. One may note that a prime 
minister may resign even if he or she is not defeated at the polls (for example, for 
'^ * See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_House_of_Commons. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
•'' Ibid. 
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personal health reasons); in such a case, the premiership goes to the new leader of the 
outgoing prime minister's party.'^' 
The House of Commons scrutinizes the government through "Question Time," a 
period during which members have the opportunity to ask questions of the prime 
minister and of other cabinet ministers. Prime Minister's Question Time occurs once 
each week, normally for a half-hour each Wednesday. Questions must relate to the 
responding minister's official government activities, not to his or her activities as a 
party leader or as a private member of parliament. Customarily, members of the 
government party and members of the opposition alternate when asking questions. In 
addition to questions asked orally during Question Time, members of parliament may 
also make inquiries in writing.'^^ 
In practice, the House of Commons' scrutiny of the government is very weak. Since 
the First-Past-the-Post electoral system is employed in elections, the governing party 
tends to enjoy a large majority in the Commons; there is often limited need to 
compromise with other parties. Modern British political parties are so tightly 
organized that they leave relatively little room for free action by their MPs. Thus, 
during the twentieth century, the government has lost confidence issues only thrice— 
twice in 1924, and once in 1979. 
The House of Commons technically retains the power to impeach ministers of the 
Crown (or any other subject, even if not a public officer) for their crimes. The House 
of Lords try impeachments, where a simple majority is necessary to convict. The 
power of impeachment, however, has fallen into disuse; the House of Commons 
exercises its checks on the government through other means such as No Confidence 
Motions. The last impeachment was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville in 
1806.'" 
House of Lords 
The House of Lords is the upper Chamber of the United Kingdom parliament. It plays 
an important part in revising legislation and keeping a check on government by 
'^ ' Ibid. 
"' Ibid. 
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scrutinising its activities. It complements the work of the Commons, whose members 
are elected to represent their constituents. Members of the Lords are not elected and 
are unpaid. They have a wide range of experience and provide a source of 
independent expertise. The House also has a judicial role as the final Court of 
Appeal.'^^ 
The Membership 
On March 7, 2007, the House of Commons voted, in principle, in favour of replacing 
the Lords with an elected chamber (either 100% elected or 80% elected, 20% 
appointed)'^^ However, the House of Lords, being the upper legislative chamber, 
rejected this proposal and voted for an entirely appointed House of Lords.'^^ 
Since its origins as a gathering of feudal magnates and churchmen, the House of 
Lords has occupied a central role in the United Kingdom's parliamentary system. 
Members no longer pass on sitting and voting rights to their offspring when they die, 
although a small proportion of hereditary members remain. Recent and ongoing 
changes are a continuation of our evolving constitution. Today there are various 
routes by which members are appointed to the House and four main categories of 
member: 
(1) Life peers 
Appointed for their lifetime, life peers make up the majority (about 615) of the total 
membership (about 730). The power to appoint belongs formally to the Crown, but 
Members are essentially created on the advice of the prime minister. Life peers' titles 
cease on death. 
(2) Law Lords 
In effect, they were the first life peers. The Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 provides 
for up to 12 Law Lords to be appointed to hear appeals from the lower courts. They 
are full time professional judges and can continue to hear appeals until they are 70 
"'' See http://www.parliament.uk/docuinents/uploacl/HofLBpRole.pdf. Accessed on 25"' October, 2007 
'•"See Reform of the House of Lords. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords. 
Also see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ldl99798/ldbrief/ldreform.htm. Retrieved on 26-10-
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years old. After they retire they go on sitting in the House. However, the judicial 
function of the House of Lords will end in October 2009 when a separate supreme 
court is set up. 
(3) Archbishops and Bishops 
The Anglican archbishops of Canterbury and York, the bishops of Durham, London 
and Winchester and the 21 senior diocesan bishops of the Church of England have 
seats in the House. This is because the Church of England is the 'established' Church 
of the State. When they retire as bishops their membership of the House ceases. 
Elected hereditary Members 
The House of Lords Act 1999'^ ^ ended the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in 
the House of Lords. Until then there had been about 700 hereditary members. While 
the Bill was being considered, an amendment was passed which enabled 92 of the 
existing hereditary peers to remain as members until the next stage of reform. The 92 
elected hereditary peers are made up as follows: 
• 15 'office-holders', i.e. Deputy Speakers and Deputy Chairmen, elected by the 
House; 
• 75 party and crossbench members, elected by their own party or group; 
• Two who hold royal appointments—^the Lord Great Chamberlain, who is the 
Queen's representative in parliament, and the Earl Marshal, who is responsible for 
ceremonies such as the State Opening of parliament. 
Qualifications 
Several different qualifications apply for membership of the House of Lords. Firstly, 
no person may sit in the House of Lords if under the age of twenty-one. Furthermore, 
only citizens of the United Kingdom, of a British overseas territory, of a nation that 
belongs to the Commonwealth, or of the Republic of Ireland may sit in the House of 
Lords. These restrictions were introduced by the British Nationality Act 1981, but 
" ' For the House of Lords Act 1999, see http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-
060.pdf. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
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were previously far more stringent: under the Act of Settlement 1701, only natural-
bom subjects were qualified.'^^ 
Additionally, some bankruptcy-related restrictions apply to members of the Upper 
House. A person may not sit in the House of Lords if he or she is the subject of a 
Bankruptcy Restrictions Order (applicable in England and Wales only), or if he or she 
is adjudged bankrupt (in Northern Ireland), or if his or her estate is sequestered (in 
Scotland). A final restriction bars an individual convicted of high treason from sitting 
in the House of Lords until completing his or her full term of imprisonment. An 
exception applies, however, if the individual convicted of high treason receives a full 
pardon. Note that an individual serving a prison sentence for an offence other than 
high treason is not automatically disqualified.'''° 
Finally, some qualifications apply only in the case of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. 
No person may be created a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary unless he or she has either 
held "high judicial office" for two years, or has been a practising barrister for fifteen 
years. The term "high judicial office" encompasses membership of the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales, of the Inner House of the Court of Session (Scotland), 
or of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland.''" 
Women were formerly ineligible to sit in the House of Lords, even if they held 
peerages in their own right. It was only in 1958 that women were admitted to the 
House of Lords; the Life Peerages Act passed in that year granted seats to all life 
peeresses. Hereditary peeresses, however, continued to be excluded until the passage 
of the Peerage Act 1963. Since the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999, 
hereditary peeresses remain eligible for election to the Upper House. All women in 
the House of Lords are amongst the Lords Temporal; the Church of England does not 
presently permit the consecration of female archbishops or bishops, though this issue 
is currently under consideration, with many observers expecting female bishops in the 
near future.''* 
139 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'^"Ibid. 
Ml 
''' Ibid. 
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Officers 
Traditionally the House of Lords did not elect its own speaker, unlike the House of 
Commons; rather, the ex officio presiding officer was the Lord Chancellor''*^. With the 
passage of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005,''*'* the post of Lord Speaker''*^ was 
created, a position to which a peer is elected by the House and subsequently appointed 
by The Crown. The first Lord Speaker to be elected, on May 4, 2006, is Baroness 
Hayman, a former Labour peer. As the Speaker is expected to be an impartial 
presiding officer. Baroness Hayman has resigned from the Labour Party. 
This reform of the post of Lord Chancellor was made due to the perceived 
constitutional anomalies inherent in the role. The Lord Chancellor was not only the 
Speaker of the House of Lords, but also a member of the Cabinet; his or her 
department, formerly the Lord Chancellor's Department, is now called the Department 
for Constitutional Affairs. In addition, the Lord Chancellor is the head of the judiciary 
of England and Wales, serving as the president of the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales. Thus, the Lord Chancellor was part of all three branches of government: the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The overlap of the legislative and executive 
roles is a characteristic of the Westminster system, as the entire cabinet consists of 
members of the House of Commons or the House of Lords; however, in June 2003, 
the Blair government announced its intention to abolish the post of Lord Chancellor 
because of the office's mixed executive and judicial responsibilities. The abolition of 
the office was rejected by the House of Lords, and the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005 was thus amended to preserve the office of Lord Chancellor. The Act no longer 
guarantees that the office holder of Lord Chancellor is the presiding officer of the 
House of Lords, and therefore allows the House of Lords to elect a speaker of their 
own.'^^ 
The Lord Speaker may be replaced as presiding officer by one of his or her deputies. 
The Chairman of Committees, the Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees, and 
'•" For details on the Lord Chancellor of the House of Lords, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord_Chancellor. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
"" For the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_Reform_Act_2005. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'"^  For more details on the Lord Speaker of the House of Lords, see 
http://www.pariiament.uk/works/lord_speaker.cfm. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'** http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords. 
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several Deputy Chairmen of Committees are all deputies to the Lord Speaker, and are 
all appointed by the House of Lords itself. By custom, the Crown appoints each 
Chairman, Principal Deputy Chairman, or Deputy Chairman to the additional office of 
Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords. There was previously no legal requirement 
that the Lord Chancellor or a Deputy Speaker be a member of the House of Lords, 
though the same has long been customary; thus the Woolsack upon which the Lord 
Chancellor sat was notionally not in the House of Lords, although situated in the 
middle of it. 
Whilst presiding over the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor traditionally wore 
ceremonial black and gold robes. This is no longer a requirement for the Speaker 
except for State occasions outside of the chamber. The Speaker or Deputy Speaker 
sits on the Woolsack, a large red seat stuffed with wool, at the front of the Lords 
Chamber. When the House of Lords resolves itself into committee (see below), the 
Chairman or a Deputy Chairman presides, not from the Woolsack, but from a chair at 
the Table of the House. The presiding officer has little power compared to the 
Speaker of the House of Commons. He or she only acts as the mouthpiece of the 
House, performing duties such as announcing the results of votes. This is because, 
unlike in the House of Commons where all statements are directed to "Mr/Madam 
Speaker", in the House of Lords they are directed to "My Lords", i.e. the entire body 
of the House. The Lord Speaker or Deputy Speaker cannot determine which members 
may speak, or discipline members for violating the rules of the House; these measures 
may be taken only by the House itself Unlike the politically neutral Speaker of the 
House of Commons, the Lord Chancellor and Deputy Speakers originally remained 
members of their respective parties, and may participate in debate, however this is no 
longer true of the new role of Lord Speaker. 
Another officer of the body is the Leader of the House of Lords'''^, a peer selected by 
the prime minister. The Leader of the House is responsible for steering government 
bills through the House of Lords, and is a member of the Cabinet. The Leader also 
advises the House on proper procedure when necessary, but such advice is merely 
'^ ^ For more details on the Leader of the House of Lords, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leader_of_the_House_of_Lords. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
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informal, rather than official and binding. A Deputy Leader is also appointed by the 
prime minister, and takes the place of an absent or unavailable Leader. 
The Clerk of the parliaments'''* is the chief clerk and officer of the House of Lords 
(but is not a member of the House itself). The Clerk, who is appointed by the Crown, 
advises the presiding officer on the rules of the House, signs orders and official 
communications, endorses bills, and is the keeper of the official records of both 
Houses of parliament. Moreover, the Clerk of the parliaments is responsible for 
arranging by-elections of hereditary peers when necessary. The deputies of the Clerk 
of the parliaments (the Clerk Assistant and the Reading Clerk) are appointed by the 
Lord Speaker, subject to the House's approval. 
The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod'"*^  is also an officer of the House; he takes his 
title from the symbol of his office, a black rod. Black Rod (as the Gentleman Usher is 
normally known) is responsible for ceremonial arrangements, is in charge of the 
House's doorkeepers, and may (upon the order of the House) take action to end 
disorder or disturbance in the Chamber. Black Rod also holds the office of Serjeant-
at-Arms of the House of Lords, and in this capacity attends upon the Lord Speaker. 
The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod's duties may be delegated to the Yeoman 
Usher of the Black Rod or to the Assistant Sergeant-at-Arms. 
Procedure 
The House of Lords and the House of Commons assemble in the Palace of 
Westminster. The Lords Chamber is lavishly decorated, in contrast with the more 
modestly furnished Commons Chamber. Benches in the Lords Chamber are coloured 
red; thus, the House of Lords is sometimes referred to as the "Red Chamber". The 
Woolsack is at the front of the Chamber; supporters of the government sit on benches 
on the right of the Woolsack, whilst members of the opposition sit on the left. Neutral 
members, known as Cross-benchers, sit on the benches immediately opposite the 
Woolsack.'^° 
'•" For more details on the Clerk of the Parliament, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clerk_of_the_Parliaments. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'•^ For more details on the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Rod. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
"° http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
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The Lords Chamber is the site of many formal ceremonies, the most famous of which 
is the State Opening of parHament, held at the beginning of each new parliamentary 
session. During the State Opening, the Sovereign, seated on the Throne in the Lords 
Chamber and in the presence of both Houses of parliament, delivers a speech 
outlining the government's agenda for the upcoming parliamentary session. 
In the House of Lords, members need not seek the recognition of the presiding officer 
before speaking, as is done in the House of Commons. If two or more Lords 
simultaneously rise to speak, the House decides which one is to be heard by 
acclamation, or, if necessary, by voting on a motion. Often, however, the Leader of 
the House will suggest an order, which is thereafter generally followed. Speeches in 
the House of Lords are addressed to the House as a whole ("My Lords") rather than to 
the presiding officer alone (as is the custom in the Lower House). Members may not 
refer to each other in the second person (as "you"), but rather use third person forms 
such as "the noble Duke", "the noble Earl", "the noble Lord", "my noble friend", 
etc.'^' 
Each member may make no more than one speech on a motion, except that the mover 
of the motion may make one speech at the beginning of the debate and another at the 
end. Speeches are not subject to any time limits in the House; however, the House 
may put an end to a speech by approving a motion "that the noble Lord be no longer 
heard". It is also possible for the House to end the debate entirely, by approving a 
motion "that the Question be now put". This procedure is known as Closure, and is 
extremely rare. 
Once all speeches on a motion have concluded, or Closure invoked, the motion may 
be put to a vote. The House first votes by voice vote; the Lord Speaker or Deputy 
Speaker puts the question, and the Lords respond either "Content" (in favour of the 
motion) or "Not-Content" (against the motion). The presiding officer then announces 
the result of the voice vote, but if his assessment is challenged by any Lord, a 
recorded vote known as a division follows. Members of the House enter one of two 
lobbies (the "Content" lobby or the "Not-Content" lobby) on either side of the 
Chamber, where their names are recorded by clerks. At each lobby are two Tellers 
''• Ibid. 
'«Ibid. 
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(themselves members of the House) who count the votes of the Lords. The Lord 
Speaker may not take part in the vote. Once the division concludes, the Tellers 
provide the results thereof to the presiding officer, who then announces them to the 
House. If there is an equality of votes, the motion is decided according to the 
following principles: legislation may proceed in its present form, unless there is a 
majority in favour of amending or rejecting it; any other motions are rejected, unless 
there is a majority in favour of approving it. The quorum of the House of Lords is just 
three members for a general or procedural vote, and 30 members for a vote on 
legislation. If fewer than three or 30 members (as appropriate) are present, the 
division is invalid.'" 
The Committees: 
The parliament of the United Kingdom uses committees for a variety of purposes; one 
common use is for the review of bills. Committees of both Houses consider bills in 
detail, and may make amendments. In the House of Lords, the committee most 
commonly used for the consideration of bills is the Committee of the Whole House'^ '*, 
which, as its name suggests, includes all members of the House. The Committee 
meets in the Lords Chamber, and is presided over not by the Lord Speaker, but by the 
Chairman of Committees or a Deputy Chairman. Different procedural rules apply in 
the Committee of the Whole House than in normal sessions of the Lords; in particular, 
members are allowed to make more than one speech each on a motion. Similar to the 
Committee of the Whole House are the Grand Committees, bodies in which any 
member of the House may participate. A Grand Committee does not meet in the 
Lords Chamber, but in a separate committee room. No divisions are held in Grand 
Committees, and any amendments to the bill require the unanimous consent of the 
body. Hence, the Grand Committee procedure is used only for uncontroversial bills.''' 
Bills may also be committed to Public Bill Committees, which consist of between 
twelve and sixteen members each. A Public Bill Committee is specifically constituted 
for a particular bill. A bill may also be referred to a Special Public Bill Committee, 
which, unlike the Public Bill Committee, has the power to hold hearings and collect 
"'' See http://www.explore.parliament.uk/TopicPopup.aspx?id= 10429. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
' " See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
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evidence. These committees are used much less frequently than the Committee of the 
Whole House and Grand Committees.'^^ 
The House of Lords also has several Select Committees. The members of these 
committees are appointed by the House at the beginning of each session, and continue 
to serve until the next parliamentary session begins. The House of Lords may appoint 
a chairman for a committee; if it does not do so, the Chairman of Committees or a 
Deputy Chairman of Committees may preside instead. Most Select Committees are 
permanent, but the House may also establish ad hoc committees, which cease to exist 
upon the completion of a particular task (for instance, investigating the reform of the 
House of Lords). The primary function of Select Committees is to scrutinise and 
investigate Government activities; to fulfil these aims, they are permitted to hold 
hearings and collect evidence. Bills may be referred to Select Committees, but are 
more often sent to the Committee of the Whole House and Grand Committees. The 
committee system of the House of Lords also includes several Domestic Committees, 
which supervise or consider the House's procedures and administration. One of the 
Domestic Committees is the Committee of Selection, which is responsible for 
assigning members to many of the House's other committees.'^^ 
Legislative functions 
The power of the Lords to reject a bill passed by the House of Commons is severely 
restricted by the parliament Acts. Under those Acts, certain types of bills may be 
presented for the Royal Assent without the consent of the House of Lords. The House 
of Lords cannot delay a money bill (a bill that, in the view of the Speaker of the 
House of Commons, solely concerns national taxation or public funds) for more than 
one month. Other public bills cannot be delayed by the House of Lords for more than 
two parliamentary sessions, or one calendar year. These provisions, however, only 
apply to public bills that originate in the House of Commons, and cannot have the 
effect of extending a parliamentary term beyond five years. A further restriction is a 
constitutional convention known as the Salisbury Convention, which means that the 
"*Ibid. 
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House of Lords does not oppose legislation promised in the Government's election 
manifesto. 
By a custom that prevailed even before the parliament Acts, the House of Lords is 
further restrained insofar as financial bills are concerned. The House of Lords may 
neither originate a bill concerning taxation or Supply (supply of treasury or exchequer 
funds), nor amend a bill so as to insert a taxation or Supply-related provision. (The 
House of Commons, however, often waives its privileges and allows the Upper House 
to make amendments with financial implications.) Moreover, the Upper House may 
not amend any Supply Bill. The House of Lords formerly maintained the absolute 
power to reject a bill relating to revenue or Supply, but this power was curtailed by 
the parliament Acts, as aforementioned.'^^ 
Hence, as the power of the House of Lords has been severely curtailed by statute and 
by practice, the House of Commons is clearly the more- powerful chamber of 
parliament. 
In March 2006, it was reported that, among other reforms, the government are 
considering removing the ability of the Lords to delay legislation that arises as a resuh 
of manifesto commitments, and reducing their ability to delay other legislation to a 
period of 60 days.' 
Judicial functions 
The judicial functions of the House of Lords'^' originate from the ancient role of the 
Curia Regis as a body that addressed the petitions of the King's subjects. The judicial 
functions of the House of Lords are exercised not by the whole House, but by a 
committee of "Law Lords". The bulk of the House's judicial business is conducted by 
the twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who are specifically appointed for this 
purpose under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. The judicial functions may also be 
exercised by Lords of Appeal (other members of the House who happen to have held 
high judicial office). No Lord of Appeal in Ordinary or Lord of Appeal may sit 
Ibid. Also see http://www.parliament.Uk/works/lords.cfm#lorole. Retrieved on 26-10-2007 
'^'Ibid. 
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judicially beyond the age of seventy-five. The judicial bpsines; 
supervised by the Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary' 
Second Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.'" 
The jurisdiction of the House of Lords extends, in civil and in criminal cases, to 
appeals from the courts of England and Wales, and of Northern Ireland. From 
Scotland, appeals are possible only in civil cases; Scotland's High Court of Justiciary 
is the highest court in criminal matters. The House of Lords is not the United 
Kingdom's only court of last resort; in some cases, the Privy Council performs such a 
function. The jurisdiction of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom, however, is 
narrower than that of the House of Lords; it encompasses appeals from ecclesiastical 
courts, issues related to devolution, disputes under the House of Commons 
Disqualification Act 1975, and a few other minor matters.'^^ 
Not all Law Lords sit to hear cases; rather, since World War II cases have been heard 
by panels known as Appellate Committees, each of which normally consists of five 
members (selected by the Senior Lord). An Appellate Committee hearing an 
important case may consist of even more members. Though Appellate Committees 
meet in separate committee rooms, judgement is given in the Lords Chamber itself. 
No further appeal lies fi-om the House of Lords, although the House of Lords may 
refer a "preliminary question" to the European Court of Justice in cases involving an 
element of European Union law, and a case can be brought at the European Court of 
Human Rights if the House of Lords does not provide a satisfactory remedy in cases 
where the European Convention on Human Rights is relevant.'^'' 
A distinct judicial fiinction—one in which the whole House, rather than just the Law 
Lords, may participate—is that of trying impeachments. Impeachments were brought 
by the House of Commons, and tried in the House of Lords; a conviction required 
only a majority of the Lords voting. Impeachments, however, are to all intents and 
purposes obsolete; the last impeachment was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount 
Melville in 1806. 
' " See http://en.wikipe(lia.org/wiki/Judicial_functions_of_the_House_of_Lords. Retrieved on 26-10-
2007 
' " Ibid. 
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Similarly, the House of Lords was once the court that tried peers charged with high 
treason or felony. The House would be presided over not by the Lord Chancellor, but 
by the Lord High Steward, an official especially appointed for the occasion of the 
trial. If Parliament was not in session, then peers could be tried in a separate court, 
known as the Lord High Steward's Court. Only peers, their wives, and their widows 
(unless remarried) were entitled to trials in the House of Lords or the Lord High 
Steward's Court; the Lords Spiritual were tried in Ecclesiastical Courts. In 1948, the 
right of peers and peeresses to be tried in such special courts was abolished; now, they 
are tried in the regular courts. The last such trial in the House was of Edward 
Southwell Russell, 26th Baron de Clifford in 1935.'^^ 
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 will lead to the creation of a separate Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, to which the judicial function of the House of Lords, 
and some of the judicial fiinctions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
will be transferred. In addition, the office of Lord Chancellor has been reformed by 
the act, to remove his ability to act as both a government minister and a judge. This is 
motivated in part by concerns that the historical admixture of legislative, judicial, and 
executive power, may not be in conformance with the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (a judicial officer having legislative or executive power 
not being likely to be considered sufficiently impartial to provide a fair trial), and in 
any case are considered undesirable according to modem constitutional theory 
concerning the separation of powers. The new Supreme Court will be located in 
Middlesex Guildhall.'^^ 
Relationship with the Government: 
Unlike the House of Commons, the House of Lords does not control the term of the 
prime minister or of the government. Only the Lower House may force the Prime 
Minister to resign or call elections by passing a motion of no-confidence or by 
withdrawing supply. Thus, the House of Lords' oversight of the government is 
limited. 
Most Cabinet ministers are from the House of Commons, rather than the House of 
Lords. In particular, all prime ministers since 1902 have been members of the Lower 
'" Ibid. 
'**lbid. 
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House. (Alec Douglas-Home, who became prime minister in 1963 whilst still an Earl, 
disclaimed his peerage and was elected to the Commons soon after his term began.) 
No major cabinet position (except Lord Chancellor and Leader of the House of Lords) 
has been filled by a peer since 1982, when Lord Carrington was the Foreign Secretary 
(Though Baroness Amos was briefly International Development Secretary until the 
death of Lord Williams of Mostyn in 2003). The House of Lords does remain a source 
for junior ministers, such as Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Department of Health). The 
Attorney-General is usually a Lord; currently it is Baroness Scotland of Asthal. The 
House of Lords also has a Chief Whip - currently Lord Grocott.'^ ^ 
'"ibid. 
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Chapter II 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PARLIAMENT 
Before the study of the working of Indian parliament in the post Nehru era, it would 
be necessary as well as usefiil to go back in retrospect in order to decipher or to 
understand the germane events and developments which formed the underpinnings of 
the parliament in India. It will be very pertinent to know as to how the institution like 
parliament came into existence in India? Is it a colonial legacy or the ancient heritage 
of India? No one will understand these questions without the knowledge of past 
historical events. In this chapter we would try to trace those historical events which 
have helped to establish the present form of parliament in India. Let us now give a 
cursory look upon pre-colonial India to trace the historical rudiments of parliament. 
(1) Vedic Period: If we go back to Vedic period (circa 3000- 1000 B.C. ), we can 
find some historical evidence that some popular assemblies existed even then. The 
reference of Sabha (General Assembly) and the Samiti (House of the Elders) given in 
the Rigveda and the Atharvaveda, prove that the democratic and the representative 
institutions existed in Vedic times. 
The Samiti : The Samiti was a powerfiil body in the Vedic times. K.P. Jayaswal 
defined it as 'a assembly of the whole people or Visah'. He writes, "The word Samiti 
(sam + iti) means 'meeting together', i.e., an assembly. The Samiti was the national 
assembly of the whole people or Visah ; for we find, 'the whole people or Samiti, in 
the alternative, electing and re-electing the Rajan or 'king'."' It indicates that the 
Samiti was a representative body of the whole people of the state. The most important 
task of the Samiti was to elect and to re-elect a king, who had been banished. The 
matters related to the states were also discussed in the Samiti. 
The Sabha : Sabha was another constitutional body in the Vedic period. It was 
considered as the sister of Samiti. But in respect of power, Sabha was supreme 
because it had the power to formulate rules and regulations. It acted as a national 
judicature. In the words of Mridul Lata, the Sabha was the supreme because the 
members of the Sabha - Sabhasad - and ministers were the pivot of the nation, their 
K.P. Jayaswal, Hindu Polity, The Bangalore Printing and Publishing, Bangalore City, 1943, p.l2. 
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entire life was to be devoted to the service of the people. In Vedic polity, the people 
could express their grievances against government servants before the Sabha without 
any fear.^  In Rigveda we can also find that Sabha, being a national institution of the 
people, it could formulate rules and principles for the welfare of the nation. The term 
Narishta used in Rigveda for Sabha means the decision by majority.^ It shows some 
of the salient features of the functioning of the modem parliamentary democracy. 
At the same time,the technical word 'Gana' which stands for republic, has been 
mentioned at several places in Regveda. The word Gana means 'number' and 
'Ganarajya' means 'the rule of numbers' or the rule of many. In this context, the 
expression Gana could be considered as 'Demos' (the people ) and the Ganarajya as 
'democracy' or 'republic'. In simple terms, Gana was the assembly or parliament and 
the Ganarajya, consequently, denote 'government by the assembly or parliament'."* 
(2) Post-Vedic period: It is really interesting that we can also find some more 
examples of republican states during the Post-Vedic period of Indian political history 
( 66 B.C. to 385 A.D. ). The writings of that time like, Mahabharata, Aitareya 
Brahmana, Panini's Ashtadhyayi, Kautilya's Arthshastra, inscriptions of Ashoka's 
pillars, texts of Buddhism and Jainism and the Manusmiriti provide enough evidences 
of the existence of republican states during that period. After the Mahabharata war, a 
number of republics were bom. Only sixteen republics including Kashi, Koshal, 
Maghadha, Kuru, Anga, Avanti, Gandhar, Vaishali, Matsya etc. were important.^ So 
far as the fiinctioning of these republics are concemed, the members met in a place 
called Santhagar and the election of people's representatives took shape in an open 
assembly. They selected their Gopa who became king and mled with the help of a 
Council of Ministers.^ Thompson puts the features of these republics in the following 
words, " The genius of the people for the corporate action expressed itself in a variety 
of self-goveming institutions with a highly developed constitution, mles of procedure, 
and machinery of administration which challenge a comparison with modem 
parliamentary institutions. Reading of the election mles of these bodies, the division 
^ Mridul Lata, Vedic Sahitya men Rajya Vyavastha, Ph.D Dissertation, Meerut University, 1989. 
' K.P. Jayaswal, op. cit., p. 19. 
* Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, Delhi, Shipra Publication, 1994, pp.6-7. 
' Ibid, p.8. 
' Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy: From the Earliest Times to the End of the 
Nehru Era, Delhi, Shipra Publication. 1991, p.2. 
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of villages and district into electoral units, their rules of debate and standing orders for 
the conduct of the business and maintenance of order in debate, cind their committee 
system, one might wonder whether many standing orders of the House of Commons 
and of the London County Council are not derived from the regulations of the ancient 
local bodies, ecclesiastical councils and village assemblies of ancient India."' 
More significantly, a study of the Buddhist Bhikhsu Snaghas would show that not 
only there were Parliaments (Sanghas ) but Sanghas observed a great many of the 
rules of procedure known to modem times. Thus, they had rules regarding seating 
arrangements, motion, resolution, quorum, whip, counting of votes, voting by ballot, 
censure motion etc. 
However, it is quite clear that representative institutions and bodies existed in ancient 
India and people were aware about the functioning of these bodies but simultaneously 
it is another truth that present form of government and ancient form of government 
are totally different to each other. Present form of parliamentary system of India is the 
result of the British rule. So, for understanding that how it (parliamentary system) 
came into existence in present form, we have to study first the history of British rule 
in India. 
Indian Parliament: A Colonial Legacy 
It is a fact that ancient India was not ignoramus with representative institutions but it 
is another fact that the present form of government is highly influenced by the British 
parliamentary system and it is really a colonial legacy. The legislative bodies in India 
are only a part of the constitutional history of British rule. Basically, the 
parliamentary form of the government in India did not come into existence suddenly. 
It was gradually introduced by British rulers through various constitutional reforms 
granted by the British parliament. Therefore, it is essential to look into various Acts of 
British parliament with regard to India in order to have a better understanding of the 
development of parliamentary democracy in India. 
' Cited from, Subhash Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., p.8. 
' Ibid, p.9. 
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British Period: East India Company 
In 1600 the British came to India as a trading company. According to the Charter, the 
Company started establishing its trading centers or factories at several places in India, 
namely; Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. East India Company was basically established 
for trading purposes but it extended its sphere of work gradually. Therefore, Company 
needed more power to make rules and regulations for the management of its affairs. 
For this purpose, the Charter of 1601 was granted.' The Charter authorized the 
Governor and Company 'to make ordain, and constitute such and so many laws, 
constitutions, orders and ordinances, as to them, or the greater part of them being then 
and there present, shall seem necessary and convenient for the good government of 
the said Company'.'° The Charter which was granted in 1609 and 1661 affirmed 
similar powers and the Charter of 1693 made no mention of legislative powers."The 
Company was granted new Charters in the year 1709, 1726, 1753, 1754, and 1758. 
The Charter of 1726 had a great legislative importance because it vested, for the first 
time, the Governors and the Councils of the three Presidencies with the legislative 
power 'to', constitute, and obtain by-laws, rules and ordinances for the good 
government. 
But the British had not become a ruling power in India until the second-half of the 
is'*" century. Victory of the Company in the battle of Buxar in 1764, marked yet 
another step towards expansion of territory by the Company. In 1765, the Mughal 
Emperor, Shah Alam was forced to grant the Diwani of the provinces of Bengal, 
Bihar, and Orissa, to the Company. This resulted in the establishment of Dual 
Government in Bengal which continued throughout the period of 1765-1772.'^ 
The Regulating Act (1773): The Regulating Act was the first enactment passed by 
the British Parliament to regulate the working of the territorial acquisition of the 
English Company in India. It has a very special significance in the legislative history 
of India because it was the beginning of the parliamentary control over the 
' Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., p. 18. 
'" H. Cowell, History and Constitution of The Courts and Legislative Authorities in India, Calcutta, 
1936. p. 10 
" J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, thirty ninth edition, 2003, Central Law Publication, 
Allahabad, p. 3. 
'^  H. Cowell, op. cit., p. 2. 
" V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Development and the National Movement in India, fifth Edition, S. 
Chand & Co. Ltd, New Delhi, 1986, p.2. 
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government of the Company.''' The important measures contemplated by the Act were 
the provision for making of Regulations. According to the Act, The Governor-
General and Council was empowered to make rules , ordinances and regulations for 
the good order and civil government of the possessions of the Company.'^ 
The Act provided the following measures: (a) A new executive for the government of 
the Presidency of Bengal, (b) A new relationship between the presidency of Bengal 
and those of Madras and Bombay, (c) Setting up of a Supreme Court at Calcutta.(d) 
Reforms for the Civil Services.(e) A new Procedure for the making of Regulations.'^ 
But the legislati\e powers of the Governor-General and Council were restricted by the 
following provisions: (a) They were not to be repugnant to the laws of England, (b) 
they were to be reasonable; (c) they were to be valid until "duly registered and 
published in the Supreme Court"." Thus the legislative powers were controlled by the 
Supreme Court. Therefore, the position of Governor-General was very weak because 
his orders could be set aside by the king-in-Council on the application of any person 
or persons in India or in England. 
The Pitts India Act, 1784: An amending Act was passed by the parliament in 1781 
for the remedying defects perceived in the working of the Regulating Act. It is known 
as Act of Settlement of 1781. It could not cure the defects of the Regulating Act. The 
agitation for an effective control over the Company's affairs in India continued. To 
solve this problematic situation, the Pitts India Act was passed in 1784 by the 
parliament of Britain. According to the Act, a Board of six commissioners was set up 
in England. It was known as Board of Control. Board was appointed to control the 
political affairs of the Company. The Board was empowered with powers of 
'superintendence, direction and control' of all operations of the civil and military 
government of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies.'^ 
Legislative Development from 1786 to 1788: By 'the Act of 1786' Comwallis 
became the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Forces. He was also given the power 
to over-ride his Council as his own responsibility. In 1788, another Act was passed by 
'" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., p. 20. 
" M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India,1600-1950, third Edition S.Chand & Co.Ltd, New Delhi, 
1984, p. l l . 
'* Ibid, p. 10. 
'^  J.N. Pandey, op. cit., p. 5. 
" M.V. Pylee, op. cit., pp. 14 -16. 
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the British Parliament. It was known as Declaratory Act of 1788. the reason behind 
the passing of this Act was the attitude of the first President(Dundas) of the Board of 
Control. The Directors of the Courts refused the Act of 1781 and Act of 1788 was 
passed. It vested full powers and supremacy in the Board of Control. This was a 
definite step in transferring the powers of the Company to the Crown.'^ 
The Charter Act of 1793: The East India Company was given a new Charter in 
1793. The Act of 1793 laid the foundations of government by written laws and 
regulations in British India in place of the personal rule of the past rulers. The 
interpretation of regulations and written Jaws was to be done by the Courts}^ 
The Charter Act of 1813: The Charter Act of 1793 had renewed the Charter of the 
Company for 20 years. There was a lot of agitation when the renewal of the Charter 
arrived. People demanded the ending of the commercial monopoly of the Company 
and they were determined to have a share in the trade with India. Considering this 
demand, ultimately, the Charter Act of 1813 was passed.^'By the Charter, the British 
Crown asserted a greater control over the power of the Council. The monopoly of 
East India Company was taken away and Indian trade was thrown open to all British 
subjects.'^ ^ 
The Charter Act of 1833: The Charter Act of 1833 was the beginning of the 
establishment of the legislative institutions in India. It introduced the first element of 
institutional specialization in the government of the British territories in India by 
differentiating the law-making meetings of the Govemor-General-in-Council from its 
executive meetings, and the Council in its legislative capacity was to be expanded by 
the addition of a fourth member who was to assist in the work of drafting the laws.^ ^ 
Under this Act, the entire legislative power for all the British territories was 
exclusively vested in the Govemor-General-in-Council. The laws made by the 
Govemor-General-in Council were subject to disallowance by the Court of Directors 
and repeal by the British Parliament.^ '* The laws passed under this Act of 1833 were 
" V.D. Mahajan, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
^^  History of India from mid 18* to mid 19* century, Impact of British Rule: Polity and Society, 
IGNOU,1994, Gita Offset Printers, New Delhi, p.9. 
'^ V.D. Mahajan, op. cit., p.6. 
^^  J.N. Pandey, op. eft., p.6. 
^^Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, Longmans. London. 1957. pp. 45-46. 
Subhash C. Kashyap. History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p.6. 
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called "Acts of Parliament" and not "Regulations" as before. The Act also contained 
a provision for the framing of the rules and procedure for the Council, in the 
"punctual, constant and even fastidious adherence" to which was believed to lie the 
best security for the efficient dispatch of legislative proceedings.^^ Thus, by the 
provisions of the Act 1833 one can easily find the seeds of legislative council. 
The Charter Act of 1853: The Charter Act of 1853 was an improved version of the 
Charter Act of 1833. It further distinguished the executive and legislative aspects of 
the Govemor-General-in Council, and the size of the Council as legislature was 
further increased by the addition of a representative of each Presidency, alongwith 
two judges.^^ Now, the Council consisted of 12 members including Governor-General 
and the Commander-in-Chief There was also a provision of "Presiding Officer" with 
the right to exercise the "casting vote" in event of "equality of voices". It was also 
provided that no law made by the Council would come into force until the same had 
been assented to by the Governor-General. Under this Act, the discussion in the 
Council became oral instead of in writing; bills were referred to select committee and 
to the single member and "legislative meetings were made public and the proceedings 
published".^^ 
The Act of 1858: The Revolt of 1857 was the first attempt to overthrow the British 
Empire. This Revolt brought up more radical changes in the constitutional history of 
India. It resulted into the enactment of the "The Act for the Good Government in 
India" of 1858, which eventually terminated the Company rule and India placed under 
the direct control of the Crown. It abolished the Court of Directors and the Board of 
Control. The government, territories and revenues of India were transferred to the 
Crovm from the Company. It further declared that India was to be governed by and in 
the name of the English sovereign. "Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858, brought 
the East India Company's century-old rule to an end".^" 
^' J.C.Johri, "Evolution of Indian Parliament", in Dr. Phul Chand (ed.), Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 
National Publishing House, 1984 p.3. 
*^ C. Illbert, The Government of India, Oxford, 1922. p.87. 
^^  Morris- Jones, Parliament of India, op. cit., p.46 
^' Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
^' Morris-Jones, Parliament of India, op. cit., p.46. 
'" M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India (1600-1950), op. cit., pp.27-28. 
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The Indian Councils Act of 1861: The Regulating Act had initiated the process of 
centralization, which culminated in the Act of 1833. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 
inaugurated an opposite process, a process of decentralization.^' 
The Indian Councils Act was passed in 1861. The Act is important in the 
constitutional history of India for two main reasons. First; it enabled the Governor-
General to associate the representatives of the Indian people with the work of 
legislation by nominating them to his expanded Council and second; it decentralized 
the legislative powers of the Governor General's Council and vested them into the 
Government of Bombay and Madras.^ ^ 
The merit of the Act lay in inaugurating the system of "legislative devolution in 
India", which was reflected in the restoration of legislative powers of the Provinces 
and the emergence of five expanded Provincial Legislative Councils as well as, the 
Governor General 's Legislative Council was enlarged by the inclusion of further 
additional members, was to be nominated, half of them were to be non-officials.^^ 
Within the sphere of legislation, the Council's initiative and authority were subject to 
important limitations. Thus, measures affecting public debt or revenue, religion, 
military or naval forces or foreign relations were not to be introduced without the 
prior permission of the Governor-General. Further, a bill passed by the Council could 
become law only after receiving the assent of the Governor-General who could 
withhold the assent absolutey, or might reserve the same for the pleasure of her 
Majesty whose assent, in that case, was necessary. The Crown also had the power to 
disallow any law which had been assented to by the Governor-General (acting without 
his Council) also enjoyed the power of ordinances, in cases of emergency, which were 
to have the same force and authority as a law passed by the Lagislative Council. 
These ordinances could remain in force for a period of six months, unless earlier 
disallowed by the Crown or repealed by another ordinance or law passed by the 
Council.^'' 
'^ Ibid, p.38. 
^^  Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p.7. 
" Morris-Jones, Parliament of India, op. cit., 47. 
^* Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
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The Indian Councils Act of 1892: The formation of the Indian National Congress, 
and its pressure for constitutional reforms, led to further changes in the composition 
of the legislative councils, beginning with the Indian Councils Act of 1892, which 
was partially intended to contain the Congress agitation and co-opt the moderates 
within it.''^  All the same, the Act futher enlarged the additional members in the 
Governor-General' Council as well as Provincial Legislative Council and their 
functions extended in such a way as to permit members to ask questions and to 
discuss (but not to vote) the budget.^ ^ By this Act, the elective principles were 
introduced in a convoluted manner at the provincial and national level, which allowed 
for a minority of the seats to be filled by nominations on the recommendations of 
certain bodies. The object of representation was that "to give the people of India a 
- I T 
real living representation in the Legislative Council" and "each important class shall 
have the opportunity of making its views known in the Council by the mouth of some 
members specially acquainted with them".^^ 
The Minto-Morley Reforms: Like other constitutional Acts, the Act of 1892 also 
failed to fulfill the expectations of the Indian leaders. The Congress resentment and 
demand for an increase in the membership and powers of the legislative council 
continued. The Indian National Congress declared at its 21^' session at Banaras (1905) 
that the time has come "for a further expansion and reform of the supreme and 
provincial Legislative Council so that they became more truly representative of the 
people, and non official members there may have a real voice in the government of 
the country".^' In the wake of growing resistance, the then Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Morley and the then Viceroy, Lord Minto jointly came to India with 
certain constitutional reform proposals which later passed by the Parliament and 
became the Indian Councils Act of 1909. 
The Indian Councils Act of 1909: By the Act of 1909, some important changes were 
made in the constitution and functions of the Legislative Council of India. 
Constitutionally, it further enlarged the numbers of the member of Council and made 
it more representative in the nature. Under the Act, the number of the members were 
" Nirja Gopal Jayal, Democracy in India, New Delhi. Oxford University Press, 2000. p.20. 
*^ Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, op. cit., 47. 
'^ Cited from, Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., p. 44. 
" Cited from, Morris Jones, Parliament in India, op. cit., p.48. 
' ' Cited from, Subhash C. Kashyap, op. cit. 
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doubled and in some cases, more than doubled. Where the maximum number of 
additional members for the Government of India was only 16 under the Act of 1892, it 
was raised to 60 under this Act, and the maximum number of additional members for 
the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bengal was raised from twenty to fifty.'"' 
For the first time in India, it introduced separate electorates and separate 
representation for the Muslim community, and the principle of indirect election was 
also introduced for the first in India. Until the Act of 1909 there were only the 
majority of the officials in the Legislative Council under this Act, the proportion of 
non-officials was increased and a non-official majority was established in the 
provinces.'*' 
Functionally, some other changes were also made in the Act of 1909. The sphere and 
the functions of the Council were enlarged in three ways by the Act of 1909. This was 
as follows: 
(a) It, for the first time, gave to the Council the power to move the resolutions on 
matters of general public interest. But the Government was not bound to accept them. 
These resolutions only had the effect of recommendations; and: 
(b) The right to ask questions on the budget by the members of the Council was 
enlarged and the supplementary questions were also allowed to be asked."*^  
•*" M. V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., pp.47-48. 
*' Ibid, pp. 48-49. 
*^ Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STRENGTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCILS UNDER THE ACT OF 1892 AND 1909 
Maximum no. of Max. no. of addl. Total strength under 
additional members members under the regulations of 
under the Act of 1892 the Act of 1909 1912 
India 
Madras 
Bombay 
Bengal 
Bihar & Orissa 
U.P. 
Punjab 
Burma 
Assam 
16 
20 
20 
80 
15 
15 
15 
20 
60 68 
50 48 
50 48 
50 53 
50 44 
30 49 
30 26 
30 17 
30 25 
Note: There was no Bihar and Orissa Provinces before 1912 and in the period of 
1905-12 Assam was 
Joined to East Bengal, both were called. Eastern Bengal and Assam."^ 
However, the Minto-Morley Reforms represented a great improvement upon the Act 
of 1892 but they could not be successful to satisfy the aspirations or expectations of 
Indian people. They failed to establish a parliamentary government in India because 
the Councils were not truly representative of the people as a whole and they did not 
have real legislative and financial powers. These Councils were absolutely 
responsible to the British Government. Thus, their existence was only for the purpose 
of debate and criticism on certain matters. 
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms: As we mentioned it earlier, Minto-Morley 
Reforms could neither satisfied the aspirations of the moderate's nor extremist's 
demand for self-government. It was a dismal failure of Minto-Morley Reforms that 
they could not associate the people to a great extent with the government in decision 
making regarding public oriented questions. In the words of Sumit Sarkar, "The 
Indian Council Act of 1909 proved to be the most short lived of all of Britain's 
'constitutional' experiments in India, being totally revised within nine years by the 
"*' M. V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., p. 48 
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Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918".'*^ This disillusionment created by the Act of 
1909 in political atmosphere of India, raised the demand of 'self-government for 
India'. This was the demand of extremist leaders of India and moderates wanted a 
'responsible government' for India. 
The feeling of self-determination and spirit of nationalism was intensified by the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914. India devoted herself whole-heartedly in the 
War on the side of Britain. According to the Montague-Chelmsford Report, the 
attitude of the Indian political leaders during the War was 'worthy of all praise'. 
Simultaneously, the Indian leaders were planning new schemes for India. They hoped 
that after the War and victory of Britain and Allies, Britain would offer to India some 
political advancement as a reward. But, unfortunately, nothing of that sort happened 
and India could not be offered any willing reward after the end of the War and the 
victory of Britain.''^ 
At that time, circumstances had patched up differences between the Muslim League 
and the National Congress. The Committee appointed by both, made a scheme jointly 
which was popularly known as the 'Congress-League Scheme' or 'the Lucknow Pact' 
of 1916. This scheme was welcomed by both Muslim League and National Congress. 
In 1916, another political development took place in India with the foundation of 
'Home Rule League'. Mrs. Annie Besant founded the 'Home Rule League' on 1 
September 1916. The objective of the foundation of the Home Rule League was to 
influence the political opinion of the Indian masses in favour of self-government 
(Home-Rule).'*^ 
In 1917, the British Prime Minister appointed Edwin Montague as Secretary of State 
for India to study the India's political problems. Montague visited whole of the 
country alongwith the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and they submitted a joint report in 
July 1918 with their proposals, which was popularly known as the 'Montford Report'. 
On the basis of this Report, a Bill was passed by the British Parliament in December 
1919 and called the 'Government of India Act, 1919."' 
"^  Sumit Sarkar, Modem India: 1885-1947, Macmillan, New Delhi, 1982, p.l42. 
"' M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India: 1600-1950, op. cit., p.54, and Subhash C. Kashyap, 
History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., p.85. 
*^ Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op. cit., p. 86. 
"' M.V. Pylee, Constiyutional History of India: 1600-1950, op. cit., p. 55. 
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The Government of India Act of 1919: Composition of the Legislature - The 
Government of India Act 1919 set up a bicameral system at the center (Council of 
State and Legislative Assembly, with elected majorities, but no control over 
ministers). It considered to enlarge electorates to five and half million in provinces 
and one half million for the Imperial Legislature. The separate electorates were 
retained for Muslims throughout India on the basis of Lucknow Pact of 1916 and 
extended to Sikhs in Punjab, Indian Christians in Madras, Anglo-Indians in Madras 
and Bengal, and Europeans in five provinces. In addition, a number of seats were 
reserved for non-Brahmins in Madras and Marathas in Bombay, both majority 
communities, who were thought likely to be under the dominance of a strongly 
entrenched [Brahmin] minority."* Special constituencies were also maintained for 
large landholders, commercial and industrial interests, and universities. 
48 His Majesty Government (HMG), Report of the Statutory Commission, vol. 1, London, 1930 pp. 
144-45 and 167-68. 
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COMPOSITION OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS UNDER THE ACT OF 1919 
Elected members Nominated members 
General Communal Special 
Electorates Electorates Electorates 
Non- Non- Muslim Muslim Euro- Anglo- Indian Sikhs Univer- Land- Comm- Officials NonTotal 
Provinces Muslim Muslim (Rural) (Urban) peans Indians Chris- sities holders erce & (nominal- offl-
(Rural) (Urban) tions Industry ed & ex- cials 
officio) 
Bombay 
Madras 
Bengal 
United -
Provinces 
Punjab 
Bihar &-
Orissa 
Central-
Provinces 
35 
56 
35 
52 
13 
42 
31 
11 
9 
11 
25 
7 
6 
9 
22 
11 
33 
4 
27 
15 
6 
5 
2 
6 
1 
5 
3 
1 
2 
1 
5 
1 
1 
2 1 
1 
12 
1 
3 
6 
5 
3 
I 
5 
7 
6 
15 
3 
4 
3 
20 
23 
20 
18 
16 
26 
5 111 
6 127 
6 139 
5 123 
6 93 
7 103 
12 
1 5 3 : 
1 3 3 10 6 70 
Assam 20 1 12 6 9 5 53 
Leislative Assembly: The strength of the Legislative Assembly was provisionally 
fixed by the Act at 140 (100 elected, 26 nominated officials and the rest nominated 
non-officials). The total number could be increased by the statutory rule and the 
proportion between the classes of members could be varied subject to the condition 
that at least five-sevenths of the total numbers were elected members and at least one-
third of the rest were non-officials. Wherever nomination was provided for, it had to 
be done by the Viceroy. The Council of the States was to consist of not more than 60 
members, nominated or elected in accordance with statutory rules, and of these not 
more than 20 were to be officials and less than thirty were to be elected. In the case of 
the Council of States, property qualifications for voters pitched extremely high 
making the House, more or less, an exclusive preserve of wealthy landowners and 
merchants. More importantly, women were not entitled to be elected to the Council or 
to vote for election to it. However, it depended upon the Council to remove either or 
both of these barriers by passing a resolution.'*' 
Qualifications of the Voters: The right to vote of the voters depended on a number of 
qualifications such as (i) residence in that constituency for a minimum period of time; 
Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 29-30, and M. V. Pylee, 
Constitutional History of India, op. cit., p. 65. 
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(ii) ownership or occupation of a house which had a minimum rental value; and (iii) 
payment of a minimum municipal tax or income tax or some other tax or the receipt 
of a military pension. Owing to these qualifications, the number of eligible voters was 
extremely small.^ 
Tenure of the Houses of the Legislature: The normal tenure of the Council, 
according to the Act, was fixed at five and of the Assembly at three years. But the 
Governor could dissolve earlier both House separately and could also extend their 
normal life in special circumstances. After the dissolution, it was necessary to 
summon a new chamber within six months. The Governor-General was authorized to 
summon and prorogue, and the presiding officer to adjourn the Chamber. '^ 
Powers and Functions of the Legislature: The powers of the Legislature were largely 
expanded through the represented character of the assembly. Under the Act of 1919, 
the Central Legislature was empowered to make laws for the whole of British India 
and for all Brifish Indian subjects within as well as outside British India. But, at the 
same time, the Central Legislature continued to be the subject of severe limitafions 
that were designed to keep the sovereignty of the British Parliament or to maintain the 
supremacy of the Governor-General and his Council. Broadly speaking, the Central 
Legislature had no power to amend or repeal any parliamentary statute relating to 
British India or to do anything affecting the authority of the British parliament. The 
Act required that measures affecting certain important matters could be introduced in 
either House of the Indian legislature only with the previous sanction of the 
Governor-General. Besides his power of veto, the Governor-General was given the 
power to secure the enactment of laws, which he considered essential for the safety, 
tranquility or interests of British India, or any part of British India. Even if the 
legislature rejected a bill recommended by him, he could certify that it was essential 
for public interest and it would become an Act on the signification of his assent. In the 
financial sphere too, the Governor-General had absolute power to restore, if 
necessary, any grants that had been reduced or rejected by the Assembly. The only 
check upon this unqualified power of the Governor-General lay in the hands of the 
°^ M. V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., p. 62. 
" A.B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India: 1600-1935, Delhi, 1990, p. 261. 
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British parliament before which every such Act had to be laid at least eight days 
before receiving Royal- assent. 
On the whole, the Reforms proved totally inadequate to satisfy the demand for 
responsible government for India of the Indian leaders. The Act of 1919 did not 
introduce any element of responsibility at the central level and the Govemor-General-
in Council continued to remain responsible only to the Secretary of State for India and 
through him to the British Parliament. Thus, the elected Indian representatives in the 
Assembly were almost invariably hostile to the government in all the discussions. 
Tilak termed it as, " dissatisfying, disappointing and a sun without morning", and the 
Congress called the reforms as, "inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing".^'' 
The Simon Commission: The Simon Commission was appointed in 1927, following 
the insipid report of the Muddiman Committee, to enquire into the working of the 
Government of India under the Act of 1919 and report as to whether or to what extent 
it was desirable to establish the principle of responsible government. All members of 
the Commission were non-Indians. It was this total exclusion of Indian element in the 
Commission due to which it met v\dth hostility fi-om nationalist opinion. This gave rise 
to protests all over India resulting in the boycott of the Commission by most of the 
political organizations in India, including the National Congress. '^* 
The Nehru Committee: By the initiative of the Congress, an all parties conference 
was called in May 1928, which appointed a committee headed by Motilal Nehru "to 
determine the principles of the Constitution for India". The Committee presented its 
report within three months, on 10 August 1928. This was the first attempt by Indians 
to frame a constitution for their own country. Most of its features were later included 
in the Constitution of India. It recommended a parliamentary system with full 
responsible government and joint electorates with time bound reservations for 
minorities. The Nehru Report laid special emphasis on securing fundamental human 
rights for the people of India. These included the right to "the freedom of conscience 
and the free profession and practice of religion", "the right to free expression of 
'^ Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p. 31 and M.V. Pylee, 
Constitutional History of India, op. cit, p. 67. 
" Ibid, p. 34. 
^ A. B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India, 1600-1935, op. cit., pp.285-289, and M. V. Paylee, 
Constitutional History of India, op. cit., p. 72, and also see the reports of the Madras Session of the 
National Congress, 1927. Indian Constitutional Documents, vol. Ill, p. 158. 
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opinion, as well as right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form 
associations or unions", equal rights for men and women, and right to free elementary 
education.^ 
The Nehru report recommended a federal structure with maximum autonomy granted 
to the provinces but residuary powers vested in the central government. The report 
provided for a bicameral parliament at the center. The upper house of the parliament 
(Senate) consisted of 200 members elected by the Provincial Councils and the House 
of the Representatives consisted of 500 members elected directly on the basis of adult 
franchise.^^ The Nehru Report was followed by the boycott of the Simon Commission 
and mass demonstrations wherever its members went. In December 1929, the 
Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru declared complete independence as its goal and 
followed this up with launching of the mass Civil Disobedience Movement in April 
1930. 
The first Round Table Conference: The first Round Table Conference commenced 
on 12 November 1930, in London by British government for the constitutional 
reforms at the time when Civil Disobedience Movement started by the Congress was 
on its peak. Every Indian delegate of this Conference expressed his willingness in the 
support of a federal plan for India. The chief spokesman of the British Government, 
the then Prime Minister, MacDonald, in his final speech, declared that "the idea of an 
All-India Federation, with a federal executive responsible to the legislature, was 
en 
agreeable to this Government" This policy was set out in a command paper which 
was subsequently approved by both the Houses of Parliament. 
But, in spite of their professed intentions, the British government did not effect to the 
proposals by introducing a Bill for the establishment of the proposals for an Indian 
federation. Thus, every Indian party realized very soon that the decisions of Round 
Table Conference were not valuable. In the words of Jawahar Lai Nehru, "R.T.C. 
decisions had not the least value". 
" Bipan Chandra, India After independence 1947-2000, New Delhi, Penguin, 1999. p. 35. 
'* R. Coupland, The Constitutional Problems of India, Madras, 1944, part I, p. 85; All Party Conference 
1928, Report of the Committee, Allahabad, 1928, pp. 100-124. 
" Cited from, M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., p.77. 
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By the efforts of the Viceroy, Lord Irvin, the famous Gandhi-Irwin Pact was settled 
on 5 March, 1931. As a result of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, the Civil Disobedience 
Movement was ended. On the basis of this pact, Gandhi agreed to participate in the 
second Round Table Conference as the sole representative of the Indian National 
Congress. 
Second Round Table Conference: The second Round Table Conference was held 
during 7 September to 1 December 1931. Mahatma Gandhi's participation at the 
Round Table Conference raised high hopes about the successful outcome of the 
Conference. But the session was soon deadlocked on the minority issue, with separate 
electorates being demanded now not only by Muslims but also by depressed castes, 
Indian Christians, Anglo- Indians and Europeans.^^ 
The Third Round Table Conference: The third and last session of Round Table 
Conference was held by British government at London from 17 November to 24 
December, 1932 with only 46 delegates. At that time, the Civil Disobedience 
Movement was going on and all the Congress leaders including Gandhi and Jawahar 
Lai Nehru were in jail. There were no Congress representatives at the Conference and 
British Laboiu- Party also abstained from participation. At the end of Conference, the 
Secretary of State declared three important points about the proposals of the new 
Constitution:^" 
(i) A begirming for establishment of a federal set up would be made if more than 
half of the princely States were prepared to join the federation. 
(ii) The Indian Muslims would get 33 percent of seats from British India in the 
Central Legislature; and 
(iii) Sindh and Orissa would be made two new provinces. 
The proposals of the Conference were knovm as the Communal Award which 
compelled Gandhi to begin a fast imto death. In the words of M.V. Pylee, "this was 
also known as Ramsay Macdonald's Award, 4 August, 1932. According to this, 
separate electoral districts were created on religious communal basis, fixing the 
number of seats in the legislature for Muslims, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, 
" Sumit Sarkar, Modem India, op. cit., p. 319. 
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Sikhs, Europeans, etc. But the worst part of it was fixing of separate electoral seats for 
the 'Depressed Classes or the Scheduled Castes' who were a part of the Hindu 
Community. It was against this that Gandhi fasted."^' Thus we can say that nobody 
was happy with the proposals of the third Round Table Conference. 
The White Paper (1933): Finally, the proposals of the British government for 
constitutional reforms were contained in the White Paper Proposals of 1933. The 
White Paper embodied provisions for a federal set up and provincial autonomy. It 
proposed diarchy at the centre and responsible government in the provinces. But the 
proposals were found to be highly unsatisfactory and unacceptable by Indian 
nationalists. Nehru described the White Paper as a "Gilbertian Solution" of the Indian 
problem, which was the outcome of "many comings and outgoings between India and 
England during three years of the three Round Table Conferences and innumerable 
committees and consultations".^^ A Joint Select Committee was appointed in 1933 to 
examine the Government's proposals which had published the White Paper. After 
eighteen months, the Committee introduced a Bill in the House of Commons at the 
end of 1934 and the Act was finally passed in August 1935.^ ^ 
It was becoming clear that Indians were not to be satisfied with anything less than the 
right to frame their own constitution. The idea that this should not be done specific 
purpose, on the basis of the widest possible franchise. Jawahar Lai Nehru was the first 
national leader who articulated this idea in 1933. The ideas underlying his concept of 
the Constituent Assembly were: (1) Full self-determination by the people of India 
without the imposition of the will of any outside authority, and: (2) A decision by the 
mass of the people through their representatives elected by adult franchise.*'' 
Nehru's idea of a constituent assembly was formally accepted by the Congress in June 
1934 when by its resolution the British Government's White Paper on further 
constitutional reforms, the Congress Working Committee resolved that the "only 
*' M.V. Pylee, op.cit., p.80. 
" Jawahar Lai Nehru, An Autobiography, London, 1963, p.387. 
" Morris Jones, Parliament in India, op. cit., p. 59. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp.58-62. 
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satisfactory alternative to the White Paper is a Constitution drdivn|Uj)cb.yja<cQnstituent 
assembly elected on the basis of aduU franchise or as near as is j^t^t^le."^^ ^ 
Thenceforward, the Congress repeated the demand for a constituent-^j^blji, 
forcefully and frequently. Nevertheless, the vehement opposition from the Congress, 
the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee(1933-34), with some 
modifications vs^ ere adopted by the British parliament and became law in the form of 
the Government of India Act, 1935. 
The Government of India Act 1935: A significant step of the Government India Act 
was the replacement of dyarchy with responsible government in the provinces of 
British India. But in spite of the introduction of provincial autonomy, the Act of 1935 
retained control of the central government over the provinces in a certain sphere. The 
Act made provisions for the establishment of "The Federation of India", including 
British India and the princely states. The important provisions of the Act of 1935: 
The Central Legislature: The Central Legislature or the Federal Legislature was to 
consist of his Majesty, represented by the Governor-General, and two chambers 
known as the House of Assembly and the Council of States. The Assembly was to 
have a maximimv of 375 members- 250 from British India and the rest from the Indian 
States. Of the 250 seats from British India, 3 were to represent commerce and industry 
and 1 labour. The remaining 246 were to be elected indirectly from provincial 
constituencies largely formed on the basis of communities, land holders etc. The 
representatives of the Indian States were to be appointed by their rulers. The 
assembly's tenure was normally for the period of five years. 
The Council of the States was to have a maximum of 260 members- 156 from British 
India and the remaining 104 from the Indian States. The representatives of the States 
could be nominated by their rulers. Out of 156 seats from British India, 7 were 
reserved for Europeans, 1 for Anglo Indians, 2 for Indian Christians and 6 for others 
to be nominated by the Governor-General in his discretion. The remaining 140 seats 
were distributed among the provinces. The Coimcil was intended to be a permanent 
" Shiva Rao and others, The Framing of India's Constitution, Select Documents, Vol. 1, New Delhi, 
m).77-78. 
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77 
body with one third of its membership retiring at the end of every second year. The 
members were to be elected by the provincial legislatures. 
The Provincial Legislature: Of the eleven Governor's provinces, six had bicameral 
legislatures, i.e.. assemblies and councils, while the remaining five had unicameral 
legislatures, i.e., legislative assemblies only. The following table will show the 
maximum number of members prescribed for each provincial legislature: 
Name of Province 1 Maximum no. of the 
Assam 
Bihar 
Bengal 
Bombay 
Madras 
United Provinces 
Central Provinces and 
Berar 
North-West Frontier 
Provinces 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Sindh 
members in the Assembly 
108 
152 
250 
175 
215 
228 
112 
50 
60 
175 
60 
Maximum Number in the 1 
Council 
22 
30 
65 
30 
56 
60 
Source: M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., pp. 94-95. 
The provincial legislatures did not represent the people through general 
constituencies. Instead, they were composed of members elected on the basis of 
constituencies organized according to religion or race, interest or sex. The main 
communities reorganized on a religious or racial basis were Muslims, Sikhs, Anglo-
Indians, Indian Christians and Europeans. Besides, there were what are known as 
'general constituencies' where the voters belonged to different castes or sects of the 
Hindu religion. Even here a certain number of seats were reserved for the 'scheduled 
castes' or depressed classes. Special interests reorganized for representation were 
67 Ibid, 
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industry, commerce, landholders, universities and labour. A small number of seats 
were reserved for women to contest in any other constituency*.^^ 
Members of the Assembly were elected directly. The extent of the franchise varied 
from province to province. Generally, it was determined on the basis of minimum 
land revenue a person paid, or house rent. A certain minimum educational 
qualification or military service also was considered adequate for the purpose. It was 
estimated that some 14 percent of the population got the right to vote under this 
system in contrast to 3 percent under the Act of 1919. The assembly had a normal life 
of five years* .^ ^ 
The council was to be a permanent body with one-third of its membership being 
renewed at the end of every third year. A great majority of its members were to be 
elected, some directly and others indirectly, and the rest to be the nominated by the 
Governor at his discretion. Those who voted in the elections to the council had high 
property qualification or paid heavy income tax or rent or held high position in 
government or were title-holders*. 
Both the Houses had equal powers except in financial matters. All money bills were 
to be initiated in the Assembly and the Council had no voice in the matter of grants. In 
case of persisting conflict between the two Houses for a period of twelve months, the 
Governor could summon a joint sitting of the two Houses in order to solve the 
deadlock.^' 
Division of Powers between Central and Provincial Legislatures: The Act provided 
for division of powers between the central legislature and the provincial legislatures 
by enumerating them into three elaborate lists - the Central, Provincial and 
Concurrent Lists. The federal legislature and provincial legislatures were empowered 
to pass laws on subjects given in their respective lists while both of them could pass 
laws on any subject in the Concurrent list. However, if the federal legislature passed a 
law on any matter given in the Concurrent list, a provincial legislature could not make 
a law on the same subject afterwards. But the allocation of the residuary power of 
** M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., pp. 94-95. 
*' Ibid, p. 95. 
™Ibid, 
' ' Ibid, pp. 95-96. 
'^ Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 
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legislation in the Act was unique. It was not vested in either the central or the 
provincial legislature but the Governor-General was empowered to authorize either 
the federal or the provincial legislature to enact a law with respect to any matter 
which was not enumerated in the Legislative lists. Though the Indian States did not 
join the federation, the federal provisions of the Act of 1935, were in fact applied as 
between the central government and the provinces. 
Legislative Powers of the Governor-General: Unlike provinces, the government at 
the center headed by the Governor-General was not to be responsible to anybody in 
India but the British Crovm through the Secretary of State for India in Britain. There 
was to be a council of ministers, but certain subjects - like defence and foreign affairs 
- were reserved to the Governor-General aided by the Counselors and were not 
subject to vote. Moreover, even in the "transferred" field certain safeguards were 
inserted in the form of provisions for the Governor-General to "act in his discretion" 
and to "exercise his individual judgment". The former powers extended from the 
"reserved" subjects to control of the Reserve Bank, appointment of ministers and 
summoning of legislature, and power to declare an emergency. The latter power was 
mainly for exercise in relation to the Governor-General's eight "special 
responsibilities": peace and tranquility; minorities; civil servants; British commercial 
interests; backward areas; princely states; the financial stability and credit of the 
Federal Government; the effective execution of all federal orders. There was no 
reference of even a prime minister in the Act*.^ "* 
Apart from the Governor-General's power of veto, a bill passed by the central 
legislature was also subject to veto by the Crown. Notably, despite the power to 
promulgate ordinances during the recess of the legislature, the Governor-General had 
independent power of legislation, concurrently with those of the legislature. Thus, he 
had the power to make temporary ordinances as well as permanent Acts at any time 
for the discharge of his "special responsibility". At the same time, no bill or 
amendment could be introduced in the legislature without the Governor-General's 
previous sanction, with respect to certain matters, e.g., if the bill or amendment sought 
to repeal or amend or was repugnant to any law of British parliament extending to 
" D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, op. cit., pp. 10-11 
'" Morris Jones, Parliament in India, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
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India or any Governor-General's or Governor's Act or if it sought to affect matters as 
respect to which the Governor-General was required to act in his discretion. It is 
really interesting to note that neither any "counselors" nor any council of ministers 
responsible to the legislature came to be appointed under the Act of 1935; the old 
Executive Council provided by the Act of 1919 continued to advice the Governor-
General until the Indian Independence Act of 1947. 
Functions of the Central Legislature: Each House of the central legislature was to 
elect its own chairman or deputy chairmen and had power to regulate, subject to the 
provisions of the Act, its own procedure and business. Both Houses had equal powers 
except in financial matters. Money bill could be introduced only in the Assembly. But 
the Council of States could amend or reject them in the same manner as the 
Assembly. In the case of persisting conflict between the two Houses on any bill 
including a Money bill, Governor-General could summon a joint sitting of the two 
Houses to resolve the differences by a majority vote of the members present and 
voting.^^ 
It can be concluded here that the Governor-General under the Act of 1935 was the 
cornerstone of the entire Constitution of India. His powers were extensive and 
overriding both in the legislative and executive departments. The federal legislature 
contemplated in the 1935 Act was an ineffective and powerless body in comparison to 
the innumerable discretionary powers vested in the Governor-General. Therefore, the 
Act of 1935 failed to gain popular support. 
Nehru as well as the Congress was convinced that there was no prospect of India as a 
whole achieving any degree of real self-government under the Act of 1935. However, 
the Congress decided to contest the election of provincial legislatures in 1937, but the 
demand for a constituent assembly was included in the Congress manifesto. The 
Congress won majorities in seven out of eleven provinces and decided to form 
ministries. However, it made sure that this was not construed as acceptance of the 
existing constitutional framework. The Congress Working Committee meeting after 
the election at Wardha on 27-28 February 1937 decided in favour of accepting office 
and also reminded the legislatures that a resolution of the Faizpur Congress had bound 
" D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, op. cit., p. 10. 
'* Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
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them to articulate the demand for a constituent assembly as soon as possible in the 
new legislatures.^^ The scheduled convention of Congress legislators and AICC 
members met with Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi on 19-20 March 1937. At the chair 
Nehru told the delegates, "They had to work for a "panchayati raj" fashioned by a 
constituent assembly, a grand panchayat of the nation, elected by all our people." In 
unequivocal terms, he said "this constitution must therefore go, lock, stock and barrel, 
and leave the field clear for our constituent assembly."^* 
In August 1937, the Congress Working Committee accepted a draft resolution 
prepared by Acharya Kriplani, which was sent to Congressmen in the provincial 
assemblies. Between August and October 1937, all the Congress provinces - Bombay, 
Madras, U.P., Bihar, Orissa, central provinces. North-West Frontier provinces - as 
well as Sindh passed this resolution which demanded that " the Government of India 
Act, 1935... be repealed and replaced by a constitution for a free India framed by a 
constituent assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise."^^ A similar resolution 
was moved in the central assembly on 17 September 1937 but it was not passed. The 
Haripura session of the Congress in February 1938 repeated the same demand.^" 
Second World War and the Constitutional Developments: In the Second World 
War, British government declared India to be a belligerent country without consulting 
the people of India in any way or referring the matter to the Central Assembly or to 
the provincial governments. "On 3 September 1939, the Viceroy (Lord Linlithgow) 
imilaterally associated India with Britain's declaration of war on Germany, without 
bothering to consult the provincial ministries or any Indian leader".^' Congress 
ministries resigned in protest against this declaration of British government. On 14 
September, 1939, the Congress Working Committee issued a long statement in which 
Committee asserted that, " India should be regarded as an independent nation entitled 
to frame her own constitution."*^ On 2 October, 1939, Dr. Rajendra Presad 
accompanied Jawaharlal Nehru to meet the Viceroy and demanded a 'full blooded. 
" Bipan Chandra, et all, India After Independence, op. cit., pp. 35-36. Subhash C. Kashyap, History of 
the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p.78 
'* The quotes are from Nehru's Presidential address to the National Convention of Congress 
Legislators, March 1937. Shiva Rao and others, The Framing of India's Constitution, Vol. 1, op. cit., 
pp. 86-91. 
' Shiva Rao and others. The Framing of India's Constitution, vol. I. op. cit., p. 93. 
*° Bipin Chandra, India After Independence, op. cit., p. 36. 
" Sumit Sarkar, Modem India 1937-1945, op. cit., p. 375. 
*^  V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1957, p. 66. 
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positive and unambiguous' declaration to the effect that after the end of the war India 
shall have 'absolute freedom' and unfettered liberty to frame her own constitution by 
means of a constituent assembly. By the end of 1939, Mahatma had been fully 
convinced by Nehru about his concept of a Constituent Assembly. Thus by the end 
of 1930s, the Congress perspective of the Constitution of India being framed by a 
constituent assembly had become an inseparable part of the Congress programme and 
the national struggle for independence. 
The August Offer of 1940: The "August Offer" made by Viceroy Linlithgow in 
1940, was an attempt to secure Indian co-operation in the War efforts. For the first 
time, the demand for a constituent assembly was authoritatively conceded by the 
British government. It also offered to set up, after the conclusion of the war, "a body 
representative of the principal elements in India's national life in order to devise the 
framework of the new constitution". How this body was to be constituted - by direct 
or indirect elections based on adult or restricted franchise, or by nomination - was not 
spelt out.^ "* However, in this August Offer, British government rejected the Indian 
demand for a constituent assembly and its basis, self-determination. Not only the 
Congress but also other major parties rejected the August offer and the rift between 
the government and the Congress became wider than ever before. The Congress 
leaders began expressing their anti British views openly and in strong terms and some 
of them started individual civil disobedience (Satyagraha). 
Vinoba Bhave was the first to offer satyagraha. By 15 May 1941, more than 25,000 
satyagrahis had been jailed. Two major changes in world politics occurred during 
1941. Having occupied Poland, Belgium, Holland, Norway and France in the west as 
well as most of Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 
1941. On 7 December Japan launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl 
Harbour and joined the war on the side of Germany and Italy. It quickly overran the 
Philippines, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya and Burma. It occupied Rangoon in 
March 1942. This brought the war to India's door-step.^^ 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 98-99. 
'"' Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution: 1921-
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Now, the British government at last felt obliged to make some gestures to win over 
Indian public opinion. For this purpose, Winston Churchill, the then prime minister of 
Britain, announced on 11 March 1942 the dispatch of Sir Stafford Cripps to India, a 
prominent Labour party member of the War Cabinet and a friend of Nehru. Cripps 
was a socialist and was known as a well-wisher of India. 
The Cripps Mission of 1942: Cripps arrived in India on 22 March 1942 and 
presented his proposals for consideration to all the parties concerned. The main 
provisions of Sir Stafford's scheme were as follows: 
(1) The object of His Majesty's Government v a^s the creation of a new Indian Union, 
which shall constitute a Dominion in the British Commonwealth but in no way 
subordinate to Britain in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs. 
(2) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India an 
elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India. 
(3) Provision shall be made for the participation of Indian States in the constitution-
making body. 
(4) The constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of 
Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the 
end of hostilities: 
The entire membership of the Lower House of provincial legislatures (constituted 
immediately after the end of the war) shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to 
the election of the constitution making body by the system of proportional 
representation. This body shall be in number about one-tenth of the electoral college. 
Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their 
total population as in the case of representatives of British India as a whole and with 
the same powers as British Indian members. 
(5) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can 
be framed, His Majesty's government must inevitably bear the responsibility for, and 
retain the control and direction of, the defence of India as part of their world war 
effort; but the task of organizing to the ftill, the military, moral and material resources 
of India must be the responsibility of the government of India with the co-operation of 
'* Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1937-1945, op. cit., p.385. 
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the peoples of India. His Majesty's government would desire, and invite, the 
immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the 
Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and the United 
Nations. Thus, they will be enabled to give, their active and constructive help to the 
discharge of the task, which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.*^ 
No doubt, the Cripps proposals were a major advance in the position of the British 
Government. For the first time, it was accepted clearly that the constitution would be 
the sole responsibility of the Indians alone. The idea of a constituent assembly was 
also unambiguously accepted and its modalities spelt out. But, in effect, it pleased 
none. The Congress found in the provisions such as 'provincial option' the powerful 
germs of a post-war Pakistan and the Muslim League's main objection was against 
the post-war provisions permitting the partition of India which, in its opinion, were so 
framed as not to give real protection to the Muslims. The Congress was also not 
happy over the manner in which the representatives of the States to the constitution-
DO 
making body were to be chosen. 
Quit India Resolution: The failure of the Cripps Mission led to another round of 
confrontation between the national movement and the British. All India Congress 
Committee adopted 'Quit India' resolution at Bombay session on 8 August, 1942. The 
resolution said that the provisional goverrunent of free India would evolve a scheme 
for a constituent assembly, which would prepare a constitution for India acceptable to 
all sections of the people. The constitution would be a federal one with the largest 
measure of autonomy for the federating units and with the residuary powers vesting in 
those units. But, before the Congress could start the movement, a number of arrests 
were made including those of all the members of the Congress Working Committee 
and Mahatma Gandhi. The arrest of the leaders provoked widespread revolution in 
India popularly known as the 'August Revolution'. 
The Simla Conference: On 14 June 1945, the British government issued a white 
paper on India, which repeated the Cripps offer. It proposed reconstitution of the 
Viceroy's Executive Council. The new proposals came to be known as the Wavell 
*' Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on The Indian Constitution: 1921-
47, op. cit., pp. 520-521; M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of India, op. cit., pp. 105-107. 
** Bipin Chandra et all, India After Independence, op. cit., p. 37; M.V. Pylee, Constitutional History of 
India, op. cit., p. 107. 
"ibid, pp. 38 and 109. 
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Plan. Lord Wavell called an All-Party conference at Simla on 25 June 1945. The 
Viceroy made it clear that the formation of this 'Interim Government' would in no 
way prejudice the final constitutional settlement. The Simla conference attended by 
Nehru, Azad and others on behalf of the Congress failed due to the obduracy of 
Jinnah. The major issue on which the conference failed to arrive at a solution was the 
manner in which the Muslim members of the Executive Council were to be selected. 
The Muslim League insisted that it alone had the exclusive right to nominate all the 
Muslim members. This was contested by the Congress as it could not agree to reduce 
itself to the status of a representative of Hindus alone.^° 
The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946: With the accession of Labour Party to power in 
Britain in July 1945, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell announced the new government's 
policy about India on 19 September 1945, which promised to convene a constitution-
making body as soon as possible. But, Viceroy emphasized to hold the election of the 
central and provincial legislatures first in order to know the will of the Indian 
electorates. The Congress contested the elections and secured the majority of the 
elected seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. Also, the Congress again formed 
popular ministries in 8 out of the 11 provinces. The Indian Muslim League could form 
ministries only in Sindh and Bengal. In Pimjab, a coalition of the Congress, Akali 
Sikhs and Unionists formed the ministries. While elections were still in progress, on 
19 February 1946, the British government declared that they were sending a Cabinet 
Mission to India to resolve the whole issue of fi:eedom and constitution making.^' 
The Cabinet Mission, which arrived in India on 24 March 1946, held prolonged 
discussions with Indian leaders. The Mission's goals were two-fold - to reconstitute 
the Viceroy's Executive Council as a coalition interim government and to secure 
agreement on a constitution-making body. On 16 May 1946, having failed to secure 
an agreement, it annoimced a scheme of its own. It recognized that the best way of 
sitting up a constitution-making machinery would "be by election based on adult 
franchise; but any attempt to introduce such a step now would lead to a wholly 
unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new constitution."^^ Therefore, it was 
^ Shiva Rao and others, The Framing of India's Constitution, op. cit., pp. 136-144; M.V. Pylee, 
Constitutional History of India, op. cit., pp. 110-111. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p. 108. 
'^ V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, Princeton, 1957. Appendix IV, p. 471. 
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decided that the newly elected legislative assemblies of the provinces were to elect the 
members of the Constituent Assembly on the basis of one representative for a million 
of the population. The Sikh and the Muslim legislators were to elect their quota on the 
basis of their population. The Cabinet Mission recommended the following plan for a 
long-term settlement: 
(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, 
which should deal with the following subjects: defence, foreign affairs and 
communications. 
(2) The Union should have an executive and a legislature constituted of British Indian 
and State's representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the 
legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and 
voting of each of the two major communities as well as majority of the members 
present and voting. 
(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in 
the provinces. 
(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union. 
(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with executives and legislatures and each 
group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common. 
(6) The constitution of Union and of the groups should contain a provision whereby 
any province could, by a majority vote of its legislative assembly, call for a 
reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after its initial period of ten years and 
at ten-yearly intervals thereafter. 
(7) The constitution-making body should be constituted immediately through indirect 
election, as direct election based on adult franchise would lead to long delay.^ ^ 
There were numerous other details about procedures to be followed by the 
constitution-making body. After a preliminary meeting at which the general order of 
business should be decided, a chairman and the other officers elected, and an 
"Advisory Committee on Rights of Citizens, Minorities and tribal and Excluded 
Areas" set up, the Provincial representatives would divide up in to three sections - A, 
' ' Shiva Rao and others, The Framing of India's Constitution, op. cit., pp. 208-18 and p. 67; Statement 
by the Cabinet Mission, 16 May, 1946, Paras 18-20, p. 42. 
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B, and C. A consisted of Madras, Bombay, the United provinces, Bihar, the central 
provinces and Orissa- the "Hindu-majority" provinces; Section B consisted of Punjab, 
the N.W.F.P. and Sindh; and section C consisted of Assam and Bengal - the 
"Muslim-majority" provinces. The provincial representatives meeting in their 
respective sections should first decide the constitution of the constituent provinces 
and also whether they wanted to adopt any group constitution. It was only after this 
process had been completed that the representatives of all the provinces and those of 
the princely states were to meet again to settle the constitution of the Union. The 
Union of India was to deal with foreign affairs, defence and communications.^'' 
The Congress again raised the basic issue whether the constituent assembly, when 
formed, would be a fully sovereign body for the purpose of drafting the constitution 
of India with full authority to vary in any way the recommendations and procedures 
laid down by the Mission. Though an assurance on those lines was not forthcoming 
from the British, the Congress nevertheless decided after a great deal of debate to 
accept the scheme, and try to work it, as there was a feeling that outright rejection 
would again delay the process of transfer of power. But the Muslim league continued 
to oppose the constituent assembly at every stage, before, as well as after it was 
constituted.^^ 
The Constituent Assembly Under the Cabinet Plan: Under the Cabinet Mission 
Plan, the Constituent Assembly was to have 398 members. Of these, 296 were to be 
from British India and 93 from the princely Indian states. Initially, however, the 
Constituent Assembly comprised only of members from British India. Elections of 
these were held in July-August 1946. Of the 210 seats in the general category. 
Congress won 3 of the 78 Muslim seats and the 3 seats from Coorg, Ajmer-Merwara 
and Delhi. Thus the Congress obtained an overwhelming majority in the constituent 
assembly by securing 208 seats out of the 296 seats allotted to British India. The 
Muslim League was able to win 73 out of the 78 Muslim seats.^ ^ 
Especially since the constituent assembly was not elected on the basis of universal 
adult franchise and was thus not as truly representative in character as the Congress 
'^' Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 109-119; Bipin Chandra, 
India After Independence, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
'* Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p. 116. 
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had wished and demanded, and also because only Muslims and Sikhs were recognized 
as minorities deserving special representation, a special effort was made to see that 
the assembly did indeed reflect the diversity of perspectives present in the country. 
The Congress Working Committee in early July 1946 specially instructed the 
provincial Congress Conmiittees to include representatives of Scheduled Castes, 
Parsis, Indian Christians, Anglo Indian, tribes and women in the Congress list for the 
general category. The other important consideration in choosing names for election to 
the Assembly was that the very best talent available in the country must be involved 
in the task of making the constitution. The lead was given by Gandhiji himself who 
suggested the names of sixteen eminent persons for inclusion in the Congress list. 
Altogether thirty people who were not members of the Congress were thus elected on 
the Congress ticket. Further, "the ideological spectrum of the Assembly was 
broadened by... the diverse nature of the Congress membership itself."^^ 
As the President of the Congress, as early as in July 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru had taken 
the initiative in the matter of the appointment of a Committee of Experts. This 
committee was formally appointed by the Congress Working Committee on July 1946 
with Nehru as its chairman and Asif AH, N. Gopalaswamy Ayyanger, K.T. Shah, K. 
Santhanam, Humayun Kabir, D.R. Gadgil and K.M. Munshi as its members. The 
Committee agreed that in drafting the power of the chairman of the assembly, the 
Procedure Committee might specially lay dovm that he should have no powers to 
dissolve the Constituent Assembly, the right of dissolution vesting with the Assembly 
itself On the question of the secretariat, Nehru made three points, viz., (1) The head 
of the secretariat organization should be a Secretary-General probably elected from 
among the assembly members; (2) The whole of the secretariat should be one organic 
unit under the Secretary-General / Chairman, and while separate Secretaries for the 
Sections might be necessary, they could not be independent of the main officer; and 
(3) It was not at all necessary to notify any appointmente just then either of the 
Constituent Assembly or of the Sections.^^ 
'^ Austin Granville, The Indian Constitution: The Comer-stone of a Nation, Oxford, 1966, p. 13. 
'* Shiva Rao and others, The Framing of India's Constitution: Select Documents, IIPA, Vol. I. op. cit., 
m. 326-330 and K.M. Munshi, Pilgrimage to Freedom:1902-1950, Vol. I. pp. 104-107. 
Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., pp. 126-127. 
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The decision to convene the first session of the constituent assembly on 9 December 
1946 was officially announced on 20 November 1946. Invitations were issued to all 
the members on the same day. However, the Muslim League declined the invitation. 
On 21 November 1946, Jinnah ordered all the Muslim League members to boycott the 
Constitution Assembly. Nehru"s response to the boycott was the firm declaration that 
"whether they come in or keep out, we will go out."'°° 
In the last minute bid to resolve the deadlock between the Congress and the Muslim 
League, the British Prime Minister, Attlee held a meeting of both in London during 2-
6 December 1946. Ho^ ?^eveT, they failed completely. The British goverriment 
responded positively to the League.'°' In this context, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in 
fact had seemed reluctant to call the Assembly and it was Congress which insisted 
that now the Assembly had been elected, it was necessary that it begins to function, 
regardless of the wishes of those who chose to stay away. Nehru had also to firmly 
quash the Viceroy's desire to appoint the provisional President of the assembly and 
issue invitation to the members to attend the first session in his own name. At Nehru's 
insistence, the oldest member of the Assembly, Dr. Sachidanand Sinha became the 
Provisional President and invitations issued in the name of the Secretary of the 
Constituent Assembly.'°^ 
Opening of the Constituent Assembly: The constituent assembly of India began its 
first session at 11 a.m., on 9 December 1946. it was truly a unique and memorable 
event in India's long history. The real responsibility of deciding the constitutional 
fi-amework within which the government and people of India were to function had 
been transferred and assumed by the Indian people with the convening of the 
constituent assembly. 207 members attended the first session. The Muslim League, 
having failed to prevent the convening of the Assembly, now refused to join its 
deliberations. Consequently, the 76 Muslim members of the League stayed away and 
the four Congress members attended the session. On 11 December, Dr. Rajendra 
Prasad was elected the permanent Chairman; an officer later designated as President 
"* For Jinnah's Statement finally dissociating the League from the Constituent Assembly, see Shiva 
Rao and others, The Framing of India's Constitution, op. cit., Vol. I. Pp. 325; Indian Annual Register, 
Vol. II. 1946. p. 279. 
'"' Indian Annual Register, Vol. II. 1946. Op. cit., pp.301-302. 
'"^  Bipin Chandra, India After Independence, op. cit., p. 40. 
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of the Assembly."^^ On 13 December, Nehru moved the famous Objectives 
Resolution in the Constituent Assembly. The Resolution envisaged the Indian Union 
as an Independent Sovereign Republic based on the will of the people and comprising 
the provinces of British India and princely Indian states as autonomous units with 
residuary powers, with classical freedoms and the ideals of social, political and 
economic justice, equality of opportunity ahd freedom of expression, belief and faith 
guaranteed to all sections of the people and adequate safeguards provided for 
minorities and backward communities and areas.' The Resolution was debated till 
19 December but its adoption was postponed to enable the representatives of the 
Muslim League and the princely states to join in the constituent assembly. Meanwhile 
the Assembly's Rules of Procedure were discussed and adopted during 21-23 
December 1946. One of the rules mooted at Nehru's instance significantly provided 
that "the Assembly shall not be dissolved except by a resolution assented to by at least 
two third of the total number of members of the Assembly."'"^ 
However, all efforts to persuade the Muslim League to join the Assembly failed. At 
the next session, which took place from 20-22 January 1947, it was decided to not 
wait any longer for the League, and the Objectives Resolution was passed.'"^ The 
third session was held from 28 April to 2 may 1947 and the League still did not join in 
the Assembly. The specter of partition was on the horizon.'°' On 3 June, the 
Mountbatten Plan was announced which made it clear that India was to be partitioned. 
Constituent Assembly: As a Sovereign Body 
It must be said to the credit of the British parliament that it lost no time to draft the 
Indian Independence Bill upon the basis of the Mountbatten Plan, and this Bill was 
passed and placed on the Statute Book with amazing speed, as the Indian 
Independence Act, 1947. The Bill, which was introduced in parliament on July 4, 
received the Royal Assent on 18 July 1947 and came into force from that day. The 
' " Ibid. 
"^ Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. I. pp. 59-65, and 247. 
'° ' Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliamentary Democracy, op. cit., p.l34; Constituent Assembly 
Debates, op. cit., pp. 155-247. For Nehru's intervention see pp. 177, 180 and 240. 
' * Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. II. P. 304. 
'"^  The new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten had indicated at the Governors Conference on 15 April 1947, 
the definite intention of partitioning India if no solution was soon found. See, The Statesman, Calcutta, 
16 April 1947. In the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Rajendra Prasad had also hinted at the possibility of 
country's division and the Constituent Assembly framing a Constitution only for a part of it. See, 
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. Ill, p.345. 
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Act provided that as from the 15 August 1947 (which date is referred to in the Act as 
the "appointed date"), in place of "India" as defined in the Government of India Act 
of 1935, there would be set up two independent dominions, to be known as India and 
Pakistan, and the Coftstituent Assembly of each dominion was to have unlimited 
power to frame and adopt any constitution and to repeal any Act of the British 
Parliament, including the Indian Independence Act. On 26 July 1947, the Governor-
General announced the setting up of a separate Constituent Assembly for Pakistan.'°^ 
The Constituent Assembly, which had been elected for undivided India and held its 
first sitting on 9 December 1946, reassembled on the 14 August 1947, as the 
Sovereign Constituent Assembly for the Dominion of India. With respect to the 
functions of the Constituent Assembly, it was decided that the business of the 
Assembly as a constitution making body should be clearly distinguished from its 
normal business as the Dominion Legislature, and different days or separate sittings 
on the same day should be set apart for the two kinds of business."° 
Noticeably, the functions of the Constituent Assembly as a legislature as well as its 
large size did not come in the way of its effectively performing its duties as a 
constitution making body is due to the enormous preparatory work as well as the 
settlement of the broad principles of the constitution had been completed as early as 
August 1947 by the Assembly and its Committees, the Union Constitution 
Committee, the State Committee and the Provincial Constitution Committee had 
made their recommendations, and, after a general discussion of the reports of these 
Committees, the Assembly appointed a Drafting Committee on 29 August 1947. The 
Drafting Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, embodied the 
decision of the Assembly with alternative and additional proposals in the form of a 
"Draft Constitution of India" which was published in February 1948. The Constituent 
Assembly next met in November 1948, to consider the provisions of the draft, clause 
by clause.'" After several sessions the consideration of renumbering of the articles, 
clauses and sub-clauses, marginal notes and consequent amendments to the 
constitution or rightly called second reading stage was completed by 17 October 
"" D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, op. cit., p. 17. 
""Ibid, p. 18. 
"° Shubhash C. Kashyap, Parliamentary Procedure: The Law, Privileges, Practice and Precedents, Vol. 
I. Delhi, Universal Law Publishing Company, 2000, p. 59. 
' " D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, op. cit., p. 18. 
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1949. Finally, the last sitting of the Constituent Assembly was held on 14 November 
1949 for the third reading stage and finished it on 26 November 1949, on which date 
the Constitution received the signature of the President of the assembly and was 
declared as passed. The provisions relating to citizenship, elections, provisional 
parliament, temporary and transitional provisions, were given immediate effect. The 
rest of the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, and this date is reffered 
to in the Constitution as the "Date of the Commencement"."^ 
Legislative Procedure in the Constituent Assembly: When the Assembly met for 
the purpose of ordinary law-making in November 1947, it was called the Legislative 
Wing of the Constituent Assembly. G.V. Mavlankar, having been received for the 
office of the Speaker, was declared as duly elected. Dr. Rajendra Prasad vacated the 
Chair, which was then occupied by Speaker Mavlankar."'' The transformation of the 
office of the Governor-General into that of a constitutional head of State made an 
important difference and led to changes in several provisions. The powers of 
disallowance, certification and restoration (of grants refused by the legislature) 
hitherto enjoyed by the Governor-General were removed from the Rules. Also the 
Rule requiring the Governor-General's consent to the putting of questions or moving 
of motions on such matters as tribal affairs and relations with the princes and foreign 
countries was removed. Besides, the President of the Constituent Assembly was now 
empowered to arrange for the election of the presiding officer, and the power of 
allotment of the time of the legislature for non-official business was given to the 
Speaker. A new form of oath was introduced and the provision for quorum omitted. 
Under the new modified Rules, members of the Assembly were entitled to speak in 
English or Hindi or, by permission in another Indian language. Significantly, the 
modified Rules included new provisions about motions of no confidence and 
allotment of days for the different stages of the Finance Bill. Finally, the definitions of 
some terms were also changed as, for example, "Member" of the Executive Council 
became "Minister", "The Governor-General in Council" was named as "The 
Government of India", the Assembly's "President" became the "Speaker" and so 
on."^ 
"^ Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
' " Subhash C. Kashyap, Parliamentary Procedure, op. cit., p. 61. 
"Mbid, pp.61-62. 
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Besides, the above changes, the Speaker appointed a Committee under his 
Chairmanship in 1948 to examine the Rules and to suggest amendments. The then 
Secretary of the Constituent Assembly (Legislature), M.N. Kaul, submitted a detailed 
memorandum to the committee on the "Reforms of Parliamentary Procedure in 
India". "^ The memorandum discussed four vital questions of parliamentary procedure 
with particular references to the position obtaining in the British House of Commons, 
viz; 
1. Statement of Government Policy at the opening of a session of parliament would in 
fact be the most suitable procedure. 
2. Allotment of time to provide members for debate on adjournment motion at the end 
of business that reflected in the "Question Hour" as the main method available to 
check the administration. And for discussion of grievances half-an-hour time was 
considered desirable after the close of the normal business for the day. 
3. With regard to financial procedure, the memorandum suggested constitution of a 
Public Expenditure Committee for effective parliamentary control over expenditure. It 
was also recommended the adoption of the House of Commons practice of voting of 
estimates on account as it would result in the provisional voting of the estimates for 
the government to carry on the administration. 
4. Finally, the memorandum advocated adoption of salient points of the House of 
Commons procedure for constitution of standing committees for the consideration of 
bills brought before the House. "^ 
On 20 December 1949, Speaker Mavalankar made an announcement regarding the 
Rules of Procedure of the House and the committee appointed in 1948 for the purpose 
of considering amendments thereto. The suggestions made by him were carefully 
examined and more important points formed part of Constitution of India. In 
particular, the provision regarding the address by the President at the commencement 
of every session, outlining the policy of government and having a general debate 
thereon would be a suitable method of starting the business of the House. The 
procedure in financial matters had been completely re-cast and the modern system of 
" ' Memorandum by M.N. Kaul, Secretary, Constituent Assembly (Lagislative) on the Reform of 
Parliamentary Procedure in India, February 1948. 
"* Subhash C. Kashyap, Parliamentary Procedure, op. cit., pp.62-63. 
94 
votes of credit and exceptional grants had been put in the Constitution. The privileges 
of the House had been made co-extensive with those of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom and included the power to initiate proceeding against any one who was 
guilty of the offence of the contempt of Parliament. Mavalankar said that it was "in 
the fitness of things that the sovereign Parliament of India should be endowed with 
these powers. It had also been provided that until Parliament otherwise provided by 
law, the quorum to constitute a meeting of the House would be one-tenth of the total 
membership thereof 
Some of the important rulings given by Speaker Mavalankar in the Assembly were as 
follows; 
Amendments: It was perfectly competent for a member to make whatever suggestion 
he might have to make, even though no amendments had been made."* 
Demand for Grants of Assembly Secretariat: Members according to establish 
conventions, were not in order to make remarks about the expenditure incurred on the 
administration of the Constituent Assembly (on the Legislative and Constitution 
making sides) which was entirely the responsibility of the President."' 
Adjournment Motion: An adjournment motion did not necessarily mean that it was a 
censure motion.'^" 
121 Written Speeches: Written speeches must be discouraged. 
Bills: 
(1). A member cannot introduce a bill on behalf of another member. Such delegation 
of authority was not recognized according to the long practice of the House.'^^ 
(2). While discussing an amending bill the principle of the original Act could not be 
challenged. 
(3). A marginal note was not part of statue and any amendment to such a note should 
be left to the draftsman.'^'' 
(4). An amendment for the omission of a clause in a bill was in order.'^^ 
' " Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debate, Vol. VII. 1949. pp. 823-831. 
' " Ibid., Vol. I. p. 55. 
" ' lbid„Vol. II.p. 1235. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 981. 
'^' Ibid., p. 1253. 
'^ ^ Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 601-602. 
'^ ^ Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 2457. 
'^ * Ibid., p. 3057. 
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Business of the House: On an objection taken by a member of the private business on 
an official day, the Speaker remarked that any business could be taken up on an 
official day with the consent of the government.'^^ 
Light hearted should not be addressed to other members of the House either directly 
or through the Chair. 
Member's Seats: Members should not change their seats. A member not found in his 
128 
usual seat shall r\ot be permitted to put any question. 
Privileges: On a point of privilege consequent on the arrest of the member of the 
House with his (Speaker's) prior consultation, the Speaker observed that each case 
would have to be judged on its own merits but every member of the House was 
subject to ordinary law.'^ ^ 
Publicity in Press: Prior publicity in the press of the Short Notice Question regarding 
precautions against attempts on the life of Mahatma Gandhi by a member (M. 
Ananthasayanam Ayyanger) admitted and answered in the House and likewise of all 
motions, before they were admitted, was an important breach of the convention of the 
House.'^° 
Unparliamentary Language: Questions and suggestions such as whether the 
scientists were in the pay of the industrialists and capitalists were not permissible and 
ought not to be made as it did not add to the dignity of the House and was 
defamatory.'"" 
From Assembly to Parliament 
It is true that the Constituent Assembly (legislature) was free India's first legislature 
and steps taken by it in various fields went a long way towards laying the foundations 
of a strong and independent nation, but it was only with the commencement of the 
Constitution of India on 26 January 1950, a full fledged parliamentary system of 
government with a modem institutional framework and all its other ramifications 
were established. The policy laid down by the founding fathers was not a blind copy 
*^Mbid.,Vol.l. p. 616. 
'^ * Ibid., Vol. IV, 1948, p. 3091. 
'"lbid.,Vol. III,p.2118. 
'^'Ibid., Vol. n,p.9l9. 
'^'Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 21-22. 
"" Ibid. Vol. I. p. 306 and Vol. V. p. 3898. 
'^'ibid.. Vol. Ill, pp. 2277-2278. 
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of the Westminster or any other model. It was largely based on India's own past 
experiences and had an organic growth on the native soil. 
The constitution gave the nation, again for the first time in her long history, a head of 
State - the President - who was to be periodically elected by an electoral college 
consisting of the elected representatives of the people in the two Houses of Parliament 
and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States. The President was to act on the aid 
and advise of the Council of Ministers. Sovereignty was vested in the people and was 
expressed and exercisable through Parliament. The Parliament was to consist not 
simply of one legislative body but of the President together with two Houses - the 
Lok Sabha (the House of the People) and Rajya Sabha (the Council of States). The 
Lok Sabha was to be directly elected by the people on the basis of universal adult 
franchise while Rajya Sabha was to be elected by the members of the State 
Legislative Assemblies. The Rajya Sabha also to have 12 nominated members by the 
President from specified fields like those of art, science, literature and social service. 
The parliamentary form of government laid dovm by the Constitution had all the 
features of representative and deliberative institutions. Every act of the Government 
could be debated, discussed, questioned and adjudicated. The council of ministers was 
responsible and fully answerable to the House of the People for all its acts of 
omission. The parliament and state legislatures were to express the urges and 
aspirations of the people, make laws and keep the Union and State governments under 
their surveillance. With comprehensive chapters on fundamental rights and directive 
principles, division of powers between the Union and States and provisions for 
judicial review, however, the Constitution clearly defined and delimited the powers 
and functions of every organ in the polity and provided the necessary checks and 
balances. An independent judiciary was set up to interpret the provisions of the 
Constitution and the powers of various organs and to protect the rights of the citizens 
incase of disputes. 
In the direction to materialize the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly (legislature) 
was named as Provisional Parliament of India immediately before the commencement 
of the Constitution. The Speaker of the House made it clear during the farewell 
address to the members that "present Parliament is a continuation of the Constituent 
Assembly of India, which came into existence as parliament from January 26, 1950, 
'^ ^ D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 2""* Edition, Calcutta, 1952. 
97 
when the Constitution came into force. Without any violent break with the past, the 
Parliament began its functions with a sustainably altered outlook as regards its duties 
and responsibility."'^^ The provisional parliament was the first parliament. It, thus, 
got a chance to establish usage which were to be followed by the later Indian 
Parliament. The provisional Parliament functioned with only single legislative 
chamber until the first general elections were held during the year 1951-1952. it was 
only after this election, Parliament was constituted under the provisions of the new 
Constitution. 
' " Provisional Parliamentary Debates, Vol. II. 1952. column, 2041. 
98 

Chapter III 
PARLIAMENT OF INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
The historical background of Indian parliament and, its development from ancient 
period to the period to provisional parliament have been discussed in the second 
chapter. This chapter will focus on the constitutional provisions with regard to the 
working of parliament and the manner in which the parliament actually functioned the 
during Nehru era. 
Constitutional Provisions with regard to Working of ParHament 
The parliament of India consists of the President and two houses known as the Rajya 
Sabha (Council of the States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). 
The President 
India has adopted parliamentary form of Government. It has two types of executive 
heads - one is nominal head and second is real. President is the nominal head of the 
executive. Our parliamentary system is basically fashioned on British pattern; 
therefore, we follow a number of its traditions and practices. Like the Crown of 
England, the President of India is a component part of the Indian parliament but the 
legislative powers which President possesses, may be used according to ministerial 
advice only [Art. 74(i)]. The legislative powers of Indian President are the following: 
(a) Summoning, Prorogation, Dissolution: Like the British Crown our President 
shall have the power to summon or prorogue the Houses of parliament and to dissolve 
the lower House. He shall also have the power to summon the joint sitting of both the 
Houses of parliament in case of a deadlock between them [Art. 85 & 108]. 
(b) The Opening Address: The President shall address both Houses of parlieiment 
assembled together, at the first session after each general election to the House of the 
people and at the commencement of the first session of each year, and inform 
parliament of the causes of its summons [Art. 87]. 
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(c) The right of President to address and send messages to the Houses: The 
President may address either House of parliament or both Houses assembled together, 
and for that purpose require the attendance of members [Article 86 (1)]. The President 
may send the messages to either House of parliament, whether with respect to a bill 
then pending in parliament or otherwise, and a house to which any 'message is so sent 
shall with all convenient dispatch consider any matter required by the message to be 
taken into consideration [Art. 86(2)]. 
(d) Special Address by the President: At the commencement of the first session after 
each general election to the House of the People and at the commencement of first 
session of each year the President shall address both Houses of parliament assembled 
together and inform parliament of the cause of its summons [Art. 87 (1)]. 
(e) The right to nominate the members to Houses: (i). In the Rajya Sabha, twelve 
members to be nominated by the President from the persons having special 
knowledge or practical experience literature, science, arts and social service [Art. 80 
(1) and (3)]. (ii). The President may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian 
community is not adequately represented in the House of the People, nominate note 
more than two of that community to the House of the People [Art. 331]. 
(f) President's Assent to Bills: When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of 
parliament, it shall be presented to the President, and the President shall declare either 
that he assents to the Bill, or that he withholds assent there from: 
Provided that the President may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of a 
Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill to the Houses with a message 
requesting that they will reconsidered the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, 
in particular, will the desirability of introducing ainy such amendments as he may 
recommend in his message, and when a Bill is so returned, the Houses shall 
reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the Houses with or 
without amendment and presented to the President for assent, the President shall not 
withhold assent there from [Art. 111]. 
loa 
(g) Previous sanction to legislation^: The constitution requires the previous sanction 
or recommendation of President for introducing legislation on some matters, though, 
of course, the courts are debarred from invalidating any legislation on the ground that 
the previous section was not obtained, where the President has eventually assented to 
the legislation [Art. 255]. These matters are: 
(i) A Bill for the formation of new States or the alteration of boundaries, etc., of 
existing States [Art. 3]. The exclusive power of recommending such 
legislation is given to the President in order to enable him to obtain the views 
of the affected States before initiating such legislation. 
(ii) A Bill providing for any of the matters specified in Art. 31a(l) 
[Prov. ltoArt31A(10]. 
(iii) A Money Bill [Art. 117(1)]. 
(iv) A Bill which would involve expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India 
even though it may not, strictly speaking, be a Money Bill[Art.l 17(3)]. 
(v) A Bill affecting taxation in which States are interested, or affecting the 
principles laid down for distributing moneys to the States, varying the 
meaning of the expression of 'agriculture income' for the purpose of taxation 
of income, or imposing a surcharge for the purposes of the Union under 
Chapter 1 of Part xii [Art. 274(1)]. 
(vi) State Bill imposing restrictions upon the freedom of trade. [Art 304]. 
(h) Laying Reports, etc., before Parliament: The President is brought in to contact 
with parliament also through his power and duty to cause certain reports and 
statements to be laid before parliament, so that parliament may have the opportunity 
of taking action upon them. Thus, it is the duty of the President to cause to be laid 
before parliament: 
(a) The Annual Financial Statement (Budget) and the supplementary statement, if 
any; 
(b) The reports of the Auditor-General relating to the accounts of the Government of 
India; 
^ D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, pp. 173-74. 
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(c) The recommendations made by the Finance Commission, together with an 
explanatory memorandum of the action taken thereon; 
(d) The report of the Union PubUc Service Commission, explaining the reasons 
where any advice of the Commission has not been accepted; 
(e) The reports of the special officer for Scheduled Castes and Tribes; 
(f) The report of the Commission on Backward Classes; 
(g) The report of the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities.^ 
(i) The Ordinance-making power: The President shall have the power to legislate by 
Ordinances at a time when it is not possible for a parliamentary enactment on the 
subject immediately [Art. 123]. 
The ambit of this ordinance-making power of the President is co-extensive with the 
legislative powers of Parliament, that is to say, it may relate to any subject in respect 
of which Parliament has the right to legislate and is subject to the same constitutional 
limitations as legislation by Parliament. Thus, an ordinance cannot contravene the 
Fundamental Rights any more than an Act of Parliament. In fact. Art. 13(3)(a) doubly 
ensures this position by laying down that "law' includes an 'ordinance'."'' 
Subject to this limitation, the ordinances may be of any nature of as Parliamentary 
legislation may take, e.g., it may be retrospective or may amend or repeal any law or 
Act of Parliament itself Of course, an ordinance shall be of temporary duration. 
This independent power of the executive to legislate by ordinances is a relic of the 
Govenmient of India Act, 1935, but the provisions of the Constitution differ from 
that of the Act of 1935 in several material respects as follows: 
Firstly, this power is to be exercised by the President on the advice of his Council of 
Ministers (and not in the exercise of his 'individual judgment' as the Governor-
General was empowered to act, under the Government of India act, 1935). 
Secondly, the Ordinance must be laid before parliament when it reassembles, and 
shall automatically cease to have effect at the expiration of 6 weeks from the date of 
re-assembly unless disapproved earlier by parliament. In other words an ordinance 
' D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, op. cit., p. 173. 
Mbid„p. 178. 
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can exist at the most only for 6 weeks from the date of re-assembly. If the Houses are 
summoned to reassemble on different dates the periods of 6 weeks is to be counted 
from the later of those dates. 
Thirdly, the ordinance-making power will be available to the President only when 
either of the two Houses of parliament has been prorogued or is otherwise not in 
session, so that it is not possible to have a law enacted by parliament. He shall have 
no such power while both Houses of parliament are in session. The President's 
ordinance-making power under the Constitution is, thus, not a co-ordinate or parallel 
power of legislation available while the legislature is capable of legislating. 
When, the legislature is not in session, the President cannot promulgate an ordinance 
unless he is satisfied that there are circumstances which render it necessary for him to 
take 'immediate action'. Clause (1) of Art. 123 says: "If at any time, except when 
both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances 
exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate 
such ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require." 
But 'immediate action' has no necessary connection with an 'emergency' such as is 
refened to in Article 352. Hence, the promulgation of an ordinance is not dependent 
upon the existence of an armed rebellion or external aggression. The only test is 
whether the circumstances, which call for the legislation are so serious and imminent 
that the delay involved in summoning the legislature and getting the measure passed 
in the ordinary course legislation caimot be tolerated. But the sole judge of the 
question whether such a situation has arisen is the President himself and it was held in 
some earlier cases a court cannot enquire into the propriety of his satisfaction even 
where it is alleged that the power was not exercised in good faith. 
But if on the expiry of an ordinance it is re-promulgated and this is done repeatedly 
then it is an abuse of the power and a fraud on the Constitution.^ However, the 
Supreme Court expressed the view that the genuineness of the President's satisfaction 
could possibly be challenged in a court of law on the ground that it was mala-fide, 
e.g., where the President has prorogued a House of Parliament in order to make an 
' Lakhinarayan v. Prov. Of Bihar, A. 1950 F.C. 59; State of Punjab v. Satya Pal, A. 1969 S.C. 903 
(912), D.D. Basu, op. cit., p.l79. 
* Wadhawa v. State of Bihar, A. 1989 S.C. 579. 
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ordinance relating to a controversial matter, so as to by-pass the verdict of the 
legislature.^ 
The Indira government wanted to silence any such judicial interference in the matter 
of making an ordinance by inserting CI. (4) in Art. 123, laying down that the 
President's satisfaction shall be final and could not be questioned in any court on any 
ground 
It is true that when the ordinance-making power to be exercised on the advice of a 
Ministry which commands a majority in Parliament, it makes little difference that the 
government seeks to legislate by an ordinance instead of by an Act of Parliament, 
because the majority would have ensured a safe passage to the measure through 
Parliament even if a Bill had been brought instead of promulgating the ordinance. But 
the argument would not hold good where the government of the day did not carry an 
overwhelming majority. Article 123 would, in such a situation, enable the government 
to enact a measure for a temporary period by an ordinance, not being sure of support 
in parliament if a Bill had been brought. Even where the government has a clear 
majority in parliament, a debate in Parliament, which takes place when a Bill is 
introduced not only gives a nation-wide publicity to the 'pros and cons' of the 
measure but also gives to the two House a chance of making amendments to rectify 
unwelcome features or defects as may be revealed by the debate. All this would be 
absent where the government elects to legislate by ordinance. It is evident, therefore, 
that there is a likelihood of the power being abused even though it is exercisable on 
the advice of the Council of Ministers,^ because the ministers themselves might be 
tempted to resort to an ordinance simply to avoid a debate in Parliament and may 
advice the President to prorogue Parliament at any time, having this specific object in 
mind. 
Parliamentary Safeguards: It is clear that there should be some safeguards against 
such abuse. So far as the merits of the ordinance are concerned, the parliament, of 
course, gets a chance to review the measure when the government seeks to introduce a 
Bill to replace it. It may also pass resolutions disapproving of the ordinance, if and 
' Cooper V. Union of India, A. 1970 S.C..564 (588, 644); A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A. 1982 S.C. 
710. 
' The 38"" Amendment Act, Constitution of India. 
' Samsher v. State of Punjab, A. 1974, S.C. 2192 (para. 30). 
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when the government is obliged to summon the parliament for other purposes [Art. 
123(2) (a)]. But the real question is how to .enable parliament to tell the government, 
short of passing a vote of censure or of no-confidence, that it does not approve of the 
conduct of the government in making the ordinance instead of bringing a Bill for the 
purpose? The House of the People has made a Rule requiring that whenever the 
government seeks to replace an ordinance by a Bill, a statement "explaining the 
circumstances which necessitated immediate legislation by ordinance" must company 
such a Bill. The statement merely informs the House of the grounds advanced by the 
government. A general discussion takes place on the resolution approving the 
ordinance generally a resolution is moved by the opposition disapproving the 
ordinance. 
Rajya Sabha (Council of the States) 
Composition of the Rajya Sabha: Rajya Sabha is the upper House of the Parliament. 
It cannot consist of more than 250 members, in which 12 members will be nominated 
by the President and rest of the members shall be the representatives of the States and 
the Union Territories of India [Art. 80 (clause 1)]. The members to be nominated by 
the President under the sub-clause (a) of Article 80 (clause 1) shall consist of persons 
having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of such matters as the 
following, namely; literature, science, arts and social service, and the representatives 
of the each State shall be elected by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly 
of the State in accordance with system of proportional representation by means of 
single transferable vote [Art. 80 (4)]. The representatives of the Union Territories'° in 
the Council of States shall be chosen in such a manner as Parliament may by law 
prescribe [Art. 80 (5)]. Under this power. Parliament has prescribed that the 
representatives of Union Territories to the Council of States shall be indirectly elected 
by members of an electoral college for that Territory, in accordance with the system 
of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote." 
'" Subs. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, sec. 3, for "States specified in Part C of 
the First Schedule". 
" Section 27 A and 27H of Representative of the People Act, 1950. 
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Duration of Rajya Sabha: The Rajya Sabha is not subject to dissolution. It is a 
permanent body, but as nearly as possible one-third of its members retire as soon as 
may be on the expiration'of every second year, in accordance with provisions made 
by parliament in this behalf.'^ The normal term of office of a member of the Rajya 
Sabha is six years from the date of election or nomination. 
Allocation of Seats: The Rajya Sabha of Indian Parliament reflects a federal character 
by representing the Units of the States. But it does not follow the equality of the states 
representation in second chamber as America follows. In India, the number of 
representatives of the States to the Council of the States varies from 1 (Nagaland) to 
31 (Uttar Pradesh). The total number of seats in the Rajya Sabha at present is 245, 
including the 12 members nominated by the President. The allocation of 233 seats in 
the Council of States, among the States and Union Territories as given in the Fourth 
Schedule is as follows: 
S.NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Distribution of Rajya Sabha Seats in the States/UTs 
States 1 No. of Seats \ S.NO. \ States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Jharkhand 
Haryana 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Chhattisgarh 
Tamil Nadu 
Maharashtra 
Kamataka 
Orissa 
18 
07 
01 
16 
01 
11 
06* 
05 
09 
11 
05** 
18 
19 
12 
10 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Uttar Pradesh 
Uttaranchal 
West Bengal 
Jammu Kashmir 
Nagaland 
Himachal Pradesh 
Manipur 
Tripura 
Meghalya 
Sikkim 
Mizoram 
Delhi 
Pondichery 
No. of Seats 
07 
10 
31 
Q2*** 
16 
04 
01 
03 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
03 
01 
Source: Compiled from India 2006, New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 2006, pp. 
1173-1181 
Lok Sabha (The House of the People) 
The Lok Sabha (the House of the People) is known as the 'Lower House' of the 
Parliament. The people on the basis of adult suffrage directly elect its members. The 
maximum strength of the House envisaged by the Constitution is 552. 
Art. 83 (1). Constitution of India. 
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Composition of the Lok Sabha: The Lok Sabha shall consist of [Art. 81(1)]-
(a) not more than 530 members chosen by direct election from territorial 
constituencies in the States,'^ and 
(b) not more than 20 members to represent the Union Territories, chosen in such 
manner as Parliament may by law provide. 
(2) For the purpose of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Art. 81 -
(a) there shall be allotted to each State a number of seats in the House of the People 
in such manner that the ratio between that number and the population of the 
States is, so far as practicable, the same for all States; and 
(b) each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the 
ratio between the population of each constituency and number of seats allotted to 
it is, so far as practicable, the same throughout the State: 
[Provided that the provision of sub-clause (a) of this clause shall not be applicable 
for the purpose of the allotment of seats in the House of the People to any State so 
long as the population of that State does not exceed six millions.]'^ 
The President may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community is not 
adequately represented in the House of the People, nominated not more than two 
members of that community to the House of the People [Art.331]. 
The election to the Lok Sabha is direct. Every citizen who has completed the age of 
18 years and is not otherwise disqualified by reason of non-residence, unsoundness 
of mind, crime or illegal practice, being eligible to vote. 
Tenure of the Lok Sabha: The normal duration of the Lok Sabha is 5 years, from 
the date appointed for its firs meeting and the expiration of the period of five years 
operates as dissolution of the House. By the 42"'' Amendment Act, 1976, the Indira 
Government extended this term to 6 years but it has been restored to 5 years by the 
44*'' Amendment Act, 1978. 
" Under the Constitution, Seventh Amendment Act, 1956, the maximum number was fixed as 500. It 
was increased to 525 by the Constitution, Thirty First Amendment Act 1973, and has been ftirther 
increased to 530 by the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganization Act, 1987. 
Under the Constitution, Seventh Amendment Act. 1956, the maximum number was fixed as 20. The 
maximum number which was increased to 25 by the Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment Act. 1962, 
has again been decreased to 20 by the Constitution Thirty first Amendment Act. 1973. 
" Ins. by the Constitution (Thirty-first Amendment) Act, 1973, sec.2. 
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Lok Sabha may be dissolved earlier by the President. Or, the normal term may be 
extended by an Act passed by the Parliament for one year during the period when a 
'Proclamation of Emergency' made by the President under the Article 352', remains 
in operation. The Lok Sabha, whose life has been extended, cannot continue beyond 
a period of six month after the proclamation of emergency has ceased to operate 
[Art.83(2)]. 
Qualifications for the Membership of the Parliament: A person shall not be 
qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Parliament unless he [Art. 84] -
[(a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorized in 
that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form 
set out for the purpose in the Third Scheduled;]' * 
(b) is, in the case of a seat in the Council of States, not less than thirty years of age 
and, in the case of a seat in the House of the People, not less than twenty-five years 
of age; and 
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or 
under any law made by Parliament. 
The Representation of People Act, 1951, requires that a person's name should be 
registered as a voter in any parliamentary constituency. 
Disqualifications for the membership'. A person shall be disqualified for being 
chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament [Art. 102 (1)] -
(a) if he holds any office of profit under the government of India or the 
government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law 
not to disqualify its holder; 
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; 
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent; 
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a 
foreign state, or is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to 
a foreign state; 
"" Subs. By the Constitution (Sixteen Amendment) Act, 1963, sec. 3, for clause (a) (w. e. f. 5-9-1963). 
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(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by parliament. 
[Explanation - for the purpose of this clause]'^ a person shall not be deemed to hold 
an office of profit under the government of India or the government of any State by 
reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or for such a State. 
[(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of either House Parliament if 
1R 
he is so disqualified under the Tenth schedule.] 
Some disqualifications have been made on the ground of defection. Article 101, 102, 
109 and 191 has been amended by the 52"'' Amendment Act and added a new 
schedule, the tenth schedule to the Constitution in which the disqualifications on the 
ground of defection has been specified. The amendment has added a new clause (2) to 
Articles 102 and 191 which provides that a member shall be disqualified for being a 
member of either House of Parliament or of State Legislature if he incurs the 
disqualifications specified in the Tenth Schedule -
(i) if he voluntarily gives up the membership of the political party, on whose 
ticket he is elected to the House; or 
(ii) if any nominated member joins any political party after the expiry e.g. six 
months from the date on which he takes his seat in the House; or 
(iii) if he votes or abstains from voting in the House against any direction of 
the political party or by any person or authority authorized by it in this 
behalf, without the prior permission, of such a party and unless it has been 
condoned by the party within 15 days from the date of voting or 
abstention. 
But in some cases, the above disqualifications will however not apply -
(i) if a member goes out as a result of a merger of his original political party 
with another political party provided 2/3 of the members of the legislature 
party have agreed to such a merger, or 
Subs. By the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, sec. 3, for "(2) For the purpose of 
this Article" (w.e.f 1-3-1985). 
" Ins. by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, sec. 3 (w.e.f 1-3-1985). 
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(ii) if a member, after being elected as the presiding officer gives up the 
membership of the party to which he belonged , or does not rejoin that 
party or becomes a member of another party. 
Salaries and Allowances of Members of Parliament: Members of either House of 
Parliament shall be entitled to receive such salaries and allowance as may from time 
to time be determined by Parliament by law and, until provision in that respect is so 
made, allowances at such rates and upon such conditions as were immediately before 
the commencement of its Constitution applicable in the case of members of the 
Constituent Assembly of Dominion of India [Art. 106]. 
Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members [Art. 105]: 
(1). Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders 
regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in 
Parliament. 
(2). No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in 
respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee 
thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the 
authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. 
(3). In other respect, the power, privileges and immunities of each House of 
Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as 
may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, [shall 
be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the 
coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 
1978.] 
(4). The provisions of clause (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who 
by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in 
the proceedings of, a House of Parliament or any committee thereof as they apply in 
relation to members of Parliament. 
Officers of Parliament 
Each House of the Parliament has its own presiding officer and staff 
J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, Forty first edition, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 2004, 
P.21. 
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The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha: The House of the people shall, 
as soon as may be, choose two members of-the House to be respectively Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker thereof and, so often as the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker 
becomes vacant, the House shall choose another member to be Speaker or Deputy 
Speaker, as the case may be [Art. 93]. The Speaker and the Deputy Speaker will 
normally hold office during the life of the House, but his office may terminate earlier 
in the case of, (a) if he ceases to be a member of the House of the People; (b) may at 
any time, by writing under his hand addressed, if such member is the Speaker, to the 
Deputy Speaker, and if such member is the Deputy Speaker, to the Speaker, resign his 
office; and (c) may be removed from his office by a resolution of the House of the 
People passed by a majority of all the then members of the House [Art. 94]. Such a 
resolution cannot be moved unless at least 14 days notice has given of the intention to 
move the resolution. While a resolution for his removal is under consideration, the 
Speaker shall not preside but he shall have the right to speak in, and to take part in the 
proceedings of, the House, and shall have a right of vote except in the case of equality 
ofvote [Art. 96(1)]. 
The Speaker and the Deputy Speaker will get such salaries and allowances as may be 
respectively fixed by Parliament by law and, until provision in that behalf is so made, 
such salaries and allowances as are specified in the Second Schedule [Art. 97]. 
Powers of the Speaker: The Speaker is the chief presiding officer of the Lok Sabha. 
He has the final power to maintain order within the House of People and control on its 
working. He has the right to interpret the Rules of Procedure of House of the People. 
In the case of absence of a quorum, it is the duty of the Speaker to adjourn the House 
or to suspend the meeting until there is a quorum. The Speaker's conduct in regulating 
the procedure or maintaining order in the House is not be a subject to the jurisdiction 
of any court. 
Besides this, the Speaker possesses certain powers - (i). The Speaker shall preside 
over a joint sitting of the two Houses of the Parliament [Art. 118 (4)], and (ii). When a 
Bill is transmitted in the Lower House, the Speaker shall endorse on the Bill whether 
Bill is a Money Bill or not. The decision of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha shall be 
final [Art. 110 (4)]. 
I l l 
Powers of the Deputy Speaker: When the office of the Speaker is vacant the Deputy 
Speaker performs the duties of the Speaker's office [Art. 93]. The Deputy Speaker 
acts as the Speaker when the Speaker is absent from any sitting of the House. If, 
however, he also absent, such other person as may be determined by the rules of the 
House and if no such person is present such other person as may be determined by the 
House shall act as Speaker [Art.95 (2)]. If the office of the Deputy Speaker is also 
vacant, the duties of the Speaker shall be performed by such member of the House as 
the President may appoint for this purpose [95 (1)]. 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman ofRajya Sabha: The Vice-President of India is the 
ex-officio Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. He is elected by the members of an electoral 
college, consisting of the members of both the Houses of Parliament, in accordance 
with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable 
vote and the Deputy Chairman is elected by the members of the Rajya Sabha from 
amongst themselves. 
The functions of the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha are similar to those of the Speaker 
in the Lok Sabha except, of certifying a Money-Bill, and presiding over a joint sitting 
of the two Houses. 
Territorial Constituencies 
For the purpose of the election to the House, it is required that the territory of India 
should be divided in such manner that the ratio between the population of the States 
and the number of seats allotted to it, as far as practicable is same for all States. 
Thereafter, each State is divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the 
number of seats allotted to it, so far as practicable, is the same throughout the States 
[Art. 81 (2)]. The total number of seats in Lok Sabha is 545 out of which two seats to 
represent the Anglo-Indian community are filled by nomination by the President. The 
elective seats numbering 543 are filled by persons chosen by direct election. The 
allocation of seats to the States and Union Territories and the number of seats are as 
under: 
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Distribution of Lok Sabha Seats in the States/UTs 
s.m. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujrat 
Jharkhand 
Haryana 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Chhattisgarh 
Tamil Nadu 
Maharashtra 
Kamataka 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Uttar Pradesh 
No. of Seats 
42 
14 
02 
40 
02 
26 
14 
10 
20 
29 
11 
39 
48 
28 
21 
13 
25 
1 80 
•S.m. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
States 
Uttaranchal 
West Bengal 
Jammu Kashmir 
Nagaland 
Himachal Pradesh 
Manipur 
Tripura 
Meghalya 
Sikkim 
Mizoram 
Delhi 
Pondichery 
Andaman and 
Nicobar 
Lakshadweep 
Daman and Dieu 
Dadar & Nagar 
Haveli 
Chandigarh 
No. of Seats 
05 
42 
06 
01 
04 
02 
02 
02 
01 
01 
07 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
Source: Compiled from India 2006, op.cit., pp. 1182-1197. 
Summoning, Prorogation and Dissolution 
Summoning: The power of summoning either House of ParUament, the Constitution 
imposes a duty upon the President. But the right of the President to summon the 
House is subject to condition that six months should not intervene between the two 
sessions of Parliament [Art. 85 (1)]. He exercises this power on the recommendation 
of the Prime-Minister or the cabinet. He may make informal suggestions to the Prime 
Minister as to more convenient date and the time of summoning the House, but the 
ultimate advice in this matter rests with the Prime Minister. 
Prorogation: The power of prorogation of the House is vested in the President 
[Art.85 (2)]. Prorogation means, "the termination of a session of the House'". The 
President in exercising the power to prorogue the House acts on the advise of the 
Prime Minister may consult the cabinet before the advice is submitted to the 
President. 
Prorogation does not end the life of the House. Prorogation only terminates a session 
and does not constitute an interpretation in the continuity of life of Lok Sabha which 
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is brought to an end only by dissolution?" Pending Bills or business which has 
already been moved and are pending in the House do not lapse on prorogation and are 
carried over to the next session. On 26* July, 1956, a question was raised as to the 
effect of prorogation of the House on the functioning of select or joint committees on 
Bills. The objection was ruled out by the Speaker: "there is a specific statutory 
provision in the Constitution that on prorogation of Parliament, a Bill shall not lapse. 
That means, the prorogation has no effect so far as that Bill is concerned." 
Motion, Resolution and Amendments, which have already been moved, do not lapse 
on the prorogation of a session.^^ It means that the House ceases to do a business at a 
particular time. It takes up pending business for consideration when it meets after 
prorogation. 
Procedure of Prorogation: After adjournment of Lok Sabha, the Ministers of 
Parliamentary Affaires or the leader of the House sends a communication to the 
Secretary-General conveying the intension of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet to 
prorogue the House. After the agreement of the Speaker, the proposal of the Prime 
Minister is submitted to the President by Secretary-General. When the President has 
made the order, it is notified in the Gazette Extraordinary of the day on which the 
order is received in the Secretariat. Simultaneously, a paragraph is issued in the 
Bulletin informing the members of the prorogation of the Lok Sabha.^ ^ "It is not 
necessary that the order of prorogation should reach each and every member 
individually before it would become effective: It would suffice if the official 
Gazette."^^ 
Dissolution of Lok Sabha: It is to be clear that the Rajya Sabha is not subject to 
dissolution. It is a permanent body. Only Lok Sabha is subject to dissolution. 
Dissolution is the end of the life of the House. After the dissolution, general election 
must be held to elect a new Lok Sabha. "The end of the life of Lok Sabha either by an 
order made by the President under the Article 85 (2) (b) or on the expiration of the 
°^ M N Kaul, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, fifth edition, 2001, p 183. 
-' Lok Sabha Debate (11), 26 7 1956, cc (Column) 984-985 
" Rules ot Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, 9"" edition, Rule 336 
"^  M N Kaul & S L Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, op. cit, p 185 
-'' State of Punjab v Satya Pal Dang, All India Reporter ( A I R ) , 1969, S C 903. 
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period of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting is termed as 
'dissolution of the House' ?^ 
The power to dissolve the Lok Sabha is vested in the President [Art. 85 (5)]. But this 
power, he may exercise on the advice of the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister 
does not enjoy the confidence of the majority in the House, President will not be 
bound to dissolve the Lok Sabha on the advice of the Prime Minister. He can find out 
an alternative ministry. He may refijse to dissolve the House. 
Legislative Procedure in Parliament 
The Parliament of India performs the cardinal fimctions of legislation. It is the duty of 
Parliament, to oversee the administration, passing the Budget, discussing various 
subjects related with public welfare. Before discussing the legislative procedure, it is 
necessary or essential to focus on the jurisdiction of Parliament. 
Jurisdiction of Parliament 
The Parliament of India is not a sovereign body with unlimited and uncontrolled 
powers as British Parliament is. It works within the boundary of a written 
Constitution. Its legislative authority is hedged with the limitations in the following 
two ways; (i). by the distribution of powers between the Union and the States, and (ii). 
By the incorporation of a code of justifiable fiindamental rights in the Constitution 
and provision for judicial review, it means that all laws passed by the Parliament must 
be according to the provisions of the Constitution and liable to be tested for 
Constitutionality by an independent judiciary. All these limitations tend to qualify the 
extent of the authority and jurisdiction of Parliament. 
But it is noticeable that, despite these limitations, Parliament occupies a pivotal 
position in the present time. The powers, which Parliament of India possesses under 
the Constitution, are so immense that it fulfills the role of a sovereign legislature as 
any other sovereign legislature does. 
The Constitution of India distributes legislative powers between parliament and State 
legislatures in three lists - (i) the Union list, (ii) the State list, and (iii) the Concurrent 
list. Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over the subjects of Union list; the State 
M.N. Kaul, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, op. cit., p. 187. 
*^ Delhi Laws Act (1912), A.I.R. 1951, S.C. 332. 
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legislature over the subjects of State list and both may legislate over the Concurrent 
77 
List. Residuary powers of legislation vest in parliament [Art. 248]. Parliament has 
power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not 
include and notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State list 
[Art. 246 (4)]. 
There are some exceptional circumstances in which Parliament may legislate the laws 
over the subjects mentioned in the State list, i.e., (i) if Rajya Sabha passes a resolution 
supported by 2/3 of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient 
in national interest that parliament should make laws with respect to any matter 
enumerated in the State list specified in the resolution, it shall be lawful for 
parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the national territory with 
respect to that matter while the resolution remain in force [Art. 249 (1)]; (ii) if the 
'Proclamation of Emergency' is in operation, parliament shall have the power to make 
laws for the whole or any part of the Indian territory with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in the State list [Art. 250 (1)]. Such a law shall cease to have the effect on 
the expiration of six months after the proclamation of emergency has ceased to 
operate, except as respects things done or omitted of the said period [Art.250 (2)]; (iii) 
if the legislature of two or more States pass a resolution that it is desirable to have a 
law by the parliament on any matter in the State list, it shall be lawful for parliament 
to pass an Act for regulating that matter and any other State may adopt such a law by 
passing a resolution to that effect [Art. 252 (1)]. Any Act passed by parliament may 
be amended or repealed by an act of parliament [Art 252 (2)]; (iv) Parliament has 
power to make any law for the whole and any part of the territory of India to 
implement any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or 
any decision made at any international conference, association or other bodies [Art. 
253]; (v) Parliament is empowered to make laws on all matters in the State list, if the 
President, on receipt of report from the Governor of a State, is satisfied that a situation 
has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance 
with the provision of the Constitution [Art. 356]. 
There are some other Constitutional provisions in which parliament has power to 
legislate directly on the State subjects. These are as below: 
Art. 246 and Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution. 
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(i) Article 31 (3) provided that a State law providing for compulsory 
acquisition of private property shall have no effect unless it has received 
the consent of the President- this Article has been excluded by 44'*' 
Amendment Act, 1978 of the Constitution. 
(ii) Article 31 -A grants immunity to laws providing for agrarian reforms from 
Art. 14 and 19. The immunity of art. 31-A will not be available to a State 
law unless it has received the assent of the President.^' 
(iii) Article 200 directs the Governor of a State to reserve a Bill passed by a 
State Legislature for the consideration of the President. 
(iv) Article 288 (2) authorizes a State to tax in respect of water or electricity 
stored, generated, consumed, distributed or sold by any authority 
established by law made by Parliament. But it makes it clear that no such 
law shall be valid unless it has it has been reserved for the consideration of 
the President and has received his assent. 
(v) Article 304 (b) authorizes a State Legislature to impose reasonable 
restricted on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the 
State in the "Public Interest". But such laws cannot be introduced in the 
State Legislature without the provision sanction of the President. Beside 
this Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution. 
Thus, it is explicit that the distribution of legislative powers between Union and the 
States, Constitution gives more powers to the Union Parliament as against the State 
legislatures. 
Legislative Procedure 
There are so many functions, which Parliament performs but the most important 
fimction of the Parliament is- the making of laws. The legislative procedure is 
initiated in the form of a Bill. A Bill has to be passed by both Houses and assented by 
the President before it becomes law. Every Bill has to pass through the following 
stages before it becomes an Act of Parliament: 
*^ J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, op. cit., pp. 585-586. 
'' Ibid. 
'" Atiabary tea Co-operation v. State of Assam. A.I.R. 1951, S.C. 232. 
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(i) First Reading'. At the first stage, the Bill is introduced in the House. A Bill 
(except Money and Financial BUI) may be introduced in either House of 
Parliament [Art. 107 (1)]. But for introducing a Money Bill or a Financial 
Bill, Presidential recommendation is essential and it can be introduced in 
Lok Sabha [109 (1)]. At this stage, no discussion takes place. 
(ii) Second Reading: At this stage, the Bill is discussed clause by clause. The 
second reading consists of two of stages i.e., (a) a general discussion on 
the Bill as a whole. It would be open to the House to decide to refer the 
Bill to Select Committee of the two Houses or to circulate the Bill for the 
purpose of eliciting opinion thereon or straightaway take it into 
consideration. When a Bill is referred to a Select or Joint Committee, the 
Committee gives it a clause and detailed scrutiny clause by clause and 
recommendations, as it deems necessary. Thereafter, the committee 
submits its report to the House, which considers the Bill as reported by the 
committee,^' and (b) the second stage of the second reading consists of a 
clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill as introduced, or as reported by 
Select or Joint committee, as the case may be. 
(iii) Third Reading: At third reading, discussion is confined to argument either 
in support of the Bill or against the Bill. Only formal, verbal and 
consequential amendments are allowed at this stage. The Bill is finally 
passed in the House in which it was introduced. 
(iv) Bill in the Other House: When the Bill is passed in one House, it is sent to 
the other House, where it passes through similar process. 
The House, which receives the Bill from another House, can, therefore, 
take either of the following courses: 
•" Subhash C. Kashyap, "Parliament of India: Myths and Realities", National Publishing House, New 
Delhi, Isted. 1988, pp. 16-17. 
"Ibid., p. 17. 
" Ibid. 
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a) It may reject the Bill. In such a case, the President may, notify to the 
Houses by message to meet them in a joint sitting for the purpose of 
deliberating and voting on the Bill.^ '* 
b) It may pass the Bill with amendments. In this case, the Bill will be 
returned to the originating House. If the originating House accepts the 
Bill with amendment, it will be sent to the President for his assent.''^ 
But if the originating House does not agree with the amendments, the 
President may summon a joint sittmg to resolve the dead lock. 
c) It may not pass the Bill and more than six months have passed the 
President may summon a joint session of both the Houses.^^ 
Money Bill: There are some different provisions laid down in the constitution related 
to the Money Bill. Article 110 (1) defines a Money Bill. According to Article 110 (1), 
a Bill shall be deemed to be a "Money Bill if it contains only provisions dealing with 
all or any of the following matters, namely:-
a. the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax; 
b. the regulation of the borrowing of the money or the giving of any 
guarantee by the Government of India; 
c. the custody of the Consolidated or Contingency Fund of India, the 
payment of moneys into or withdrawal of moneys from any such 
funds, 
d. the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India, 
e. the declaring of any expenditure to be expenditure charged on the 
Consolidated Fund of India or the increasing of the amount of any such 
expenditure, 
f the receipt of money on account of the Consolidated Fund of India or 
the Public Account of India or the custody or issue of such money or 
the audits of the accounts of the Union or a State; or 
34 Article 108(1) (a) 
" Article. 111 
^^  Article 108(l)(b) 
"Article 108(l)(c) 
119 
g. any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) 
to (f). 
But a Bill shall not be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition 
of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licenses 
or fees for service rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, 
remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local 
38 
purpose. 
The power to decide, whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not, is empowered in Speaker 
of the Lok Sabha.''^ This means that the nature of a Bill which is certified by the 
Speaker as a Money Bill shall not be open to question either in a Court of Law or in 
the either House or even by the President. 
A Money Bill can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha.'*" It can only be introduced in 
the House with the recommendation of the President. But the recommendation of the 
President is not necessary for the moving of an amendment taking provisions for the 
reduction or the abolition of any tax.'*' When a Money Bill has been passed by the 
Lok Sabha, it is sent to the Rajya Sabha for its recommendations. Rajya Sabha cannot 
reject a Money Bill nor amend it by virtue of its own power. It must return the Money 
Bill to Lok Sbaha within a period of fourteen days fi-om the date of the receipt of the 
Bill.''^ Lok Sabha may accept or reject any or all of the recommendafions of the Rajya 
Sabha. If Rajya Sabha does not return the Bill within fourteen days, it is deemed to 
have been passed by both Houses in the form in which it was passed by Lok Sabha 
(Article 109 (4). 
President's Assent: Without President's assent, no Bill can become a law. When a 
Bill is passed by both the Houses, it is presented to President for his assent.'*^ The 
President may give his assent to the Bill or he may withhold his assent, or he may 
return a Bill with his recommendations for reconsideration (if it is not a Money Bill). 
But, if the Houses passed the Bill again with or without amendments, the President is 
"Article 110(2) 
"Article 110(4) 
•'"Article 109(1) 
"'Article 117(1) 
'^Article 109 (2) 
"' Article 111 
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bound to give his assent to the Bill. But,.for a Constitutional Amendments Bill, he is 
bound to give his assent in the first instance. 
Amendment Bill: The Bill for amendment of the Constitution, which is governed by 
Article 368 (2) must be passed by each House of the Parliament, separately, by the 
special majority, namely, the majority of the total number of the House and a majority 
of not less than two-third of the members of the House present and voting, and in 
certain cases of ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the states, a 
Bill for amendment of the Constitution followed practically the same legislative 
process as any ordinary part of legislation. 
Procedure in Financial Matters 
Budget: At the outset of every financial year, the President shall, in respect of the 
financial year cause to be laid before both the Houses of Parliament "an armual 
financial statement", commonly understood as the Budget.'*'' This statement gives out 
the estimated income and expenditure for that year. This estimated expenditure shall 
show separately under two heads-
a) the sums required to meet expenditure described by this Constitution as 
expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India, and 
b) the sums required to meet other expenditure proposed to be made from the 
Consolidated Fund of India. The expenditure or revenue account shall also be 
distinguished from the other expenditures. 
The Budget is presented in two parts: 1) the General Budget and 2) the Railway 
Budget. The General Budget is presented in Lok Sbha by the Finance Minister on 
such day as the President may direct. By convention it is usually presented at 5 p.m. 
on the last working day in February.''^ The Railway Budget is presented by the 
Railway Minister about a week or ten days earlier, usually after the Quesfion Hour. 
Discussion and Voting: No discussion takes place on the day the Budget is presented 
to the House. The Budget is discussed in two stages in Lok Sabha: 
"^Article 112 
^'Article 112(2) 
'' Subhash C. Kashyap, "Parliament of India: Myths and Realities", op.cit., p. 19 
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i. First, General discussion in which only the broad outlines and 
the principles of the Budget are discussed. 
ii. Second, Discussion and Voting on the Demands for Grants of 
individual Ministries is taken up. 
According to Article 113, the expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of 
India shall not be submitted to the vote of Parliament, but the House of the Parliament 
or not prevented from discussing any of those items of expenditure. The estimates as 
relates to other expenditure must be submitted to Lok Sabha in the form of demands 
for grants and Lok Sabha has power to assent, or to refuse to assent, to any demands 
or to assent to any demands subject to a reduction of the amount specified therein. No 
demand for a grant is to be made except on the recommendation of the President. 
In Rajya Sabha, there is only a general discussion on the Budget. It does not vote on 
the Demand for Grants. 
Vote on Account: It is not possible for the Lok Sabha to vote the Demands for Grants 
before the financial year ends on 31^' March, the Parliament is asked to vote usually 
two months supply, approximately one-sixth of the total estimated expenditure under 
various grants. This is called Vote on Account, which is passed after the general 
discussion on the Budget is over. 
Usually, a Vote on Account is taken for two months, but it may be taken for a longer 
period (3 to 5 months) when the House is to be dissolved or a new House is 
constituted.''^ 
Appropriation Bills: No money can be taken out of the Consolidated Fund of India 
unless the Appropriation Act is passed. ^ ° After the demands for grants have been 
passed by the House, there shall be a Bill introduced to provide for the appropriation 
out of the Consolidated Fund of India of all moneys required to meet the grants and 
the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India.^' No amendment shall be 
proposed to the Appropriation Bill which will have the effect of varying the amount 
"Ibid. 
** Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
'" Article 114(3) 
^'Article 114(1) 
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or altering the destination of any grant so made or of varying the amount of any 
expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India [Article 114 (2)]. 
Supplementary, Additional or Excess Grants 
According to Article 115, no expenditure in excess of the sums authorized in the 
Budget by Parliament can be incurred without its sanction. If the amount authorized to 
be expended for a particular service for the current financial year is found to be 
insufficient for the purposes of that year or when a need has arisen during the current 
financial year for supplementary or additional expenditure upon some new service not 
contemplated in the budget for that year, the President cause to be laid before both the 
Houses of Parliament another statement showing the estimated amount of that 
expenditure or cause to be presented to the House of the People a demand for such 
excess, as the case may be. 
Finance Bill: Finance Bill means a Bill ordinarily introduced every year to give 
effect to the financial proposals of the Govenmient of India and it includes a Bill to 
give effect to supplementary financial proposals for any period.^ ^ 
Financial Bills are those which do not receive the Speaker's certificate of two classes. 
These are dealt with the Article 117 of the Constitution-
(i) the first class belongs a Bill which contains any of the matters specified in 
Article 110 but does not consists solely of those matters, e.g., a Bill which 
contains a taxation clause but does not deal solely with taxation [Article 
117(1)]. 
(ii) Any ordinary Bill which contains provisions involving expenditure from 
the Consolidated Fund is a Financial Bill of the second class [Article 117 
(3)]. 
Financial Bill is introduced immediately after the presentation of the Budget. Such a 
Bill cannot be opposed. The appropriation Bill and Finance Bill may be introduced 
without prior circulation of copies to Members. Scope of discussion is vast on the 
Finance Bill and members can discuss any action of the Go\'emment of India. 
Procedure of the Finance Bill is the same as in the case of other Money Bills. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, "Parliament of India: Myths and Realities", op.cit., p. 20 
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Rules and Procedures in General 
Within the broad framework of powers and responsibilities specified in the 
Constitution, the parliament of India came out with procedural tools to carry forward 
the legislative affairs. In this particular context the following procedural devices are 
being adopted to raise the matters in the parliament:-
(1) Question Hour: The Question Hour is an important feature of both the Houses of 
Parliament. It usually takes place every day in the first hour during a session in the 
Lok Sabha and four days a week in the Rajya Sabha. 
The question raised during this hour puts the ministers and other government 
spokesmen on their merit and it provides an opportunity to the House for discussion 
of issues of general public importance and it also gives an equal opportunity to the 
opposition members of parliament to raise questions and criticism to which the 
Government has to pay the attention and to defend itself against the criticism. 
(2) Short Notice Question: A question relating to a matter of public importance may 
be asked with short notice of ten days and if the Speaker is of the opinion that the 
question is of an urgent character he may direct that an enquiry may be made from the 
minister concerned if he is in a position to reply. But, if he is unable to answer at short 
notice, the Speaker is of the opinion that the question is of sufficient public 
importance to be orally answered in the House, he may direct that the question to be 
placed as the first question on the list of questions for the day on which it would be 
due for answer under rule 33." 
(3) Half an Hour Discussion: The Speaker shall allot half an hour for raising 
discussion on a matter of sufficient public importance which has been the subject of 
recent question, oral or written, and answer to which needs elucidation on a matter of 
fact and this power empowers the Speaker to decide whether the matter is of sufficient 
public importance to be put down and may not admit a notice which, in his opinion, 
seeks to revise the policy of government.^'' 
(4) Motion and Short Duration Discussion: Members of the Parliament may raise 
discussion on specific matter of public importance by giving notice either of a motion 
" Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Loic Sabha, V ed. Lotc Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 
pp. 25-26. 
^* Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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popularly known as "No-Day-Yet-Motion" or "Short Duration Di^ussion".^^ This 
notice provides an opportunity for discussion of a situation or a statement, but there is 
no question to be put to the vote of the House. 
(5) Calling Attention Notices: Calling Attention notice enables the member to draw 
the attention of the government to an important development of public interest and to 
elicit its views. It may be admitted straight a way by the Speaker in his discretion and 
the government have to come forward with a statement.^^ 
(6) Matters Under Rule 377: "Matters Under Rule 377" is known for the ventilation 
of the public grievances in the Lok Sabha or "Special Mention" in Rajya Sabha. In 
this device, a member who wants to bring to the notice of the House any matter which 
is not a point of order can do so if he has given a notice thereof in writing to the 
Secretary-General and the Speaker has power to permit him to raise such a matter in 
the House." 
Adjournment Motion: An adjournment motion draws the attention of the House to a 
recent matter of urgent public importance having serious consequences and in regard 
to which a motion or a resolution with proper notice will be too late. The Speaker's 
CO 
consent is necessary to make such a motion. 
There are some restrictions to move the adjournment of House for the purpose of 
discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely :-
(i) not more than one such motion shall be made at the same sitting; 
(ii) not more than one such matter shall be discussed on the same motion; 
(iii) the motion shall not deal with any matter which is under adjudication by a court 
of law having jurisdiction in any part of India; 
(iv) the motion shall be restricted to a specific matter of recent occurrence; and 
(v) these rules can only be raised on a distinct motion by a notice given in writing to 
the Secretary.^^ 
Subhash C. Kashyap, "Parliament of India: Myths and Realities", op.cit., p. 11. 
'* Ibid. 
"Ibid., p. 12. 
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Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, op.cit., p. 30. 
"ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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Chapter - IV 
WORKING OF INDIAN PARLIAMENT: NEHRU ERA 
Writing about the development of parliamentary system in India, Subhash Kashyap 
pointed out, "if any one individual could be given credit of being the prime artificer of 
modem India and the architect and builder of representative parliamentary polity, it 
was unquestionably Jawaharlal Nehru. His contribution to the evolution of India's 
political system was unique. Nehru built, brick by brick, the infrastructure and the 
edifice of the institution, called the parliament of India." 
Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India had full faith in the parliamentary system. His 
contribution towards the building up of a parliamentary form of government in India 
can hardly be over emphasised. He played a pivotal role in establishing parliamentary 
practices as the leader of Lok-Sabha - Provisional Parliament (1950-52), First Lok 
Sabha (1952-57), Second Lok Sabha (1957-62) and Third Lok Sabha (1962-64). 
It is now more than four decades since Jawaharlal Nehru departed but, even today, it 
is equally important for us to assess the significance of his work in the field of 
parliamentary practices because he was one of the founding fathers of parliamentary 
system in India. 
In this chapter, an attempt is being made to bring out those structural, organizational, 
procedural and functional aspects of the parliament of Nehruvian era, which left an 
impact on the parliamentary practices even after his passing away. Today, the prestige 
of the parliamentary institutions and the parliamentarians has been seriously eroded 
due to a decline in the standards of parliamentary conduct. Therefore, it is certainly 
necessary to reinvestigate Nehru's role, especially in the context of building up an 
institution like parliament, whose repute and glory is in jeopardy today. 
' Subhash C. Kashyap, "Nehru and Parliament" in Nehru Revisited, (Mumbai: Nehru Centre, 2003), p. 
275. 
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Provisional Parliament 
The Constituent Assembly adopted the draft constitution on November 26, 1949 and 
it came into force on January 26, 1950. According to the provisions of the 
constitution, the Constituent Assembly became the provisional parliament of India on 
January 26, 1950. As the speaker of the House made it clear during the farewell 
address to the members "present parliament is a continuation of the Constituent 
Assembly of India (Legislature) which came into existence as the parliament from 
January 26, 1950, when the constitution came into force. Without any violent break 
with the past, the parliament began functioning with a substantially altered outlook as 
regards its duties and responsibility."^ It was acted as such until the first general 
election on the basis of adult franchise were held in 1952 and the first bicameral 
parliament was duly constituted under the provisions of the new constitution. 
As the provisional parliament was a continuation of the constituent assembly of India, 
it was a single-chamber legislature. It was not directly representative of the people of 
India but does not mean that the provisional parliament in any sense lacked public 
support and confidence. In the words of Nandini Upreti, "perhaps it enjoyed as much 
public confidence as it was expected to; and the members of parliament took 
themselves as representatives of the people and always tried to fulfill their duties in 
the same spirit."^ 
Membership 
The membership of the provisional parliament was quite limited. During 1950, the 
total membership came only to 296 members which increased to 313 the next year. 
The Lok Sabha proposed by the new Constitution was to consist of about five hundred 
members and, in addition, there was also to be an upper chamber having a total 
membership of 250 members. Hence, the total membership of parliament was to be 
above 750, while the provisional parliament had just about half of this total 
membership. The limited membership of parliament was also a legacy of the 
Constituent Assembly. From the very beginning it was assumed that the Constituent 
Assembly would be a small body of select people qualified by both their 
^ Provisional Parliament Debate, II (1952), Column, 2041. 
Nandini Upreti, Provisional Parliament of India; A Case Study in the Development of Parliamentary 
Democracy, Laxmi Narain Agrawal Publication, Agra, 1975, p.2. 
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representative character, and qualities of head and heart, to shoulder the challenging 
responsibility of framing the constitution- of independent India. The first official 
proposals for the constituent assembly, which were called the Cripps proposals, had 
proposed 207 members to be elected by provincial legislatures of British India and 49 
to be sent by the Congress as well as the Muslim League on the basis of prescribed 
method of representation but not on the basis of restricted membership. The Cabinet 
Mission proposals announced an increase in the total membership of the Constituent 
Assembly which was to have 389 members out of which 296 members were to be 
elected by provincial legislatures and the remaining 93 were to come from the states. 
The Office of the Speaker 
During the provisional parliament, the chair of the Speaker was occupied by G.V. 
Mavalankar. He was elected to the post in the last days of the central assembly and 
after that he continued to hold this important post throughout the provisional 
parliament. In the opinion of Subhash Kashyap, "there could have been no better 
arrangement than having the same person in the chair before and after independence, 
who could utilize the experiences and skills gained in the two different situations for 
adjusting and modifying the procedures in accordance with the changed 
circumstances."^ Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru once said when he was replying to the 
farewell address given by the speaker to the members of the provisional parliament on 
5 March 1952: 
"... you were sitting in the chair, sir, to guide us and we could not go 
astray so long as you were there. In any event, whatever we may have 
done, there can be no doubt that such conventions as have grown up 
and such habits and procedures that have developed been largely due 
to your able and, if I may say so, very understanding guidance of this 
House. And all of us, whether we come back to the subsequent 
parliaments or not, have profited greatly by that guidance of yours and 
in whatever spheres of activity we may indulge in, that profit will 
* Ibid, p. 6-7. 
Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, (Vol. 2), Shipra Publication, New Delhi, 
1995, p.7. 
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endure ... Above all I am sure we shall remember you, sir, what you 
have taught us during these years. " • 
Sessions and Sittings 
The term of the provisional parliament was 2 years, 2 months and 22 days. During 
this period, only five sessions were held. 
Sessions and Sitting of Provisional Parliament (1950-52) 
Sessions 
First Session 
Second Session 
Third Session 
l"Part 
2"'' Part 
Fourth Session 
Fifth Session 
Total 
Date of 
commencement 
28.01.1950 
31.07.1950 
14.11.1950 
05.02.1951 
06.08.1951 
05.02.1952 
Date of adjournment 
20.04.1950 
14.08.1950 
22.12.1950 
09.06.1951 
16.10.1951 
05.03.1952 
No. qfdays 
of the 
session 
83 
15 
39 
125 
72 
30 
364 
No. of sittings or 
days on which 
the house sat 
60 
12 
29 
49 
51 
23 
274 
Source: Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, (Vol.2), op.cit. p.5. 
It is being clear from given data that of the 364 days when the House was in session, 
actual sittings took place on 274 days which formed 75 percent of the total life period 
of parliament, the percentage of number of days on which house actually met was 
35.5. 
The first session of the provisional parliament was the budget session which passed 
the budget for the year 1950-51. The second session was an emergency session called 
by the President on account of the unprecedented international situation created by the 
Korean crisis and the deteriorating Indo-Pakistan relations. The last session was called 
to conclude the pending business and to pass the interim budget for 1952-53. The last 
meeting of the provisional parliament was held on 5 March 1952. The provisional 
parliament was not dissolved; it ceased to exist on 17 April, 1952 under article 374 of 
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I, Pt. II, 1952, Cols. 2046-47. 
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the constitution with the constitution of both houses of parliament. Notification under 
section 73 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 constituting the first Lok 
Sabha was issued on the same day 7 
Development of Legislative Procedure 
When the provisional parliament started its working, some changes were made in the 
procedure. The constitution of India authorized the Speaker to make necessary 
changes in them whenever needed. "Until the parliament made rules for regulating the 
procedure and conduct of its business, the rules and procedure immediately before the 
commencement of the constitution would remain effective subject to such 
modifications as might be made by the speaker."^ The speaker (Mavalankar) declared 
in the beginning of the provisional parliament: "In view of the new set up and the new 
provisions in the constitution, modifications and adaptations have become obviously 
necessary and I have therefore made them keeping the main body intacf .^  
There were some general changes made just after independence as has already been 
pointed out: (i) The President of the House was to be called the Speaker of the House 
for the first time; (ii) The rules about the use of language were also changed. Before 
independence a member could speak in English or with the permission of the chair in 
any Indian language, but now the members could speak either in English or Hindi; 
permission was to be obtained only if a member wanted to speak in any other Indian 
language (iii) There were no provisions regulating the procedure about the vote of no-
confidence against the government, but these were created after independence, as, for 
the first time, the government became fully responsible to the house, (iv) Separate 
days were to be allotted for the discussion on the finance bill (v)The terminology also 
changed and members of the executive came to be addressed as ministers. The 
Governor-General-in-Council came to be called as government of India. Finally, the 
most important change in the structure of the assembly, however, was that the 
Governor-General came to be transformed into a constitutional head.'° By these 
changes the assembly of pre-independent India was converted into a fully sovereign 
body of independent India. 
' Subhash, C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India (Vol. 2), op.cit. p.6. 
' Art. 118, Sub-clause 2, Indian Constitution. 
^ Provisional Parliament Debates,Vol.I, 1950, p.20. 
'" Nandini Upreti, op.cit., pp.36-37. 
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Some more changes were also made by the committee which was appointed by the 
Speaker in 1948 to examine the old rules-and to suggest further amendments. This 
conunittee's proposal's provided for the President's address to parliament, revised 
financial procedure including the vote on account and vote on credit, appropriation 
bill and creation of the consolidated fund. These,changes were mentioned in the 
constitution on the initiative of the Speaker, G.V. Mavalankar. Article 105 of the 
constitution gave to parliament the power of defining its own powers and privileges 
and immunities, and declared that until so defined, they should be those of the House 
of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Important changes and 
modifications were to be made after consultations with the government. The 
distinction between rules and standing orders was removed and now they were given 
the general title of "Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Parliament."" 
Procedure for Asking Questions 
The adoption of the new constitution brought some changes in the procedure of 
asking questions. These changes were declared by the Speaker in the beginning of the 
provisional parliament. The changes only related to the number being permitted to put 
down five questions for oral answers on any one day, the number was limited to three. 
In the words of the Speaker himself: 
"As regards the questions the old rules regarding the form and content 
of the questions as well as the Speaker's power in relation to them 
have been retained with necessary modification and amplification. One 
is that, instead of a member being permitted to put down five questions 
for oral answers on any one day, the number is limited to three ... This 
does mean that there is a limit on the number of questions that he shall 
star only three question each day, which he requires to be orally. "'^ 
Later on, during the question hour, the speaker asked the ministers not to read long 
statements on the floor of the House, which could be utilized in a better way by 
members by putting more supplementaries to other important questions.'^ 
" Ibid, p.37-38. 
'^  Provisional Parliament Debates, Vol. I, 1950, Cols. 28-29. 
" Ibid, Cols. 30-32. 
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Short Notice Questions 
Procedure of short notice questions was started during the provisional parUament. The 
members could put questions at short notice of three days provided the minister 
concerned agreed, only on a very important subject, while the usual notice often days 
was required for ordinary matters. This device was called "short notice question"."'* 
Half-an-hour-Discussion 
Another important procedural device innovated during the provisional parliament was 
that of enabling members to raise half-an-hour discussion on the matters of public 
importance. The speaker said in the Parliament on 5 March 1952, "to faciUtate 
elucidation on points that arise during the question hour, we have provided for, what 
we technically call, a rule for half-an-hour discussion and I am happy to say that 
advantage was taken of this by the members." 
Financial Procedure 
During the provisional parliament, some important changes had taken place in the 
financial procedure. In the words of the then Speaker: "Important provision is made 
that every bill shall be accompanied by a financial memorandum, which shall invite 
particular attention to the clause involving the expenditure and shall also give an 
estimate of recurring amount and non-recurring expenditure involved in case it (bill) 
IS passed."'^ It was also mentioned that the chairman of the select committees would 
be appointed by the Speaker and, if the Deputy Speaker was a member of the 
committee, he would be its ex-officio chairman. The quorum for the committee 
meeting was henceforth to be one-third instead of five as earlier.'^ 
Another important change was also introduced in the financial procedure during 
provisional parliament. Under the new Constitution, a Consolidated Fund was created 
for the government of India. Parliament was empowered to pass a vote on account 
before passing the whole budget. The procedure for passing a vote on credit and 
appropriation bill was also laid down in the constitution. 
•'' PPD, Vol. Ill, 1950, pp. 889-95. 
" PPD, 5 March, 1952, Col. 2042. 
" PPD, Vol. 1, 1950, p.29. 
'^  Ibid, 2-5 Feb, 1950, pp. 901-903. 
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During the first year of the provisional parliament the budget could not be proposed 
according to the changed procedure but the next budget was passed according to the 
new procedure.'^ 
President's Address 
Some modifications were also introduced in the procedure of the debate on the 
President's address. Under the Acts of 1919 and 1935 the right of the Governor-
General to address the assembly was not limited only to the commencement of the 
session, but he could address the House during a session also. The Constitution of 
India restricted this power of the President to addressing the Houses only at 
commencement and not later when the session has advanced with its business. Before 
independence and prior to the adoption of the constitution of free India, the address of 
the Governor-General could not be made a subject of criticism and there was no 
provision for a discussion on his address in the central legislature as the government 
was not responsible to the legislature. The right to criticize the address of the head of 
state and discussion on the address of the head of the state was also started during 
provisional parliament. Thus, the practice of discussing the President's address on a 
'Motion of Thanks' was started during provisional parliament.'^ 
Adjournment Motion 
During the days of the Central Legislative Assembly, the government was not 
responsible to the legislature and so an adjournment motion could not be treated as a 
motion of censure of the government. Thus, the necessity to change the attitude of the 
members to the procedure governing adjournment motion was insisted upon by the 
speaker soon after independence. He also insisted that it may be treated as a censure 
motion. The Speaker also felt that adjournment motion ought to be taken seriously by 
the members and such a motion should be brought by them only on most urgent and 
important issues. In the words of the then Speaker: 
"With full responsible government, we have also appreciated that the 
procedure for raising discussion on a budget by means of an 
adjournment motion should now be abandoned, particularly when 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op.cit., p. 11. 
Nandini Upreti, op.cit., p. 45 and Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op.cit., p. 
12. 
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members have so many opportunities of raising questions, half-an-
hour discussion, budget speeches, ^tc. The adjournment motion has 
consequently become very rare and I hope it will soon be a matter for 
historians. " 
Thus, the adjournment motion as a censure motion in disguise was developed at the 
time of provisional parliament. This motion was not accepted by the Speaker on 
ordinary issues and throughout the provisional parliament a sort of struggle went on 
between the members and the Speaker and motions brought by members on various 
ordinary issues were rejected on the grounds of non-admissibility. For example, when 
a member sought to move an adjournment motion to discuss the escape from custody 
of Mir Laik Ali, on 7 March 1950 it was not allowed by the Speaker, Mr. Mavalankar. 
Parliamentary Committees 
The committee system in the provisional parliament was inherited from the Central 
Legislative Assembly. There were several committees that existed during provisional 
parliament like, standing departmental committees, financial committees, committee 
on privileges, and rules committee. No changes were made in the composition and 
functioning of these committees during the days of the provisional parliament. But the 
debates in the provisional parliament on the motion for the election of the committees 
indicated divergence of opinion with regard to the functioning of these committees. 
Some members went to the extent of questioning the very utility and desirability of 
committees functioning under the control of the ministers and not the speaker. 
Members from the opposition wanted more cooperation from the government with a 
view to making these committees more effective and fruitful. H.V. Kamath, T.T. 
Krishnamachari and R.K. Sidhva, demanded important reforms in their organization 
and functioning.^' 
Legislation 
During its tenure, provisional parliament passed 190 government bills in which 96 
were new bills and 94 were amending bills. The main focus of the legislation was to 
deal witl' the problem of people's welfare and the needs of nation-building. The 
^° Provisional Parliament Debates, 5 March, 1952, p. 2042. 
•' Parliamentary Debates, Vol. Ill, 1950, pp. 2091; See also Morris Jones, Parliament in India, 
Philadelphia, 1957, p.309. 
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maximum number of bills passed by provisional parliament was related to industry 
and very few were related to agriculture. But it does not mean that the agricultural 
field was ignored. The problem of rehabilitation was another big issue to resolve. 
Some important Acts passed by the provisional parliament were: The Rehabilitation 
Finance Administration (Amendment) Act, the Administration of Evacuee Property 
Act, the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, the Influx from Pakistan (Control) 
Amendment Act, the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits and Legal Proceedings) 
Amendment Act, etc. Some of important bills passed were to give effect to the 
arduous task of the integration of the princely states like, the Bhopal and Vindhya 
Pradesh Act, the Punjab State Legislature Act etc. These bills formed nearly 13 
percent of the total number of bills passed by the provisional parliament. The 
Representation of Peoples Act and Census (Amendment) Act were enacted in 
connection with the preparations for and the holding of the general elections. No less 
important was the area of national security and there were as many as ten bills passed 
dealing with matters concerning defence, e.g., the Territorial Army (Amendment) 
Act, the Inflammable Substances Act and the U.P. Goverrunent (Control of Rent and 
Eviction) Act. Some of the important Acts relating to other fields were: the Preventive 
Detention Act, the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, the Supreme 
Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, the Vishva Bharti Act, the Benaras 
Hindu University (Amendment) Act, the Rajghat Samadhi Act, the Press 
(Objectionable Matter) Act, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, etc. 
More than 13 percent of all laws passed related to financial matters. 
Important Discussions 
Some discussions on bills had very important place in parliamentary practices like 
discussion on Preventive Detention Bill, the Hindu Code Bill, Road Transport 
Corporation Bill, Private Member's Bills, etc. The Preventive Detention Bill was 
introduced by Sardar Patel on 25 Feb 1950. In the words of Subhash Kashyap: "It was 
one of the most memorable events during the provisional parliament". It was the 
emergency bill and the reaction of the members against the bill was mixed. H.V. 
Kamath, Dr. Deshmukh, Masavi, and R.K. Chaudhary were against and they felt that 
^^  Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 19-22. 
" Ibid, p.22. 
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the bill was against individual liberty. Even R.K. Chaudhary went to the extent of 
calling it the 'Black Bill'. K.K. Bhattacharya, Bal Krishna Sharma, Goluka and 
Mahavir Tyagi were the supporters of this bill. In the opinion of Mahavir Tyagi, the 
bill was a necessary evil. The bill was passed the same day, i.e., on 25 February 1950 
with only one amendment proposed by Thakurdas Bhargava.'^ '* 
The Hindu Code Bill was another most controversial measure debated by parliament. 
It was brought to the House twice but no progress could be made on both the 
occasions. It was introduced on 5 Feb 1951, 28 members participated in the debate out 
of which 23 were against it. A fierce debate took place for five days on a clause of the 
bill which provided that the bill would apply to Hindu community only and opponents 
argued that other communities also suffer from the evils which the bill sought to 
remove. In the opinion of M.A. Ayyangar, the legal measures had failed in reforming 
long established social customs and that the bill awaited the same fate as was met by 
measures like the Child Marriage and Restraint Act and Widow Remarriage Act. Only 
Raj Bahadur (Rajasthan) supported the bill at this stage.^ ^ After a long debate, the bill 
was postponed till the next session. It was again taken up for consideration on 17 
September 1951. Every clause of the bill was opposed as usual. Dr. Ambedkar was 
very desperate because of the criticism of the congress members who opposed the bill. 
Finally, it was withdrawn and never taken up by the provisional parliament again. 
Because of this. Dr. Ambedkar resigned from cabinet. He wrote in his resignation 
letter: 
"For a long time I have been thinking to resign my seat from the 
cabinet. The only thing that held me back was that it would be possible 
to give effect to the Hindu Code Bill before the life of the present 
parliament came to an end." 
Provisional Parliamentary Debates, 25 Feb 1950, p. 885-890 & 901-903. 24 
" Provisional Parliamentary Debates, 5 Feb 1951, Cols. 2392-2400,2402-05, 2408-20; 6 Feb 1951, pp. 
2467-80; 7 Feb 1951, Cols. 2488-2504,2517-32 & 2533-37. 
*^ Ibid., Cols. 2939, 3110, 3174,4735. The members who voted against the bill were Anchit Ram, M.B. 
Bhargava, Thakur Das Bhargava, Chandrika Ram, Nand Kishore, V.T, Gupta, B.S. Man, Ram Narain 
Singh, Balkrisha etc. 
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Important Decisions/Observations from the Chair 
During the exercise of its fvinction of debate and discussions on matters of general 
importance, the House came across situations where it had become necessary for the 
chair to give decisions or make observations to settle the matter before the House. 
These rulings were of immense value to parliamentary practice and procedure. Given 
below are some of the important rulings given by the chair, from time to time, during 
the provisional parliament: 
1) Name of members giving notice of adjournment motion need not always be 
mentioned by the Speaker. Sometimes an adjounmient motion is so obviously 
untenable and the desire for publicity is achieved by the very fact of mention of 
the name of the members giving the notice of it. In such cases the name of the 
members should not be mentioned.^^ 
2) A policy which is continuing from day to day cannot be the subject matter of an 
adjournment motion. 
3) A marginal heading is not part of a bill; Amendments thereto are not 
permissible.^' 
4) During the discussion on an amending bill, only those sections are discussed 
which are sought to be amended and not the whole law.''" Sections in the 
original Act which are not included in the amending bill caimot be touched.^' 
5) After having placed the bill before the House, no clause of the bill can be 
withdravm. It has to be put to vote and can only be negatived by the House. 
6) Private member's bills involving expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of 
India should have President's sanction before they can be considered by the 
House.^^ 
" Parliamentary Debates, 7 March 1950, pp. 1177-79. 
" Ibid, 15 Nov 1950, Cols. 19-20. 
" Ibid, 10 Feb 1950, pp. 409-10. 
'"ibid, 3 Feb 1950, p. 189. 
"Ibid, 8 Feb 1951, Cols. 73-81. 
'Mbid,21 Dec 1950, Col. 2215. 
" Ibid, 12 April 1951, Cols. 6727-28. 
137 
7) The question of a bill being ultra vires of the Constitution will not be decided 
by the chair. It might be left to the House which can reject the bill in case it is 
found ultra vires. If the House accepts the bill for consideration, the party 
aggrieved has his remedy in the Supreme Court, or other courts?'* 
8) No debate is permitted, by convention, on an appropriation bill.^'' 
9) Re-committal of bill to a new select committee is permissible.^^ 
10) Members of the select committee should not try to participate in the debate on 
the report.^^ 
11) For raising a point of privilege, chair must be contacted in the chamber first and 
made cognizant of the matter. It should not be raised straightaway in the 
House.^^ 
12) It is within the powers of the House to constitute other special committees if 
there are any special circumstances and enquiries to be made. 
13) Merit of an order of a High Court should not be discussed in the House as the 
House cannot sit in judgment over the proceeding of the court. Copy of the 
proceedings of the House relating to a matter on which a High Court has passed 
orders should not be sent to the court. 
14) It is for the speaker to decide whether a prima facie case of privilege exists. If 
he comes to such a conclusion, he will certainly send the matter to the pri\ ileges 
committee.'" 
Referring to Articles 110, 112, 113 and 114 of the constitution, a point of order was 
raised on 24 March 1950, which stated that there could be only one financial 
statement and one appropriation bill as there was only one Consolidated Fund of 
India. It was argued that railways of India could not have a separate income, \\ ith a 
separate Appropriation Act. It was contended that any estimate or appropriation w hich 
'" Ibid, 10 Aug 1950, Cols 765-85, 24 April 1952, Col 7366 
'* Ibid, 5 March 1952, Cols 1999-2000. 
'* Ibid, 5 Sept 151 
" Ibid, 4 June 1951, Cols 10, 14-24 
'* Ibid, 10 March 1950, pp.337-38 
" Ibid, 6 June 1951, Cols 1024-26 
^° Ibid, 3 March 1952, Cols 440-41. 
'^ Ibid, March 1950, pp 1019, 10 April 1951, Cols 66, 60-61 
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came either in respect of railways or in respect of general administration has to come 
under one appropriation bill. The Speaker observed that no doubt, Article 112 implied 
that the appropriation bill should be one but it did not provide for the operation of the 
Consolidated Fund once for all by one stroke. The very fact that the Constitution 
permits the House to have a vote on account and excess grants, to split it into one or 
more compartments, proves that it nowhere provides that the House shall consider the 
entire expenditure as one block and that it shall take only one appropriation bill.''^ 
THE FIRST LOK SABHA 
The first Lok Sabha was constituted on 17 April 1952. For the first time, Indian 
Parliament was constituted by general elections, which were held in 1951-52 on the 
basis of universal adult fi-anchise. It was the first fully representative body of India. 
The first general elections were fought on the basis of principles because Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru had very clear vision towards the electoral politics and he wanted 
that the elections should be fought on the basis of principles. It was his contribution 
that election commission did its work without any interference of govenmient and 
right men were used in the conduct of elections. In the words of Pandit Nehru, "The 
coming elections are important, but it is far more important to know exactly what we 
stand for and how we want to fimction in the fiiture. It is better to keep our soul and to 
lose an election than to win that election in the wrong way and with wrong means."''^ 
Composition 
As we have written earlier that the first Lok Sabha was constituted on 17 April 1952, 
it was constituted under the notification to this effect issued in accordance with 
section 73 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951. It consisted of 499 
members in which, the Constitution provided 497 members for the election from 
many constituencies and 2 members for nomination by the President to give 
representation to the Anglo Indian community.'*'* 
In the first Lok Sabha, there was a majority of Congress Party which had 364 seats, 
constituting more than70 percent of the seats for which the elections were held. The 
^^  Ibid, 24 March 1950, pp. 2064-67. 
*^ Quoted from A.M. & S.G. Zaidi, "A Report Submitted to the Congress Party by Pandit Nehru" in 
The Encyclopedia of Indian National Congress, New Delhi, 1983, 146. 
'''' Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, Vol. II, op.cit. p.83. 
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Communist Party was the second largest party and rest of the members belonged to 
about nineteen small parties or were independents.'* 
Government Formation 
As the leader of the largest party in Lok Sabha, Jawaharlal Nehru was invited by the 
President to form the new government of India. It formed on 13 May 1952. There 
were several talented persons in the first Cabinet like, V.V. Giri, T.T. 
Krishnamachari, G.L. Nanda, CD. Deshmukh, Maulana Azad, Jagjevan Ram etc. 
They were not only astute politicians but also good ministers and capable executive 
heads. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was only a single female candidate of the first cabinet. 
At the time of formation of the government, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wanted that 
fresh blood (young generation) should be in the ministry. In his words: 
"An important fact to be borne in mind is the necessity of fresh blood, 
new faces, new out looks; it is a bad thing for the same persons, 
however good, to perpetuate themselves in office. This is bad for them 
and bad for the public. Inevitably there is staleness and we function in 
set grooves of thought. Also, opportunity is denied to newcomers who 
may be good and no provision is made for a proper succession. " 
Sessions and Sittings 
The first day of the first Lok Sabha was Tuesday, 13 May 1952. The total life of the . 
Lok Sabha was 4 years 10 rhonth and 22 days. During this period, fifteen sessions, 
consisting of 887 days were held. There were three sessions in each year except 
during the years 1952 and 1957. The House was constituted on 17 April, 1952 and 
was dissolved on 4 April, 1957, i.e., one month and 8 days before the date when it 
would have completed its full 5 year term."*^  
•^^ Subhash C. Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas, Shipra Publication, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 10-11. 
^^ Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 2 (1950-52), Oxford, New Delhi, 1986, p.610. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, Vol. II, op.cit., p.94. 
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Sessions and Sittings of first Lok Sabha 
Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Total 
Duration of session (in 
days) 
138 
180 
175 
178 
205 
876 
No. of working 
days 
103* 
137 
137 
139 
151 
667 
% 
74.63 
76.11 
78.28 
78.08 
73.65 
76.14 
Duration of sittings (in 
hrs) 
433 
749 
716 
859 
1026 
3783 
•From the month of May 1952 
Source: Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, Vol.11, op.cit., p. 95. 
It is evident that there was a marked increase in the number of days constituting a 
session and also in the total number of days on which the House sat in each successive 
year from 1952 onwards. 
President's Address 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected as the first President of Indian Republic. According 
to Article 87 of the Constitution, the President was required to address members of 
parliament at the commencement of every session. As the provisional parliament was 
unicameral so there was no question to address members of both the Houses 
assembled together until the two Houses came into existence. In this respect, Article 
87 was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 to require the 
President to address both the Houses assembled together only at the commencement 
of the first session of parliament after each general election to Lok Sabha and at the 
commencement of the first session every year. . 
The President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, addressed the two Houses assembled together for 
the first time on 16 May 1952. He said to members of the parliament on the beginning 
of new era: 
"Now that we stand on the threshold of another phase of India's long 
history, we have to determine afresh how best to serve her. You and I 
48 Ibid, p.95 
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have taken the oath of service to this country of ours. May we be true 
to that pledge and dedicate our highest endeavour to its fulfillment. "'* 
Hindi Nomenclature of the House 
On 14 May 1954 a further step was taken by the Speaker in the process of adoption of 
Hindi. He announced that the 'House of the People' would be officially known as 
'Lok Sabha' and all parliamentary papers would carry this title. Thus, the secretariat 
of the House which was thus far called the parliament secretariat was hereafter to be 
named as 'Lok Sabha Secretariat.' A similar announcement was made by the 
chairman in 'the Council of States' on 23 August 1954. 'The Council of States' was 
named in Hindi as the 'Rajya Sabha' and its secretariat (the Council of States 
Secretariat) was named as the 'Rajya Sabha Secretariat'.^" 
Legislation 
After independence, legislation was adopted as a machinery of socio-economic 
change. A large number of socio-economic and political changes were made by 
legislative measures. During the first Lok Sabha the Parliament passed several bills to 
establish a socialistic pattern of society like, the Imperial Beink of India was 
nationalized, life insurance business was nationalized when parliament passed the 
Life Insurance Corporation Act and many more bills were passed by the parliament 
for this purpose. In the political and administrative field, the States Reorganization 
Act was a very important work of legislation of the first Lok Sabha.^' 
There were six Constitution Amendment Acts passed by the first Lok Sabha. When 
the Fourth Amendment Bill was referred to a Joint Committee of the two Houses, 
Prime Minister Nehru conveyed some important views about some aspects of the 
working of the constitution. He said: 
"Obviously, the Constitution cannot and should not be changed 
frequently. Obviously also, it can and must be changed when the 
situation requires it to be changed. In fact the Constitution itself has 
laid down how it can and should be changed ... Nothing is perfect, and 
when it becomes necessary to make changes to remove those flaws ... 
SI 
Lok Sabha Debates, 16 May 1952, Cols. 58-59. 
Subhash C. Kashyap, History of Parliament of India, Vol. II, op.cit., p.96. 
Subhash C. Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas, op.cit., pp.18-19. 
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After all, the Constitution is meant to facilitate the working of the 
government and the administrative and other structures of this country 
...There are plenty of checkers in this Constitution. Now, therefore, the 
fact that an. amendment is proposed to this constitution should not and 
cannot be challenged except on merits.' 
In the same speech, Nehru also described the role of the judiciary. In his opinion, "the 
fundamental basis of the Constitution and the general practice in India was to have an 
independent and powerful judiciary and there is no question of challenging, 
modifying, limiting or minimizing the authority of the judiciary. What the judiciary, 
the High Courts or the Supreme Court, decided was inevitably accepted and acted 
upon. But, with all respect to the judiciary, they could not decide about high political, 
social, or economic or other questions. It was for parliament to do so." 
Some Important Procedural Decisions/Rulings 
As far as parliamentary rulings or parliamentary procedures are concerned, the term 
of first Lok Sabha is very important. So many important parliamentary institutions 
and procedures laid down during this period. Some of the important decisions/ 
rulings^'' from the chair in the first Lok Sabha were as follows: 
Adjournment Motion 
i) Adjournment motion should not anticipate a debate in the House, i.e. if there is 
a fairly good chance of the matter otherwise coming up for discussion on the 
floor of the House, it may not be permitted on an adjournment motion. An 
adjournment motion may be allowed only as a matter of exception, when there 
was no other opportunity or chance for the House to consider the matter (16 
May, 1952). 
ii) A matter is not considered to be urgent unless brought before the house at the 
first available opportunity (22 May, 1952). 
iii) Subject-matter of an adjournment motion cannot be a press report as it is not 
treated as authoritative (25 May, 1952). 
" Lok Sabha Debates, 14 March 1955, Cols. 1445-46. 
" Ibid, Cols. 1947-48; and Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op.cit., p.105. 
'' For Details see Decisions from the Chair and Obervations from the Chair in the Lok Sabha 1952-57; 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi. 
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iv) Interpretation of provisions of the Constitution cannot be a subject-matter of an 
adjournment motion (14 December, 1952). 
v) Debate on a fast-unto-death to compel the government to take a particular 
decision cannot be allowed through adjournment motions (8 December, 1952 & 
6 April, 1953). 
vi) Neither the chair nor the House need go into ascertaining the facts of a subject 
matter sought to be raised through an adjournment motion. It can be postponed 
in order to enable the government to ascertain the facts of the case (15 
December, 1954 & 20 and 22 December, 1955). 
vii) Situation which may be continuing from day to day cannot be subject-matter of 
an adjournment motion (6 August, 1956). 
Bills 
\) Only new points with prior intimation and approval of the Speaker can be raised 
while discussing an Appropriation Bill (3 & 4 July, 1952 & 12 December, 1952 
& 7-8 April 1953). 
ii) A member caimot move an amendment labeled by another member even though 
he may have been authorized by the latter (19 July, 1952; 4 December, 1952 & 
24 July, 1956). 
iii) Principles of the bill cannot be discussed on a motion for consideration of the 
bill as reported by the joint committee (1 August, 1952). 
iv) Whenever an objection is taken to the legislative competence of the House, it is 
not for the chair to decide the matter but that may be taken into consideration by 
the House (25 November, 1952). 
v) Introduction of a Bill dependent on another bill pending in the House cannot be 
permitted unless the first bill has been passed and assented to by the President 
(24 August, 1953). 
vi) The House, by aggressing to join a joint committee as proposed by the other 
House, does not commit itself to the principles of the bill. But if originating 
House refers it to a Joint Committee, it commits itself to the principles of the 
bill (17 December, 1953 & 30 July, 1956). 
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vii) Amendment for circulation of a bill, after it has been passed by the other House 
is out of order (8 May, 1954). 
viii) Guillotine does not apply to a government bill (24 November, 1954). 
ix) Amendments disallowed in the joint committee can be considered by the House 
(25 November, 1955). 
x) After the introduction, withdrawal of any provision of a bill can be made with 
the permission of the House (21 December, 1956). 
xi) It is for the House and not the Chair to decide whether a bill is ultra-vires of the 
Constitution or not (15 April, 1955). 
xii) Bills attracting the provisions of Article 117 (3) may be introduced in both the 
Houses (17 April, 1955). 
xiii) Money Bill should be passed on to the Rajya Sabha as soon as passed by the 
House and the period of 14 days should be computed fi-om the date of receipt of 
the Bill in the Rajya Sabha secretariat. 
xiv) A Bill cannot be introduced in both the Houses simultaneously (17 July, 1956). 
xv) A Bill under the consideration of a joint committee does not lapse on 
prorogation of a session (26 July, 1956). 
Debates 
i) Allegations against persons who are not present in the House to defend 
themselves should not be made (26 February, 1952). 
ii) Referring to parliament as a 'talking shop' and the chamber as 'gas chamber' is 
un-parliamentary (4 March, 1953). 
iii) Merit on an order of a High Court should not be discussed in the House (3 
March, 1952 & 1 December, 1953). 
iv) Discussion on a State subject on which the state acts as an agent of the center, is 
permissible (28 June, 1952). 
v) Quoting lines from newspapers in support of one's argument is in order (10 
July, 1952). 
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vi) Power to expunge certain words from proceedings is vested in the Speaker in 
his discretion (13 March, 1953). 
vii) Second speech by a member on a motion is not allowed (25 July, 1955). A 
member making an explanatory statement in support of his amendment for re-
committal of a bill to a joint committee may, however, be permitted to speak 
again on motion for consideration of a bill (18 August, 1953). 
viii) Members should speak in third person and avoid personal explanations (22 
May, 1952). 
ix) Reference to individuals not belonging to the House is not allowed (3 June, 
1952). 
x) Production of exhibits in the House is depreciated (26 November, 1952). 
xi) Reference to an individual officer is not allowed. The criticism should be 
directed to the minister concerned (8 April, 1954). 
xii) No member can claim to speak as a matter of right. He must catch the Speaker's 
eye and wait for his turn (18 Jime, 1952). 
Quorum 
Question of quorum may not be raised between 1:00 to 2:30 pm and the convention 
that the House shall not be covmted between 1:00 to 2:30 pm should be.observed 
unless the House decided otherwise (8 September, 1954; 3 & 5 September, 1957). 
Information Regarding Lok Sabha 
Information pertaining to the Lok Sabha cannot be asked for on the floor of the 
House; such information may be obtained from the Secretary-General or the Speaker 
(21 March, 1957). 
Point of Order 
i) Point of order must relate to procedure only, other points under its guise are not 
permitted (16 June, 1952). 
ii) A member may raise a point of order at any time on a matter or business then 
under consideration in the House. He should do so there and then and not after 
the business is over (10 August, 1953 and 10 April, 1956). 
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Resolutions 
Following amendments to a resolution were ruled as out of order: 
i) Amendment enlarging the scope of original resolution (17 April, 1953 and 31 
March, 1956). 
ii) Amendment seeking to allocate proceeds of duty for particular purpose (24 
November, 1953 & 23 November, 1954). 
iii) Amendments negative in character (29 March, 1956). 
iv) Amendments contradictory to the text of resolution (31 August, 1956). 
v) A partly discussed resolution does not lapse on prorogation of the House (20 
July, 1956). 
Statements 
i) Questions or discussion on statements made by ministers are not permitted (19 
November, 1952). 
ii) Policy statements should be made by ministers on the floor of the House when 
the House was in session before releasing them to the press or public (1 
September, 1953). 
iii) No discussion is permissible on statements made by Attorney-General (1 May, 
1954). 
These were the major rulings and procedures which were laid down during first Lok 
Sabha. We can say that these rulings laid down the foundations of parliamentary 
procedures in India. In the words of Subhash Kashyap, "On the whole, the Lok Sabha 
during the years 1952-57 was in a formative period - a period for laying down healthy 
foundations for building a strong edifice of parliamentary institutions and procedures. 
New situations had to be faced, fresh procedures evolved and appropriate rules laid 
down. And, in all this it fared very well indeed and passed on high standards to the 
succeeding House."^^ 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, Ten Lok Sabhas, op.cit., p.23. 
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THE SECOND LOK SABHA 
The first Lok Sabha was dissolved on 4 AJDril 1957. And the election to the second 
Lok Sabha was held in February-March, 1957.^ ^ Under section 73 of the 
Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, a notification was issued to constitute the 
new House on 5"" April 1957. The old Council of Ministers resigned on 16 April and 
the resignation was accepted on the same day. The new ministry was formed on 17 
April, 1957. 
Composition 
In the second Lok Sabha, there were 499 members in which 493 were directly elected 
and two were nominated by the President. 
Party Position in Second Lok Sabha 
Political Parties 
Indian National Congress (INC) 
Communist Party of India (CPI) 
Praja Socialist Party (PSP) 
Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) 
Other Parties 
Independents 
% of Votes Secured 
47.8 
8.9 
10.4 
05.9 
19.4 
07.6 
No. of Seats Won 
371 
27 
19 
4 
42 
30 
Source: Subhash C. Kashyap, Ten Lok Sabhas, op.cit., p. 37. 
It is evident from the figures that the Congress was in a dominant position. In 
comparison to first Lok Sabha, the Congress Party got seven seats more in the second 
Lok Sabha. Communist Party of India also improved its posifion and now had 27 
members in the House as against the 16 in the first Lok Sabha. Above all, the 
composition of the second Lok Sabha confirmed the one-party dominant system. 
Formation of the Government 
As the leader of the majority party in the second Lok Sabha, Jawaharlal Nehru was 
invited by the President to form the government. The new Union Cabinet, headed by 
Jawaharlal Nehru, was swom-in on 17 April, 1957, in New Delhi. It was the third 
government which was formed by Pt. Nehru. It was a three tier Council, having 
cabinet ministers, ministers of state, and deputy ministers. The strength of the new 
^ The elections commenced on 24 February, 1957 and were completed by 14 March, except in the 
snow bound regions of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. 
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council of ministers was 39, including Prime Minister. In the council, the cabinet 
ministers numbered 13, ministers of state 14^  and deputy ministers 12." 
Presiding Officer (The Speaker) 
Mr. Ananthasyanan Ayyangar, a member of the new House and formerly Speaker of 
the first Lok Sabha, was unanimously elected as the Speaker for the second time on a 
motion moved by Jawaharlal Nehru on 11 May, 1957. Welcoming the new Speaker 
and congratulating him on his re-election to high office, the Prime Minister said: "Sir, 
in electing you the House has not, if I may say so, taken a risk. We have come into 
intimate contact with you in your capacity as Speaker and previously as Deputy 
Speaker of this House... You, Sir, who come here with considerable experience in the 
past of occupying this office will, we all know, supply that good leadership and keep 
us all in order if we forget the right path at any time."^^ 
Sessions and Sittings 
The second Lok Sabha had 16 sessions during its total life of 4 years, eleven months 
and six days. 
Duration and Sittings of Second Lok Sabha 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Total 
Total No. of Days of 
the Session 
124 
171 
168 
162 
133 
19 
111 
No. of Days on which House 
Actually Sat 
•94 
125 
123 
121 
102 
**14 
579 
%(Approx) 
76 
73 
73 
74 
76 
64 
74 
Duration of Sittings 
(in Mrs.) 
Approx 
612 
721 
792 
798 
668 
-
3,651 
1 1 _ I 1 
Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, Vol. 11, op.cit., p. 197. 
*From the month of May 
**Lame duck Session (12 March, 1962 to 30 March 1962) 
According to the given data, the total number of days on which House actually sat 
was 579, or 74 percent of the duration of the session. The sixteenth session was a 
lame duck session. The Second Lok Sabha was dissolved on 31 March, 1962. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op.cit., pp. 188-89. 
** Lok Sabha Debate, 11 May, 1957, Cols. 28-29. 
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Legislation 
The second Lok Sabha passed a total number of 325 bills. 29 bills were referred to the 
joint committee of both the Houses and 11 to the select committees of the Lok sabha. 
Among the bills passed by the Lok Sabha, four were Amendment bills. Many of the 
bills (32.6 percent) were related to fiscal matters. Three legislative measures in the 
financial field concerned Wealth Tax, Expenditure Tax, and Gift Tax, and one 
consolidated and amended the law relating to Income Tax and Sales Tax. In Banking, 
an important measure was passed to provide for the establishment of a Corporation 
for the purpose of insurance of deposits. In the field of labour welfare, there were 
several Acts passed like, Working Journalists (Fixation of Rates and Wages) Act, the 
Motor Transport Workers Act, the Maternity Benefits Act, and Iron Ore Mines 
Labour Welfare Cess Act. In the social field, the Dowry Prohibition Act, the 
Probation of Offenders Act, and the Children Act (providing for the care and 
rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent children and for the trial of delinquent 
children in Union Territories) were passed. For the first time in the legislative history, 
we had a joint sitting of both the Houses of Parliament on 6 and 9 may, 1961 to 
resolve the deadlock on Dowry Prohibifion Bill when the two Houses failed to agree 
on some amendments to the Bill.^ ^ 
Procedural Development 
The process of adopting, modifying and developing the parliamentar}' practices and 
procedures of the colonial Central Legislative Assembly to the requirement of a 
system which rested on the bed rock of responsibility which had started with the 
commencement of the Constitution of independent India, the provisional parliament, 
and the first Lok Sabha, confinued during the second Lok Sabha period also. 
Gradually, step by step, more and more healthy conventions and traditions were 
developed to suit the changing needs and situations. The presiding officers of the 
Houses played a very vulnerable and important role in as much as only their 
observations, decisions or rulings in the Houses interpreted and decided the meaning 
of constitutional provisions, rules, regulation, etc. as these applied to a particular 
matter. Some of the important decisions/observations from the chair having a bearing 
on procedural aspects may be summed up in paras that follow: 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, Ten Lok Sabhas, op.cit., pp. 43-44 
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Adjournment Motion 
(1) While technically, members had a right to give notice of an adjournment 
motion at any time when the House was in session, the convention was that 
when the President was to address the House at the opening session normally 
no business (other than oath taking and the election of the Speaker) could be 
transacted before such address by the President.^ '^  
(2) Notice of an adjournment motion relating to a state subject was out of order. 
In order to merit consideration, it must be accompanied by a statement 
showing what responsibility of the government of India was attracted and how 
it had not been discharged.^' 
(3) On a notice of an adjournment motion regarding strike call given by the 
employees of the Civil Aviation Department, the Speaker withholding his 
consent observed: "Are we not substituting government by Parliament? The 
Cabinet is a high-powered committee of Parliament and it is entitled to 
negotiate. Are we to give them direction even before there are negotiations 
and hamper that work? How we can sit in judgment? It is for the government 
to prevent strikes and take every step required to prevent that."*^ ^ 
(4) Adjournment motion to discuss the arrest of a member in the territory of a 
State under due process of law is inadmissible. 
(5) Every adjournment motion, if admitted, is not necessarily a censure motion on 
the government. On 12 March, 1959, the Speaker while allowing an 
adjournment motion told the House that it was not a matter of adjournment in 
the sense that there was any censure but he wanted the matter to be simply 
discussed in the House.^ '^  
*" Lok Sabha Debate, Vol. XLVI, 11 May, 1957, Cols. 25. 
*' Ibid., 15 July & 19 August, 1957, cols. 6721, 6869 & 10666-67. 
" Ibid., 19 July, 1957, Cols. 4262-64. 
" Ibid., 28 April, 1958, Cols. 11931-41 
Ibid., 12 March, 1959, Cols.5852-53. For more details on Adjournment Motion, see Lok Sabha 
Debates, 5 August, 1956, Cols. 661-66; Debates of Joint Sitting of the Houses of Parliament, 6 May, 
1961, Cols. 8-11; Ibid. Pt. II, 12 March, 1958; Ibid., 18 December 1958; Ibid., 29 August, 1959, and 
Subhash C. Kashyap, History of the Parliament of India, op.cit., pp. 237-38. 
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Bills 
(1) Appropriation Bill cannot be considered and passed the same day, on which it 
was introduced, except when absolutely necessary. 
(2) Discussion on a bill returned by the Rajya Sabha should be confined to the 
amendments suggested; there cannot be a general discussion at that stage.^^ 
(3) A member cannot be compelled to introduce a Private Member's Bill standing 
in his name once he has declined to do so. 
(4) Last minute amendments to bills are not admissible unless agreed to and 
accepted by the mover of the bill.^ ^ 
(5) Amendment enlarging the scope of a bill is out of order. 
(6) President's sanction is necessary for amendments seeking to increase the 
imposition of a tax.^° 
Amendments 
(1) Amendment, which is frivolous, is out of order. 
(2) In the absence of a request from any member that his amendment may be put 
separately, all amendments may be put to vote together. 
(3) During the third reading stage, verbal amendments to make clear the intension 
of any clause in the bill are in order.^ ^ 
(4) Amendment carmot be moved to a motion when it is half-way under 
discussion.'''' 
" Ibid., 25 February, 1958, Cols. 2274. 
" Ibid., 23 February, 1960, Cols. 2408. 
" Ibid., 27 March, 1961, Cols. 7138. 
** Ibid., 27 May, 1957. 
*''' lbid.,27, 31 August, 6 December, 1957. 
™ Ibid.,27, 29, 31 August, 3 September, 1957. 
" Ibid., lODecember, 1957. 
" Ibid.,20 February, 1961. 
^Mbid.,4 September, 1957. 
'•• Ibid.,20 November, 1957. 
152 
Questions 
(1) In the matter of determining the numbers of supplementary questions to be 
allowed, the importance of the question and various other considerations have 
to be taken into account^^ If a question is completely answered on the first 
supplementary itself, Speaker may proceed to the next question. It is for the 
Speaker to decide whether a question has been answered sufficiently/^ 
Debate 
(1) Reference to proceedings in the Rajya Sabha in the course of a debate in the 
Lok Sabha is not in order/^ Reference in the House to the proceedings of a 
78 
committee are not in order. 
Points of Order 
A point of order cannot be raised when the Speaker is speaking. Member desiring to 
raise a point of order may give prior notice to the chair and the minister concerning 
unless the point has arisen during the debate. A point of order should not be raised if it 
does not relate to the matter under discussion.^^ A point of order cannot be raised (a) 
before the commencement of proceedings, and (b) on a matter which is yet to be 
placed before the House.*' 
Quorum 
House is not counted within one hour of assembly and also during the time when the 
House sits beyond normal hours.*^ 
Speaker 
A ruling by the Deputy Speaker, of a member of the panel of chairmen on a 
particular point is final and no appeal there from lies to the Speaker.*^ Chair has no 
'Mbid.,31 July, 1957. 
'^Ibid. 
" Ibid, 27 May, 1957. 
''Mbid., 19 November, 1957. 
"ibid., 13 May, 1957. Col. 66. 
'" Ibid.,6 May, 1958, Col. 3362; 17 February, 1959, Col. 1430; 10 February, 1960, Col. 303; 5 
December, 1960, Col. 3848. 
" Ibid., 6 May, 1961. 
'^  Ibid., 22 March, 1960, Cols. 10559; 12 April, 1961, Cols. 10807-8 
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jurisdiction to give a ruling that evidence tendered before a commission not appointed 
by parliament be laid on the table of the House.^ '* Speaker has no jurisdiction to sit 
over action of the Speaker of a State Assembly.^ ^ Participation by the Speaker in 
deliberation of the House by vacating the Chair is not in order. 
Ordinance 
In an emergency when Lok Sabha is in session an ordinance may be issued in terms of 
the bills as passed by Lok Sabha. In no other case shall an ordinance be issued when 
Lok Sabha is in session.^^ A resolution seeking to disapprove an ordinance cannot bar 
the progress of a government bill which seeks to replace that ordinance. 
These were some procedural developments, which came into being during the second 
Lok Sabha. The second Lok Sabha came to an end on 30 March, 1962. Over all, the 
term of second Lok Sabha was good. The circumstances in which the second Lok 
Sabha worked, were very challenging. Ift reference to second Lok Sabha, Palmer and 
Tinker remarked: "The operation of parliamentary democracy in India would be 
difficult under the best circumstances, it is further jeopardized by the lack of a 
substantial democratic tradition in India. Other factors complicating the successful 
functioning of parliamentary government in India are fissiparous tendencies of many 
kinds, caste and class and regional, linguistic and religious divisions, and widespread 
illiteracy and poverty which effectively remove the great majority of the people of 
India from positive participation in political life, at least on the national level...but it 
would be quite unwise to conclude that parliamentary government in India cannot 
possibly operate because of these handicaps. As a matter of fact, it is operating now 
and seems to be operating with growing effectiveness, in spite of a multitude of 
problems and obstacles.^^ 
" Ibid., 11 April, 1961, Cols. 10559; 12 April, 1961, Cols. 10807-8 
'Mbid., 18 March, 1959 
*'ibid., 9 September, 1958. 
'Mbid., 19 November, 1959. 
" Ibid. 
Ibid., 24 May, 1957. 
Norman Palmer and 1 
India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, p. 117. 
Irene Tinker in Park and Tinker (eds.), Leadership and Political Institutions in 
154 
THE THIRD LOK SABHA 
When the term of second Lok Sabha was over, the third general election to the Lok 
Sabha was fixed by the Election Commission. The third general elections were held 
from 16 February to 25 February, 1962. 
Composition of the Third Lok Sabha 
The second Lok Sabha was dissolved on 31 March 1962, nearly one month prior to 
the expiry of its normal term of five years. Members to the third Lok Sabha had 
already been elected in February. The new House stood duly constituted on 2 April 
1962 when a notification under section 73 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 
1951, was issued by the Election Commission setting out the names of all the 
members elected from various constituencies. Even after the members for the new 
House had been elected, the old House had met in a lame-duck session to get some 
essential business through. 
The third Lok Sabha consisted of 496 members- 494 elected and 2 nominated to 
represent the Anglo-Indian community. 
Party Position in the Third Lok Sabha 
Party 
Congress 
CPI 
Swatantra 
Jana Sangh 
PSP 
DMK 
Socialist 
Others 
Independents 
No. of candidates elected 
361 
29 
22 
14 
12 
07 
06 
23 
20 
% to the total 
73.50 
5.80 
4.40 
2.80 
2.40 
1.40 
1.20 
4.65 
4.00 
i % of the valid votes polled 
' 44.72 
9.44 
8.19 
6.44 
1 6.81 
; 2.01 
i 2.69 
! 6.74 
1 10.08 
Source: Subhash C. Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas, op. cit., p. 41. 
Activities and Achievements 
The first sitting of the third Lok Sabha was held on 16 April, 1962. There were in all 
sixteen sessions covering 792 days. The House actually sat for 578 days (73% of the 
total days covered by all the sixteen sessions) and worked for a total of 3752 hours 
and 40 minutes. Thus, the average duration of a sitting in the third Lok Sabha came to 
6 hours and 27 minutes. 
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An interesting development during the third Lok Sabha was that law-making function, 
in terms of time taken, was relegated next to that of discussion and approval of the 
budget. While the latter claimed one-fourth of the total time, legislative function 
claimed less than that. In other words, as the discussion on budget involved discussion 
on the working of various ministries and departments in their administrative, financial 
and policy aspects, it was an indication of shifting emphasis of parliamentary 
business. Law-making function remained no more the major occupation of the House. 
Discussing matters of general public concern and ventilating grievances of the people 
by means of the motions, resolutions and other forms of discussions including those 
on addresses by the President also took more time than taken by legislation. 
Legislation 
In the field of law-making, one of the important functions of the Lok Sabha, the 
performance of the third Lok Sabha was impressive. Even against several odds, it was 
able to apply itself with a spirit of dedication to negotiate social, economic, and 
political problems facing the country. Number of bills was 275, of which three were 
Private Member's bills and eight amended the Constitution with a view to making the 
system more responsible and purposeful. 
Apart from passing the Finance Bill every year to give effect to the taxation proposals 
of the government, some comprehensive enactments were added to the Statute Book 
in the financial field. These included the Customs Act, 1963, Super-Profit Tax Act, 
1963, Unit Trust Act, 1963, Gold (Control) Act, 1965, etc. 
An important step was taken to constitute a Press Council under the Press Council 
Act, 1965 with a view inter alia to safeguard the liberty of the Press and to evolve and 
maintain standards of journalistic ethics. 
The Official Language Act, 1963, provided for the continued use of English, in 
addition to Hindi, for official purposes of the Union and for transaction of business in 
parliament even after 26 January, 1965. 
In the wake of Chinese aggression in 1962, the President proclaimed a state of 
emergency on 26 October, 1962 and promulgated a Defence of India Ordinance. The 
Defence of India Act, 1962 was enacted to substitute the Ordinance which 
empowered the government to take special measures, to ensure public safety, order 
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and interest, secure defence of the country and civil defence for the efficient conduct 
of military operations and for maintaining supply of essential goods and services. 
The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 conferred several powers on the Union government in 
the matter of production, development and use of atomic energy and regulation of 
activities related to it. 
The State of Nagaland Act, 1962 was passed to give effect to an agreement with Naga 
People's Convention that Naga Hills Tuensang Area, which was a Part B tribal area 
within the State of Assam, be formed a separate State of Nagaland. Similarly, Punjab 
Reorganization Act, 1966, was passed with a view to reorganize the then existing 
State of Punjab so as to constitute two separate states of Haryana and Punjab and a 
new Union Territory of Chandigarh. The Delhi Administration Act, 1966, sought to 
establish a Metropolitan Council and also an Executive Council for the Union 
Territory of Delhi. The Delhi High Court Act, 1966, provided for a separate High 
Court for the Union Territory of Delhi. Likewise, the Government of Union 
Territories Act, 1968, provided for the establishment of legislature and also Council 
of Ministers in the then Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, 
Goa, Daman £ind Dieu, and Pondicherry 
The period of the third Lok Sabha was the most momentous and eventful in the 
history of parliament of India. The term of the third Lok Sabha saw two wars-one 
with China and other with Pakistan-and death of two Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Lai Bahadur Shastri and taking over the reins of Prime Ministership by 
Indira Gandhi, were all events of the greatest significance in the life of the nascent 
republic. The third Lok Sabha remained very vigilant in domestic as well as foreign 
affairs no less than the earlier Lok Sabhas. The case of inquiry into the select-deal 
provided an example of parliament being "a grand inquest" of the nation. 
Nehru as a Dedicated Parliamentarian 
Jawaharlal Nehru was a parliamentarian par excellence. He set himself as a model for 
all parliamentarians to come. Indeed, there were a few who through their lives 
exemplified like Nehru the qualities of rationalism, sensitiveness, intellectual 
inquisitiveness and breadth of vision. As a leader of the House, Nehru played the most 
outstanding role in establishing healthy parliamentary practices and precedents. He 
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showed tremendous respect to the institution of parliament and to rules of 
parliamentary procedure. Nehru used to hear the debates in his room through his 
microphone. Whenever there was any interesting debate, he would quietly walk into 
House and without disturbing the proceedings take his seat in the back bench and 
watch the proceedings. Whenever policy had to be stated or clarifications offered, 
Nehru intervened in the debate and raised the level of discussions.^^ Under Nehru, 
senior party leaders kept an eye on the performance of newcomers, spotting talent and 
enabling them to rise in the parliamentary hierarchy. 
Nehru went out of his way to reiterate that the basis of parliamentary functioning was 
mutual respect among members. They might belong to different parties, but within the 
precincts of Parliament, each and every member carried the same status and was 
entitled to the same courtesy. Chakravartty points out that: "So far as the dignity of 
the House and the exercise of mutual respect were concerned, Nehru set the model as 
leader of the House. With him present, abuse and name-calling were unthinkable."^^ 
Thus, Nehru led the way in emphasizing the need to preserve dignity of the House. In 
the words of Dr. S. Gopal: "He took seriously his duties as leader of the Lok Sabha 
and of the Congress Party in Parliament, sat regularly through the question hour and 
all important debates, treated the presiding officers of the two Houses with extreme 
deference, sustained the excitement of debate with a skilful use of irony and repartee, 
and built up parliamentary activity as an important sector in the public life of the 
country. The tone of his speeches in the Parliament was very different from that 
which he adopted while addressing public meetings. There was no suggestion of 
loose-lipped demagoguery. He still sometimes rambled, but sought to argue rather 
than teach, to deal with the points raised by the critics, to associate the highest 
legislature in the country with deliberation on policy and to destroy any tendency to 
reduce it, in Max Weber's phrase, to 'routinized impotence'. By transferring some of 
his personal command to the institution of parliament, he helped the parliamentary 
system take root."^^ 
^ Kashyap, "Nehru and Parliament" in Nehru Revisited, (Mumbai: Nehru Centre, 2003), pp. 294-95. 
Nikhil Chakravartty, "Nehru, Press and Parliament" in Sheila Dikshit and others (eds.), Jawaharlal 
Nehru, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 114 
'^ Ibid. 
" S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru-A Biography, (New Delhi: 1979), Vol. II, p. 304. 
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Nehru's respect for the institution of parliament was commendable. Hiren Mukherjee 
wrote nostalgically that Nehru dominated -parliament not because of his oratory or 
parliamentary acumen or mastery over intricacies of parliamentary procedure but "on 
account of an innate respect for parliament as the symbol of the people's power and as 
a good repository of the country's wisdom."^'' Speaker Hukum Singh paying his 
tribute to Nehru after his death remembered that it was pleasure to see him enter in the 
House.'^ Nehru was greatly concerned to ensure that proper parliamentary behaviour 
was maintained on the floors of the Houses of Parliament, proceedings were orderly 
and rules of conduct were observed. This he did by setting himself as role model. As 
Shri R. Venkataraman said, "It was his innate gentleness and his gentlemanliness that 
made Nehru an ornament to parliament." 
During Question Hour, Nehru answered questions with dignity and dexterity, 
gracefiilly and effectively. Mrs. Violet Alva once observed that Nehru spoke "with 
passion but not with malice." Sometimes he denounced wrongs "with the spirit of a 
rebel but he felt no wounds behind." He "could intervene answer any intricate point 
and wind up the critical stage of any debate." Nehru had always taken note of 
decorum and orderly behaviour in the House and appealed others too to maintain its 
dignity. He was intolerant so far as the disorderly conduct. He even went to the extent 
of getting the members of his own party expelled from the membership of the Lok 
Sabha if found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of Parliament.^* In another 
case of disorderly behaviour of some members when President was addressing both 
the Houses assembled together on 18 February 1963, Nehru strongly reacted. The 
Committee set up to go into the conduct of these members, recommended that they 
should be reprimanded. Nehru went out of his way to establish enduring conventions. 
On appealing to accept the Committee's report without much argument, Nehru said: 
"The sole question before us - it is highly important one and vital one what rules and 
conventions we should establish for the carrying on of the work of this Parliament 
with dignity and effectiveness...! would submit to you. Sir, and to the House, that the 
" Cited from Kashyap, "Nehru and Parliament" in Nehru Revisited, op.cit., p. 296. 
' ' Journal of Parliamentary Information, Vol. XC, 1964, pp. 1-2 
'^ Cited from Kashyap, "Nehru and Parliament" in Nehru Revisited, op.cit., p. 300. 
'^ Ibid. 
H.G. Mudgal, a Member of Parliament, who had been adjudged to be unbecoming of a member of 
Parliament in 1951. See for this case S. L. Shakdar, Glimpses of the Working of Parliament, (New 
Delhi:, 1977), pp. 111-36. 
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least we can do is to accept this and thereby give an indication to this House, to the 
country and to other Assemblies in India that we shall adhere strongly to the 
behaviour that is expected of such a High Assembly as parliament and other 
representative bodies in India." 
Nehru strongly deplored the unseemly behaviour of one Hon'ble member on the 
introduction of the Official Language Bill in August 1963. He said: "I do not know if 
that gentleman has the least conception of what parliament is, what democracy is, and 
how one is supposed to behave or ought to behave." 
" Lok Sabha Debates, 26 November 1956, cc. 993-97 
"* Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. V, pp. 95-96. 
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CHAPTER V 
WORKING OF THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT: POST-
NEHRU ERA 
Working of the parliament during Nehru's premiership has already been discussed in 
the third chapter. This chapter will examine the working of the Parliament of India in 
post Nehru era and the institutional challenges facing the Indian parliament. It is often 
argued that, over the years, there has been a decline in the effectiveness of parliament 
as an institution of accountability and as a representative body. But before we do so, it 
is necessary to give some references of Nehru period because we cannot deal with the 
problem without a comparative study between Nehru era and post-Nehru period. We 
have to find out as to how many changes and modifications have taken place in the 
working of parliament since Nehru passed away. It is true that during Nehru's prime 
ministership, Parliament of India was a much more serious and business like forum 
which used to fiinction with dignity and authority. Nehru's charisma and 
statesmanship enabled him to easily secure parliament's approval for his 
government's policies. At the same time, he showed the greatest deference to it and 
was always sensitive to its moods. The members came well prepared to the parliament 
and were heard with rapt attention. Outstanding debates. were common and 
fiinctioning of the executive was criticized and debated, sometimes by the ruling party 
itself Weak and fragmented as the opposition was, Nehru nevertheless gave it a sense 
of participation. It is also true, on the other hand, that parliament is stronger today 
than it was when first elected in 1952, and much of the credit for raising the status of 
Parliament goes to Nehru. Conversely speaking, it also cannot be denied that there 
seems to be a distinct change in the functioning and status of parliament after Nehru. 
The pivotal position the parliament of India once held in the Indian political system is 
not there anymore and, in recent years, it has suffered some heavy decline in its 
prestige. Mrs. Gandhi, whose political career spanned more than fifteen years, 
showed scant respect for parliament and its time honoured conventions. 
During the last few years of her reign, she spent less and less time in 
parliament and stayed away during crucial debates. After Indira Gandhi, most 
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of the prime ministers treaded parliament in the most casual mamier. Even in 2002 
when the Indian parliament celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, Indian commentators 
rued the palpable decline of what Jawaharlal Nehru had termed as the "majesty" of 
Parliament. With much of parliament's time wasted on rowdiness and disorder and 
theatrics replacing debate, there are serious concerns about whether parliament has 
become dysfunctional. While "un-parliamentary" behaviour by members of 
parliament has undoubtedly robbed it of the mystique that often underpins authority, 
the weakness of parliament as an institution of accountability stems from many 
factors, both within and outside the institution. 
Decline in the Quality of Debates after the Nehru Period 
Subhash C. Kashyap so aptly wrote: "An overview of developments in the 
parliamentary institutions since the first Lok Sabha reveals some very interesting and 
some disturbing facts. The number of days on which the Houses of parliament sit each 
year and the time that is devoted to has declined considerably in recent years. Even 
when they do meet, often little gets done. In the face of disturbances and shouting, the 
Houses have to be adjourned frequently. This is so irrespective of who is in power. 
This is so during the BJP-led government and it is the same under UPA."' 
"Parliament was conceived as the legislature or the law-making body, but of late law 
making has ceased to be even the most important of its functions either qualitatively 
or quantitatively. Frorh about 48 percent, it has come down to occupy less than 13 
percent of its time on making of laws. The character of parliament has also changed as 
a result of changes in membership composition." 
There has been a distinct change in the content, canvas and culture of debates right 
from the first Lok Sabha days. In the earlier Lok Sabhas, there was much greater 
emphasis on discussions of national and international importance. Increasingly, more 
regional and even local problems are coming to acquire greater relevance and 
importance for our members. We are more and more looking at national problems 
from regional, communal, linguistic or otherwise parochial angles rather than the 
other way round. 
Subhash C. Kashyap, Parliament, reform thy self, The Tribune, Special supplement, Chandigarh, 
Sunday, September, 24, 2005. 
^Ibid. 
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There has been, in recent years, a considerable thinking about devaluation of 
parliamentary authority, deterioration in the quality of members, poor levels of 
participation and the like. Today, one notices a certain cynicism towards 
parliamentary institutions and normal parliamentary processes and the 
parliamentarians. We have an unending debate in regard to the falling standards in the 
conduct of legislators as evidence by poor quality of debates, niggardly attendance in 
the legislature, unruly behaviour of members, scenes of pandemonium, and the like. 
Legislatures having members with criminal records, role of money and muscle power 
in politics are the most common topics of popular discussions today. 
Sanctity of means has lost all value, meaning and relevance. If dacoits, smugglers, 
gangsters and foreign agents can help put us or sustain us in power, we are prepared 
to compromise with them. We do not hesitate to buy stability through corruption, 
bribery, distribution of spoils and yielding to the pressures and blackmail brought by 
partners and supporters.^ 
These days we hardly have debates of the standard of the 1950s and 60s. This is 
shameful, to say the least. The whole complexion of parliament has actually 
undergone a radical transformation during the past 20 years or so. Not that the 
newcomers to the two Houses lack caliber and talent, but in absence of proper 
orientation and grounding, they allow themselves to be carried away by populist 
postures and wayward directions coming from their leaders. What sort of standards 
can we expect from those who are not sure of themselves or the challenges ahead? 
In the words of Arun Shourie (an eminent economist and a great parliamentarian): 
"Parliaments are in such disarray that they cannot deliver accountability at all. Bills 
are passed without meaningful discussion, indeed, amidst ear-splitting hulla. Even 
budgets are passed amidst chaos. Hours and hours are spent on adjournment over the 
headline of the day, and then the 'legislators' are corralled to constitute a quorum and 
the Bill is declared to have been passed... And at the end of the Session, the presiding 
officer intones, 'This was a very productive Session... The House passed twenty-three 
Bills. Two hundred and seventy five papers were laid on the table of the House. Very 
productive debates were held on issues of national and international significance 
^ Ibid. 
•* Hari Jaisingh, Decline of Parliament: People's Expectations Belied, 
http://www:tribuneindia.coni/2000/20000310/ edit.htm#3. 
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which, I am sure, will provide very useful guidance to the Government as it guides the 
country in its onward march on destiny...'."^ The reality is very different from the 
figures. C.V. Madhukar, who has begun studying working of parliament diligently, 
points out that while, formally, parliament has passed 58 or so bills per year during 
the last six years, 'Over the past seven sessions of parliament, the time spent on 
debating legislative issues was approximately 20 percent in Lok Sabha and 23 percent 
in Rajya Sabha. In fact, in the winter session of 2004, less than 15 percent time was 
spent on legislation in Lok Sabha...' In fact, that vastly overstates the deliberative 
effort of members. Madhukar points out that in 2006, 'Over 40 percent of the Bills 
were passed in Lok Sabha with less than one hour of debate. The situation is only 
marginally better in Rajya Sabha. But even this vastly overstates the work that is 
done. For, while the House may be said to be formally debating a piece of legislation, 
the chamber may be embarrassingly empty. Madhukar recalls the case of the 
Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Bill that The Indian Express had reported earlier: 
there were all of 21 MPs in the Treasury Benches and nine in the Opposition Benches 
when this important Bill was passed by voice vote in the Lok Sabha.^ 
Shourie further said: "Of course, passing laws is not the only function of legislature. 
Discussing policy, discussing events and the government response to them is as 
important. The record here is even more dismal. The Session usually begins with 
those in Opposition - that is, whichever side happens to be in Opposition at that time 
- demanding that issues 'X' and 'Y' be taken up immediately - farmers' suicides, 
price rise, the crisis in agriculture... The government insists that the business that has 
been settled be adhered to. The House is adjourned a few times. Each side having 
'given the right signal' to the section whose eye it wants to catch, all sides agree to 
have a discussion on the issue. The debate has but to start, and the issue is over. The 
House barely has a quorum."^ 
Parliament is the nerve center of national activities. It is through parliament that 
elected representatives of the people ventilate their grievances and opinions on 
various issues; scrutinize the functioning of the executive both on the floor of the 
Arun Shourie, The Parliamentary System, 'What we have made of it, What we can make of it', ASA 
Rupa Publications, New Delhi, 2007, p.26. 
C.V. Madhukar, 'House this for debate?,' The Indian Express, 3 January, 2007. 
Arun Shourie, The Parliamentary System, op. cit, p. 27. 
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House and through special committees constituted for the purpose; and enact laws. On 
the floor of the House members are given ample opportunity to prove into the 
functioning of the government through questions, calling attention motions, 
adjournment motions, no-confidence motions, short duration discussions ect. 
However, despite these wide powers conferred on the members of the parliament to 
discharge their obligations as elected representatives of the people, we hear 
simmering of discontent from different quarters on the functioning of parliament and 
its members. 
Here, we examine the application of the parliamentary devices during parliament 
sessions. 
Question Hour: 
Question Hour forms the most interesting part of the parliamentary proceedings. No 
other business evokes as much interest among the public, the press and the members 
themselves as the Question Hour. The first hour of every sitting in both the Houses is 
devoted to asking and answering of questions. It is known as the 'Question Hour'.^ 
The basic purpose of asking question is to seek information and elicit facts on a 
matter of public importance. During'this hour, matters concerning the Government of 
India are raised and problems are brought to the notice of the government to seek their 
intervention to meet any situation, to redress public grievances or to expose some 
administrative abuse or excess. The government is thus put on trial during this hour. 
Questions asked in both Houses of Parliament are normally addressed to the ministers 
(government member) and can be categorized as Starred Questions, Un-starred 
Question and Short Notice Questions. Questions may sometimes be addressed to 
private members also. Starred Questions are to be answered orally on the floor of the 
House. Answers to such questions may be followed by supplementary questions by 
members. Starred Questions derive their name from the fact that they are always 
distinguished by an asterisk.^ An un-starred question is so named because it dose not 
carry an asterisk mark. Answer to such a question is given in written form. 
Consequently, no supplementary question can be asked thereon."' Short Notice 
' Rule 32. 
' Rule 36. 
'" Rule 39. 
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Question is one which relates to a matter of urgent public importance and can be 
asked with notice shorter than the ten days prescribed for an ordinary question.'' 
It is not that members can ask questions in the House to any minister as and when 
they want, without a prior notice. In such a case, the ministers may not be in a 
position to fially satisfy the member's queries. The concerned department needs some 
time to collect the relevant information from various levels and to prepare a precise 
answer to be given by the minister in the House. To facilitate this, rules governing the 
procedure and conduct of business in both the Houses provide that a member may 
give a notice to the Secretary-General of the concerned House intimating his intention 
to ask a question. Such notice should be given before not less than 10 days and not 
more than 21 days keeping in view the date on which the question is desired to be 
answered.'^ 
Keeping in view the time of the House and other business to be transacted, it has been 
provided that a member of the Lok Sabha cannot ask more than five questions a day 
of both the starred and the un-starred categories. Further not more than three starred 
question in the Lok Sabha by the same member can be admitted on a single day. The 
total number of the questions in the starred list for a day is not more than 20.'^ The 
maximum number of questions in the un-starred list for a day is 230 in the Lok Sabha. 
In Rajya Sabha there is no such limit but normally the number of un-starred questions 
listed for a day is less than 200. 
The ministries are supplied with the list of finally admitted questions at least five days 
before the date fixed for asking questions, in order to provide them sufficient time for 
preparing the answer.''' 
No debate is permitted during the Question Hour on any question or answer given. 
However, supplementary or follow-up questions may be allowed to be asked for the 
purpose of elucidating any matter of fact regarding an answer already given.'^ 
" Rule 54. 
'- Rules 33 & 34. 
"Rule 37(1). 
" Rule 35. 
" Rule 46 & 50. 
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Decline in the Standard of Questions 
While investigating the quaUty of question's raised in the parliamentary sessions, we 
find that there is a visible decline in the very standard of questions raised by the 
members of parliament from Nehruvian period to post-Nehruvian period. It is noticed 
that most of the members of parliament ask the questions to the minister concerned 
without having adequate knowledge of the background and the issues involved. At the 
same time, minister concerned provides the answer without putting much effort to 
provide necessary details, and some times it has happened that the minister concerned, 
without collecting proper information gave the answer, attempting to satisfy the 
queries of the members. Obviously, such answers fail miserably to satisfy members 
which results in supplementary questions and subsequent embarrassment of the 
government. This is one of the most notable and negative trend that has taken place 
since Nehru's departure. It seems that questions are raised merely for the sake of 
asking questions and not for any genuine interest in the issues involved or for airing 
of public grievances. 
Poor Participation of Members in Parliament during Question Hour 
The participation of the members of parliament in parliamentary business is getting 
low year after year. Our parliamentarians do not take much interest in participating in 
the debates, asking of questions or other parliamentary business within the parliament, 
even if they do take part in putting questions, debating issues, presenting proposals, 
resolutions and motions, but show hardly a serious concem with these in a responsible 
way. 
Debates in parliament provide an opportunity to members to elicit information, probe 
into the functioning of government, express their own opinion and vote on various 
bills. Members, who individually represent about ten lakh citizens, are expected to 
utilize all avenues available to discharge their fiinctions and express the viewpoint of 
the electorates. But it doesn't happen with our parliamentarians. Question hour, which 
is the most interesting part of parliamentary proceedings, our parliamentarians have 
seldom utilized this opportunity properly since the very inception of parliament. There 
have been, in every parliament, many members, who didn't raise even a single 
question in the House during their entire tenure. 
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During the second Lok Sabha, out of the total membership of the House, 112 
members either did not ask any question-or none of their notices were admitted.'^ 
During the third Lok Sabha, 85 members or 16% of the total membership did not ask 
any question during all the sixteen sessions of the third Lok Sabha.'^ As many as 79 
members forming nearly 15 percent did not put any question during the entire period 
of fourth Lok Sabha. Since, 43 members (forming 8.4 percent of the total) were 
ministers during the entire term of the fourth Lok Sabha, they were not, by virtue of 
their position, entitled to ask any question. Percentage of the members not asking any 
question thus came down to 7. For some 22 members, average was less than one 
question each during this period. There were 93 members (18.16%) whose average 
was less than one question each session i.e. they asked less than 12 questions each.'* 
A study of the seventh Lok Sabha (Monsoon, session 1981) shows that questions of 
only 101 members were answered orally; only 54 members participated in calling 
attention motions during the session, 93 members raised matters under Rule 377 of 
the Rules of Procedure; 107 members participated in the Private Members Business 
while only 28 members participated in the half-an-hour discussions. There are also 
members who participated in more than one category of business. In all 214 members 
i.e. 46.5% participated in the proceeding of the House.' 
The study of the first session of 1991 (Ninth Lok Sabha), which was intended to be 
the budget session, shows that it was drastically cut short to have only 11 sittings in 
total. However, the session became a historic one, establishing several records of 
sorts. On the opening day itself, the opposition unprecedently boycotted the 
Presidential Address itself The Bhartiya Janata Party stayed away in protest against 
the government's decision to present a Vote on Account instead of a regular budget 
and the Left parties and those constituting the National Front abstained to register 
their protest against the "arbitrary" manner in which the DMK government in the state 
of Tamil Nadu was dismissed by the President. Then, for the first time the prime 
minister announced on the floor of the House the resignation of his Council of 
Ministers. The disposal of the pending financial and other business with a lightening 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas, Shipra Publications, New Delhi, 1992, p.44. 
" Ibid, pp. 65-66. 
" Ibid, p. 93. 
19 C.K. Suchitra, Indian Parliament at Work- Some Suggestions for Reform, in Indian Parliament 
Edited by Dr. Phule Chand, National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984. p. 182. 
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speed and without voting was a record by itself. The business transacted on 11 March 
including passing of the general and - railway budgets with their connected 
Appropriation and Finance Bills, the Demands for Grants and the related 
Appropriation Bills in respect of the Budgets of the States of Assam, Jammu & 
Kashmir, Punjab and Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Pondicherry which were 
under President's Rule as also the supplementary Demands for Grants for 1990-
1991.^ ° 
In all 19 Bills, including the Constitution (Seventy-fifth Amendment) Bill providing 
for continuance of President's Rule in Punjab for a further period of six months were 
passed by the Lok Sabha during the session. Out of these, as many as 18 were passed 
without discussion on 11 March in less than two hours. Another significant event in 
the session was of the Question Hour becoming a casualty; either it could not be 
proceeded or had to be dispensed with on as many as 7 sittings out of a total of 11 
sittings.^' 
The biggest casualty during the ninth Lok Sabha period was institutional; the rules, 
conventions and time-honoured traditions in many respects were given a go-bye. Day 
after day there was hardly any Question Hour. The irregular, against-the-rules, the so 
called 'Zero Hour' was almost legitimized and sometimes continued for hours with 
the ministerial benches and more sober members on all sides of the House feeling 
restive. The phenomenon of low attendance in the House, scant respect by ministers 
themselves to the House and to the desirability of presence at least at the time when 
the questions or other business of the concerned Ministry happened to be before the 
House, non-observance even of the clock striking twelve etc. were some of the 
matters which could cause concem.^^ 
In the words of Subhash C. Kashyap: "Parliamentary democracy in India reached its 
lowest depths and touched the nadir during the ninth Lok Sabha period. On the whole, 
its record was poor and its tenure would perhaps go down in the history of parliament 
^^  Shubhash C. Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas, op. cit., p.221. 
^'Ibid. pp. 221-222. 
^^  Ibid. pp. 223-224. 
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as the darkest period. The achievements were few and failures too many. Fortunately, 
the ninth Lok Sabha's tenure was the briefest in India's parliamentary history."^'' 
The study of the fourteenth Lok Sabha reveals the facts about the number of members 
who took part in legislative debates. How much time is spent on making laws in 
parliament? How many bills are introduced and passed by parliament? We take a look 
at the date for the last four sessions: '^* 
• In the Lok Sabha, of the 542 members, an average of 103 members 
participated in the legislative debates per session in 2006. 
• In Rajya Sabha, of the 246 members, an average of 68 members participated 
in legislative debates per session in 2006. During Budget Session in 2007, 30 
different MPs participated in debates on Bills. 
No. of MPs Participation 
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During Budget Session 2007, Lok Sabha spent 9% and Rajya Sabha 12% 
of their time on discussions related to Bills other than Finance Bills and 
Appropriation Bills. The corresponding figures for Budget Session 2006, 
were 12% and 14% respectively. 
^^  Ibid p 226 
PRS Legislative Research, Centre for Policy Research, www prsindia.org. 
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• In 2006, Lok Sabha spent an average of 26 hours 32 minutes per session 
debating legislation other than -financial business. Rajya Sabha spent an 
average of 25 hours 27 minutes. 
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• Parliament passed 65 Bills in 2006. out of these, 14 Bills were related to 
financial business. 
• In Budget Session 2007, Parliament passed 20 Bills out of which seven were 
related to financial business. This was less than 28 Bills (including 8 related to 
financial business) passed in Budget Session 2006. 
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Lok Sabha • Rajya Sabha 25 
The data for the above graphs has been obtained form the Parhamentary proceedings as reported on 
http://parliamentofindia.nic in/. The computation of MP participation and time utilized has been done 
by PRS. For the first two graphs, Finance Bills and Appropriation Bills have not been included. 
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If we talk about the Short Notice Questions, the scenario is not too different. Short 
Notice Questions are those questions which relate to recent matters of public 
importance and which require urgent attention. A short notice question can be raised 
by giving notice of a period less than 10 days but it is in the discretion of the minister 
concerned to answer it or not. If the minister expresses his inability to accept the short 
notice question, the question is disallowed and the member is informed accordingly. 
But the Speaker may in his discretion place the question as the first question in the 
Starred list. In the 5"' session (budget session) of the seventh Lok Sabha 177 short 
notices were given notice of and, none admitted. In the 6' session (Monsoon session) 
and in the 7"^  session, 127 and 44 short notice questions were given notice 
respectively, but again, none admitted. 
This, therefore, clearly shows that the constraints put on raising questions on short 
notice on matters of recent and urgent public importance have made this 
parliamentary tool almost infructuous. Obviously, the presiding officer has also not 
under his discretion admitted any of them as starred question. It is therefore, 
suggested that in order to make this tool effective, the discretion, whether to admit a 
short notice question or not should lie with the presiding officer and not with the 
minister concerned. Ministerial influence in parliamentary functioning must be 
removed. 
The reasons for this poor performance of the members in the proceedings are many. 
Although a number of members give notice of their intention to put a question or call 
the attention of the House to matters of urgent public importance or participate in the 
legislative business, many of them are prevented from doing so due to paucity of time. 
In the time fixed for each discussion, only a small number of members can participate. 
Further, the system of balloting for determining the priority of various notices 
received introduces an element of chance in the entire system. Even though a member 
gives notice of his question about twenty days in advance and despite it involving an 
issue of greater importance than other issues, notice of which may have been given 
later, the latter may get selected in the system of balloting. 
^^  C.K. Suchitra, op. cit., p. 187. 
" C.K. Suchitra, op. cit, p. 183. 
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There are other reasons for the low participation of members in the proceedings. 
Certain members do not show any interest in the deliberations in the House. They are 
silent spectators and only vote in the House if their party issues a whip for this 
28 
purpose. 
Poor participation in the business of the House hampers proper ventilation of public 
opinion in the House. It is often suggested that it must be obligatory for every member 
to participate at least once in a short session and at least thrice in a session lasting 
more than 75 days.'^ ^ 
Parliament secretariat must maintain a separate register enumerating the participation 
of each member. Members who do not take part in the debate at least for a minimum 
extent given above should be informed about it and their names displayed on the 
Parliament notice board at the end of each session.^^ 
Zero Hour 
The time immediately following the Question Hour in both Houses has come to be 
popularly known as Zero Hour. It is a Zero Hour in more than one sense. It is a non-
existent hour. It starts at 12 noon which is the zero hour of the day. It came to be 
called an 'Hour' also because very often it continued for one full hour, until the House 
rose for lunch at 1 p.m. Later, during the seventh and eight Lok Sabha periods, for 
example, the 'Zero Hour' usually did not consume more than 10 minutes. The 
maximum time ever taken by the 'Zero' proceedings during the eight Lok Sabha came 
to 32 minutes.^' Things however, changed sharply during the short-lived ninth Lok 
Sabha (1989-19991) when the Speaker, Rabi Ray, tried to regularize and 
institutionalize the illegitimate 'Zero Hour'. The resuU was that it very often 
continued beyond one full hour. In fact, sometimes it extended to two hours and more 
to the great discomfiture and uneasiness of the ministers and members waiting for the 
regular business of the House to start. 
In the eyes of the Rules Book the so called 'Zero Hour' is an irregular affair. Since the 
matters are raised without any permission or prior notice, it results in loss of precious 
time of the House and • encroaches on the legislative, financial and other regular 
'' Ibid. 
'' Ibid. 
^^  Ibid. p. 184. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, Tiie Ten Lok Sabhas, op. cit., pp. 122-123. 
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business of the House. With several agitated members speaking at the same time, the 
task of the Presiding Officer becomes very difficult. The Speaker and the House, 
therefore, cannot legitimately encourage such interruption of the regular business of 
the House. In the Words of Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta: " A second major 
indicator of legislative decline is that attendance of parliamentary sessions is highest 
during what is known as Zero Hour. This allotted time in parliamentary proceedings 
allows with the permission of the Speaker, to raise and debate unlisted matters. There 
is no written procedural requirement for zero hour though it seems by common 
consent and attendance figures to be the most popular process. There are two reasons 
for this. First, it allows members to speaks to a crisis or an issue with immediate 
repercussions. Second, the free-floating format allows members to grandstand on 
issues. This is usually the occasion for high decibel proceedings in parliament. By one 
calculation, matters raised during zero hour consumed as much as 13 percent of the 
time of the tenth Lok Sabha, and this average is considered fairly typical."^^ 
Suspension of Question Hour 
The rules provide that unless the Chairman or the Speaker otherwise direct, the first 
hour of every sitting shall be available for asking and answering questions in the 
House concerned. To enable the passing of the Finance Bill swiftly, this rule was 
suspended in both Houses.^^ 
"I appreciate that Rajya Sabha members, Fall S. Nariman, Bimal Jalan, Sharad 
Ananthrao joshi and P.C. Alexander raised valid protest against the suspension of 
Question Hour. Actually, Question Hour is called Opposition Hour. If the major 
parties, in power and in the opposition, came to some agreement outside the House to 
suspend the question hour, it should not be to bind the House and to deny the right of 
individual members."^"^ 
"From my experience in parliament, 1 feel suspension of question hour can be 
accepted only if the House is unanimous in wanting this. When Prime Minister Lai 
Bahadur Shastri informed the House on September 23, 1965 about the cessation of 
hostilities and ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, there was a demand 
" Deesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, op. cit., p. 18 
^' Parhament under Suspension by Era Sezhiyan, September 4, 2004, 
http//www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2004/09/04/stories/20040940//21000.htm. 
" ibid. 
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from members for a detailed discussion on this matter of public importance. The 
Prime Minister agreed to the discussion."^^ -
But as the next day, September 24, was the last day of the session, the veteran 
legislator M.S. Aney suggested that question hour be dispensed with to have more 
time for a discussion on the ceasefire. Speaker Sardar Hukum Singh said he had no 
objection if the members agreed. S.M. Banerjee protested: "No; no!" The protest by a 
single member was enough to prevent the suspension of question hour.''^ 
The list of Business for Friday, September 24, had question hour and also Private 
Member's Business for two and a half hours in the afternoon. Before the deliberations 
began, some members approached the Speaker in his chamber to seek suspension of 
these two items to get more time for the discussion on the impact of unwarranted war 
unleashed by Pakistan and the eventual that the Speaker could direct that question 
hour be dispensed with in the case of a special or short session or an additional sitting 
beyond the session's period announced. However, once question hour is allowed and 
the list of question published, the House should not set aside the right of members 
without a motion passed by it as a whole.^^ 
This is confirmed by Subhash C. Kashyap, former Secretary-General of the Lok 
Sabha, who gives several similar instances in his book on parliamentary procedures. 
He states: "Question Hour may be dispensed with if the House agrees unanimously 
for devoting more time to other business." He adds ftirther; "the Speaker may not 
agree to suspend Question Hour if opinion of members is not unanimous on that 
point."^^ 
But, in a session of the parliament recently. Question Hour was unceremoniously 
suspended in spite of spirited objections from some members. 
Suspension of some Rules was done in passing the Finance Bill also. Regarding 
admissibility of amendments. Rule no. 80(1) of Lok Sabha states: "An amendment 
shall be within the scope of the clause to which it relates." 
''Ibid. 
'' Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
'»Ibid. 
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The Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2004 contained 105 clauses. The Finance Minister himself 
moved 55 amendments, nine of which were beyond the scope the Bill. With 
suspension of question hour and the Rules of Procedure, without discussion, without 
any explanation for amendments moved and the new clauses added, the Finance Bill 
was passed. Probably for the first time in the history of India's parliament, the motion 
of thanks on the President's Address, the Demands for Grants, the Appropriation Bill, 
and the Finance Bill were all passed without any discussion. 
Adjournment Motions 
The basic object of bringing an Adjournment Motion is to draw the attention of the 
House to a recent matter of public importance having serious consequences, and in 
regard to which moving a motion or resolution with proper notice will be too late. The 
matter proposed to be raised should be of such a character that something very grave, 
affecting the people and their security happened and the House is required to pay its 
attention immediately by interrupting the normal business of the House. The 
Adjournment Motion, thus, is an extraordinary procedural device, which, if admitted, 
leads to setting aside the normal business of the Hous'e for discussing a 'definite 
matter of urgent public importance'. Some essential elements of an Adjournment 
Motion can be delineated- (1) the matter must be definite, (2) it should have a factual 
40 
basis, (3) issue must be urgent, (4) it must be of public importance. 
Usually the House transacts its business according to the agenda paper. It does not 
take up items not included in the list of Business without the permission of the 
Speaker.'*' A matter of urgent public importance, however, can be brought before the 
House through an Adjournment Motion by interrupting the regular business, if the 
Speaker agrees to do so.'*^  
As it is noted clearly in the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament that Adjournment 
Motion can only be brought before the House when there is a matter of urgent public 
importance, thus, the general issues like the political situation in the country, 
lawlessness, unemployment, railway accidents and air crashes, closure of mills, the 
international situation in general, are not proper subjects for Adjournment Motion. 
'' Ibid. 
""* Subhash C. Kashyap, Our Parliament, op. cit., p. 126. 
" Rule 31(2). 
"- Rule 56. 
176 
Similarly, shortage of transport vehicles, cases of kidnapping, dacoity, explosions, 
communal, tensions have been held not to be appropriate matters for such a motion. It 
should not raise a matter involving a question of privilege; a question, which can be 
raised under a distinct motion; a motion which is sub-judice; and a matter which has 
already been discussed during the same session/^ The subject matter of the motion 
must have a direct or indirect relation to the conduct or default on the part of the 
government of India. However, an Adjournment Motion is in the nature of a censure 
motion though not absolutely. If an Adjournment Motion is carried, it indicates more 
strong disapproval of the policy of the Government than a censure against it. 
A keen observation of the Lok Sabha debates after Nehruvian period reveals some 
other interesting facts about adjournment motions. It has been seen that the opposition 
members repeatedly insist on raising an adjournment motion on every issue although 
a calling attention motion can serve the purpose. For instance in the third Lok Sabha, 
only 7 adjournment motions out of 776 were admitted and debated.'*'* During the span 
of the fourth Lok Sabha, notice of 1078 adjournment motions were received, of which 
89 representing 8.5 of the total were brought before the House. Of these 12 were 
admitted and discussed, making an average of only one adjournment motion each 
session.'*^ During the seventh Lok Sabha, for example, out of 5762 notices of 
adjournment motions received, only 149 were brought before the house and finally 
only 24 of them could be admitted and discussed, and none of them was adopted. In 
the eighth Lok Sabha, notices of 1801 adjournment motions were received. Of these 
80 notices on four subjects were admitted. In the ninth Lok Sabha, of the 375 notices, 
nine on eight subjects were discussed.'*^ 
No-Confidence Motion 
The most important constitutional right in the hands of a member is to move a vote of 
No-Confidence against the Council of Ministers. The only self-imposed restriction is 
that at least fifty members should support the motion. Members have not to give any 
reason for moving the motion; there is no time limit for giving such a notice; no 
" Rule 58. 
"" India, Lok Sabha, Third Lok Sabha (1962-67): A Souvenir (new Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1967) 
p. Appendices. 
R.B. Jain, Executive Accountability to Parliament, in Indian Parliament edited by Dr. Phul Chand, 
The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 1984, p. 51. 
"* Subhash C. Kashyap, Our Parliament, op. cit., p. 128. 
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permission of anybody to move it is required. Once such a motion is admitted, 
goverrmient has to find time early enough to have it debated. This Motion, if 
sustained, would result in the fall of the government. 
But, the effectiveness of no-confidence motion as a disciplining device depends upon 
the alternatives available to replace a sitting government. In a very simple sense, a 
government with a substantial majority in parliament is unlikely to be much deterred 
by the introduction of No-Confidence Motions. The most egregious failure of 
Parliament to prevent abuse of executive powers occurred in 1975 when Indira 
Gandhi rammed resolutions approving the presidential proclamation of an internal 
emergency through both Houses of parliament, and also suspending the fundamental 
rights of citizens. The Congress party, then in power, voted en masse to approve the 
emergency proclamation by a vote of 336 to 59. Even when executive abuses of 
authority were as flagrant as those involved in the declaration of an emergency, it 
proved impossible to break the ranks of a dominant majority party .'*^  
No-confidence motion can be successful only in very limit scenario where 
governments have a small majority, and small part of that constituent majority has 
some reason to defect to another coalition or seek a general election that would result 
from the dissolution of government. In the case of coalition governments, where no 
single party dominates Parliament, some coalition partners in question would have to 
prefer an alternative set of governments- essentially a different coalition - rather than 
face elections. In the Indian case, no-confidence motions have been successful in 
brining down the government only under such conditions. Since 1989, this has 
occurred four times. In 1989, the government headed by V.P. Singh was brought 
down; in 1990, the Chandrashekhar government met a similar fate, in 1997, the I.K. 
Gujral government fell; and most recently, in 1999, the A.B. Vajpayee government 
was brought down. In an average parliament, four to five no-confidence motions are 
introduced but their deterrent effect depends upon the contingencies of the mechanism 
itself'« 
Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability, 
Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number, 23 January, 2006, United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Science, p. 9. 
'* Ibid. p. 9. 
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In fact, the use of no-confidence motions as a censuring device in coalition 
governments is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, narrowly divides Parliament in 
coalition governments - the prevailing situation in India in the last decade - gives 
small parties a good deal of censuring power. They can hold the government 
accountable by threatening to withdraw and ensure the success of a no-confidence 
motion. On the other hand, this leverage can also be used to attract substantially 
greater resources for particular parties. Thus, in principle, because of the threat of no-
confidence motions, a govenmient could respond to the pressures of particular groups 
within the Parliament, even as it became less accountable to Parliament as a whole. 
Although, the net effect depends upon the particular ends for which these parties 
exercise their bargaining power, the copycat and competitive effects of extracting 
greater resources as the price for staying in the coalition can be quite high. 
Thus, the manner in which a no-confidence motion produces accountability, depends 
in part, upon the incentive under which particular political parties are operating. These 
considerations are of some relevance in examining the working of a no-confidence 
motion. Recent debates in India on the use of no-confidence motions, parliEiment have 
led some to suggest that parties should be allowed to vote out governments only if 
they commit themselves to an alternative and credible coalition before doing so, 
similar to the German model. The idea behind this move is to bring stability to 
coalition governments since no coalition partner in an existing government would, 
under this rule, be able to bring down a government unless a credible alternative 
exists.^° 
Private Member's Bills 
Although private members can introduce bills, the government initiates most of the 
legislation, and most of the bills are introduced first in the popularly elected Lok 
Sabha. Private members' bills have become almost a non-starter in parliament. During 
the ninth Lok Sabha, for instance, 156 private members' bills were introduced, but 
only eight came up for discussion of which seven were withdrawn and the remaining 
one was not passed. In the tenth Lok Sabha (1991-1996) as many as 406 private 
members' bills were initiated. Only 31 of these were discussed and none was 
•" Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, op. cit., p. 9. 
'" Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
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recommended to any parliamentary committee or passed. Yet, the paradox is that 
despite no hope of being passed, the number of private members' bills being 
introduced is increasing. Some have argued that procedural impediments are the 
principal obstacle to private members' bills. Only two and a half hours are set aside 
each week when parliament is in session to discuss private members' bills. As one 
would expect in parliamentary systems, there is very little encouragement to take 
initiatives in parliament that are independent of party approval. And given that, as 
many as a third of the private members' bills in any given session of parliament seek 
to amend the Constitution. It appears unlikely that the institution of private members' 
bills is being used by parliamentarians for any purpose other than to make symbolic 
statements.^' 
Crisis of Quorum 
The quorum to constitute a sitting of the Lok Sabha is 55 members (one-tenth of the 
total membership) including the Speaker or the person acting as such. At the 
beginning of the sitting each day, before the Speaker takes the Chair, the existence of 
quorum is ascertained. If on some day, it is found that there is no quorum at 11 a.m., 
the quorum bell is rung and the Speaker takes his seat only after there is a quorum. 
The same is true of the procedure followed whenever the House reassembles after the 
lunch break or after any adjournment. During the rest of the sitting of the day, by a 
sort of unwritten understanding or convention, the question of quorum is usually not 
raised by any member. More particularly, it is not questioned during extended hours 
of sitting - either during lunch - time or after 5 p.m. But, even if single member 
questions it at any time, proceedings have got to be interrupted, the quorum bell has to 
be rung and proceedings can be resumed only after there is a quorum. 
The parliament is hailed as the highest body representing the sovereign people. The 
members of parliament are endowed with immense clout, privileges and 
responsibility. Yet it is surprising if not painful to learn that there are not enough 
members present in the House when important bills or resolutions are put up for 
discussion or even for vote. On April 21, 1984, during the resumed discussion on the 
finance Bill in the Lok Sabha, the attendance in the House was very thin. In fact at 
''Ibid, p. 16. Ibi ,
" Subhash C. Kashyap, Our Parliament, op. cit., p. 86. 
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one stage there were only 10 members in the House, including the ministers. Most 
speakers belonged to the ruling party.^ ^ In 1983, but not exclusively for this year 
alone, the defence budget for the year, running into lakhs of crores of rupees was 
voted and passed by the Lok Sabha when there were less than 50 members present in 
the House. On April 24, 2002, the Lok Sabha approved grants for all ministries -
totaling Rs.7,68,836 crores without any discussion. In Kamataka very recently, when 
the topic of farmer's suicides was taken up for discussion, the entire House broke up. 
one by one, for lunch, and only those were left in the House who were listed to speak. 
Similarly, in the Rajya Sabha when the issue of farmer's suicides was taken up for 
discussion there were less than 20 members present (15"^  July, 2004). In the Lok 
Sabha in December, 2002 several bills were passed in one day - not because the M.Ps 
were enthusiastic about it, but because most of them were absent, and indeed only 38, 
less than the required quorum, were present and they too did not bother much about 
what was happening.^'' On December 13, 2002, for the second time in less than a 
fortnight, parliament failed again to transact any business in the two Houses because 
of lack of quorum in the post lunch session, resulting in their adjournment till 
December 16, 2002. the quorum bells were pressed in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya 
Sabha during private member's business.^^ 
On September 6, 1996, while Calling Attention Motion over the situation arising out 
of closure of a number of jute mills in the country particularly in West Bengal had to 
move, no quorum was made in the House. At 1400 hours quorum bell was rung. No 
quorum was made. At 1406 hours once again quorum bell was rung and no quorum 
was made. Thereafter, at the 1403 hours quorum bell was rung again and no quorum 
was made. Secretary-General made the following armouncement. 
Secretary-General: "There is no quorum. So, the House cannot meet. We cannot start 
the House till there is quorum. The honourable Speaker has directed that the House 
will meet 15 minutes later."^^ 
" The Times of India, April 22, 1984. p. 9. 
R.L.M. Patil, Need for Parliamentary Procedure Reform in India, in Future of Parliamentary 
Democracy in India, edited by G. Gopa Kumar, Icon Publications Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 2007. pp. 49-
50. 
" The Tribune, December 14, 2002, Chandigarh, India. 
" XI Lok Sabha Debates, Session II, Budget, Friday, September 6, 1996/ Bhadra/ 15, 1918/ (saka). 
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Duration of Parliamentary Deliberations 
A simple examination of the number of sittings of Parliament, the number of hours 
per sitting and the number of transactions conducted when Parliament meets reveals a 
grim story. The lack of seriousness with which Parliament takes itself is starkly 
evident in the declining number of days it is in session. Compared to the 1950s, the 
number of sittings of Parliament has declined by about a third. An analysis of the time 
spent on various kind of business during the first to twelfth Lok Sabhas reveals that 
the fifth Lok Sabha recorded an average of seven hours and 38 minutes per sitting, 
followed by the seventh Lok Sabha, which devoted an average of seven hours and 9 
minutes per sitting. However, there has been a decline recently in the trend and the 
average sitting of the twelfth Lok Sabha was six hours and 32 minutes per sitting. 
These have led to calls from the Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha for the legal 
stipulation of a mandatory minimum number of sittings for Parliament and state 
legislatures in order to provide more time for useful and effective legislative business 
(The Hindu 1999). 
But even these numbers sharply overstate the degree to which parliament, even when 
it is officially meeting, actually conducts its business. This is because of a sharp 
increase in adjournments as a resuh of disorderly scenes and interruptions where 
nothing could be recorded and nobody could hear MPs. For example, the 186* session 
of the Rajya Sabha met for 72 hours, of which half were lost to interruptions and 
adjournments caused by disorderly scenes. Nearly one-fifth of the time of the fourth 
session of the twelfth Lok Sabha was lost due to similar reasons.^^ 
Number of Sittings of Parliament, 1952-2003 
Decade 
1952-1961 
1962-1971 
1972-1981 
1982-1991 
1992-2001 
2002-2003 
No. of Sittings of Lok 
Sabha (Annual Average) 
124.2 
116,3 
97.9 
92,7 
81,0 
79,0 
No. of Sittings of Rajya 
Sabha (Annual Average) 
90,5 
98.5 
85.5 
79,4 
71,3 
78,0 
Source: Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. 
Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Annual Report 1999-2000, paragraph 5,4, 
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The 'Citizen's Report on Governance and Development - 2006, prepared by the 
National Social Watch Coalition, that was released on Thursday, January 19,2006 by 
former Prime Minister Mr. I.K. Gujral, reveals the fact that Parliament is wasting time 
on political controversies. Indian Parliament has shown a marked decline in number 
of its sittings per year while it is progressively devoting lesser time to issues of real 
concern. The dismal picture is further accentuated by MPs who exhibit a disinterest 
towards critical issues like drought, insufficient food and water and plight of farmers. 
Interruptions during Parliamentary Debates 
One of the fundamental requisites of successful functioning of a democracy in respect 
of the ruling party towards the opposition and vice-versa, the opposition must be 
allowed to have its say and the ruling party must be allowed to govern smoothly. Any 
restrictions put on these two principles would lead to strains, which are likely to be 
reflected in the House through disruptions in its proceedings. A study of the Lok 
Sabha Debates can show recent trends of the parliamentary proceedings. The truth is 
that one cannot even listen what the members of parliament are debating. One 
example of the recent debate can be given here. One of the most important part of the 
parliamentary proceeding is to discuss and pass the budget. It is a tool in the hands of 
the opposition to control or to criticize the government's functioning and a serious 
debate should be required to discuss the budget. But the budget of the year 2007 was 
passed during loud protests and without any debate. On March 16, 2007 Union 
Finance Minister P. Chidambaram confirmed that the Union Budget and the 
Supplementary Grants commended to the Lok Sabha were passed by voice vote amid 
loud protests by the opposition parties, led by Bhartiya Janata Party. Finance Minister 
read out parts of the speech to the media persons and television channels as nothing 
CO 
could be heard while he was replying to the debate on the Union Budget. 
If we go back to the parliamentary debates of the Nehru era, we do not find these 
types of interruptions in the parliamentary proceedings. Perhaps, it is because of the 
fact that Nehru was a great democrat about the role of the parliament and the 
opposition. He had very clear views on the role of parliament and the importance of 
opposition in such a system. Once he stated: "I believe completely in any government, 
whatever it might be, having stout critics, having an opposition to face." Again: 
'* Lok Sabha passes Budget amid Protest, http//www.rediff.com/money/2007/march/16bud.htm. 
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"without criticism people and Government become complacent. The whole 
parliamentary system is based on such criticism. I welcome criticism in parliament." 
Now a days, the scenario has drastically changed. Both the ruling party and the 
opposition do not want serious debates. They waste their time in interruptions rather 
than directing their talent and energy on serious debates. If we study the Lok Sabha 
debates, we find that these interruptions started around 1969. But the situation was not 
as bad as it is today. Every minute of Parliament's session costs the exchequer about 
Rs.7,000, that is Rs. 4,20 lakh per hour. Interruptions in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya 
Sabha not only upset the routine business of the two Houses but also result in the loss 
of time and money. A question is often asked whether leaders of the ruling party, or a 
coalition and the opposition parties realize that interruptions in parliament are a 
national loss. 
M.R. Madhavan^° presents a brief summary of the proceedings of the national 
legislative bodies during the winter session, 2005, which was conducted during Nov.-
Dec. 2005. According to this study^' -
• Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha had 23 sittings each during the winter session 
of Parliament. Lok Sabha met for 120 hours during the session. Rajya 
Sabha met for 111 hours. 
• Lok Sabha lost 26 hours (22% of working hours) due to adjournments on 
account of interruptions. Rajya Sabha lost 25 hours (23%) on this account. 
• During the session, 14 Bills were passed by both Houses of Parliament. The 
government introduced 24 Bills during the session. 
There has been a trend in recent years of wastage of time resulting out of incidents of 
pandemonium and indecorous behaviour of some members which leads to 
adjournments of the House. For example, during the winter session (Nov.-Dec.) 2000, 
34.6% of the total time of the House was wasted because of adjournments of the 
House, the total time of the House lost during the Budget session of 2001 was 40.2%, 
Quoted from Surendranath Dvvivedy, 'A Dedicated Parliamentarian' in Jawaharlai Nehru edited by 
Sheila Dikshit, K. Natwar Singh and more, Delhi Oxford University Press, Oxford New York. 1989. p 
208. 
M.R. Madhavan is a researcher with 'Parliamentary Research Service' a Unit of the Center for Policy 
Research in New Delhi. 
'^ India Together, Wed. 23 May, 2007. 
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winter session of 2002, 0.3% and the wastage of time during the Budget (Feb.-May) 
session of 2003 was 2.2%." 
According to the 'Citizen's Report on Governance and Development - 2006', "While 
the cost of running Parliament has gone up phenomenally down the years, so has the 
time lost in both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha due to the 'frayed tempers' of the 
legislators. While 5.28 percent of the time was lost in pandemonium in the ll"^ Lok 
Sabha (1996-1998), the figure increased to 10.66 percent in the 12"' Lok Sabha and 
more than doubled to 22.4 percent during 1999-2004. The fourteenth Lok Sabha has 
recorded 38 percent of loss of time in the first two sessions, owing to the row over 
induction of 'tainted' MPs into the UPA government and the absence of 'absconding' 
minister Shibu Soren. Rajya Sabha reacting similarly to these issues, lost a 
'whopping' 46 percent in the corresponding 201^' and 202" sessions. The report also 
stated that between 1951 and 2003-2004, the cost of running the two Houses 
registered an increase from 100 per minute to Rs. 18"430 per minute. This was 
estimated to reach Rs.20'000 in 2004-2005."" 
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-G.C. Malhotra, Understanding the Standing Orders-Geneva Meeting- l" - 3"* Oct., 2003. 
'" Citizen's Report on Governance and Development - 2006, prepared by the National Social Watch 
Coalition. http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/Jan202006/updatel027442006/20.asp. 
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Code of Conduct: 'Discipline, Dignity and Decorum' of Parliament 
The questions of 'discipline, dignity and decorum' of parliament are as old as the 
origin of democracy. It would not be wide off the mark to say that the quest for 
democracy arose out of the quest for a disciplined and orderly existence of life in 
society. Mankind has been addressing these questions of discipline and decorum as 
part of a constant striving of further perfecting democracy not only as a form of 
government but also as a way of life. It is essential, therefore, to dispel the notion that 
these questions have suddenly assumed importance, primarily because of the 
prevailing perception that parliamentary institutions have been functioning in a 
manner which, in relative terms, are not in consonance with their dignity and 
authority or that of their representatives. 
Discipline, dignity and decorum of parliament are of paramount importance for the 
efficient functioning and success of parliamentary institutions. In the day-to-day 
functioning of the parliament, the observance by members of certain rules regarding 
personal behaviour or etiquette is very important not only for the smooth and decent 
conduct of the business of the House but also for upholding the dignity of the 
parliament and its members. These rules are based on the Rules of Procedure and 
Conduct of Business in both the Houses and have been gradually evolved from 
conventions and rulings given by the Presiding Officers fi:om time to time. 
Unfortunately, of late, there has been a widespread feeling of decline in the levels of 
conduct and etiquette followed by the members, both inside and outside the Houses of 
parliament. When day after day, the Houses are adjourned after scenes of 
pandemonium and without transacting any business, one wonders whether the 
institutions are not becoming dysfunctional despite their high cost of maintenance on 
the public exchequer. It is also found that many of our elected representatives in their 
personal conduct, relationships and dealings with the people, do not follow the basic 
norms of conduct. In a democracy nothing can be sadder and cause for greater 
concern than the erosion in the respect for the representatives.^^ 
*'' Subhash C. Kashyap, Ministers and Legislators, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 44-50. 
" Subhash C. Kashyap, Ten Lok Sabhas, op. cit., p. 229. 
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On November 25, an all-India conference of presiding officers, chief ministers, 
ministers for parliamentary affairs and leaders and whips of political parties adopted 
unanimously a resolution on "discipline and decorum in parliament and legislatures of 
state and union territories". This was preceded, on November 22, by the tabling in 
Parliament of a report on a code.of conduct for parliamentarians, painstakingly 
prepared by a committee on ethics. Yet, the following days saw the two Houses of 
Parliament plunging into disorder. The code of conduct went out of the window as 
some members, both from the opposition parties and from the treasury benches, 
flouted the Chair's ruling and interrupted proceedings.^^ 
The code of conduct for members is categorical about what one can and cannot do 
while the proceedings of the House are on. The dos include: always address the Chair, 
keep to one's usual seat while addressing the House, maintain silence while not 
addressing, maintain the inviolability of the question hour, refrain from rushing into 
the well of the House, and resume one's seat as soon as the Speaker rises to speak. 
The don'ts include the following: do not interrupt any member while speaking by 
disorderly expression or noises, do not obstruct proceedings, do not shout slogans 
inside the House, do not question or comment on the ruling of the Chair, do not speak 
unless called by the Chair or speak un-parliamentary words, do not use one's right of 
speech to obstruct the business of the House, among others. 
A look at the proceedings of parliament in recent years would establish that the code 
of conduct has been observed more in its violation than in its compliance. The code 
specifies that violations would be punishable by measures such as admonition, 
reprimand, censure, or withdrawal from the House for offences of a less serious 
nature and by automatic suspension from the services of the House for grave 
misconduct, which includes rushing into the well of the House. It calls upon the 
leaders of political parties and the leaders of the House and the opposition to ensure 
disciplined behaviour by members on their respective sides and directs the 
government and the treasury benches to be more positive and responsive towards the 
opposition by responding promptly to matters raised by them on the floor of the 
House. Besides, it calls upon the presiding officers and leaders of political and 
** Pumima S. Tripathi, " Code of Conduct (Parliament), Article published in Frontline, Vol. 18-issue 
26, Dec. 22, 2001-Jan. 04, 2002, New Delhi. 
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legislature parties to ensure that new members are given proper orientation and 
training in parliamentary procedure, discipline and decorum. 
However, November 26, 2001 saw pandemonium in the Lok Sabha. While opposition 
members vociferously demanded that the government withdraw the controversial 
circular ordering the deletion of certain portions from some history textbooks 
published by the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT), 
the treasury benches tried to shout them down. Members of the Bharatiya Janata Party 
refused to heed the Speaker's repeated requests that only the Minister for 
Parliamentary Affairs speak on behalf of the government. The opposition continued to 
protest vociferously against the use of expressions such as "Talibanisation of 
education" as well as the charge that the government sought to impose its 
"obscurantist" ideas by rewriting history. The Parliamentary Affairs Minister added to 
the pandemonium by declaring that what the opposition was doing was akin to what 
Joseph Goebbels had done - keep repeating lies until others believed them. When he 
announced that the circular relating to the NCERT textbooks would not be withdrawn, 
the entire opposition staged a walkout. Former Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, who 
remained in his seat, strongly objected to the Goebbels parallel, which he said was 
extremely unfortunate.^^ 
Again on November 28, 2001 Congress (I) member of the Rajya Sabha K.K. Birla 
refused to put supplementary questions to Defence Minister George Fernandes, 
despite the Chair directing him to do so. The Opposition has been boycotting 
Fernandes, objecting to his re-induction into the Cabinet even as a commission of 
inquiry was probing the charges against him in the Tehelka affair. As Birla refused to 
put his question to the minister, the entire Opposition rose in his support. Members of 
the ruling coalition joined issues with this, leading to uproarious scenes.^^ 
The code of conduct is categorical about the "inviolability" of the question hour. The 
Lok Sabha witnessed ugly scenes as the opposition demanded a statement from the 
government on the alleged violation of Indian air space by a U.S. helicopter from USS 
John Young, a U.S. ship that had docked at the Chennai port. Opposition members 
staged a walkout protesting against the absence of any senior minister to reply to an 
"Ibid. 
*' Ibid. 
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issue of national importance. The House witnessed a similar scene the next day too as 
Opposition members refused to put any question to Femandes. There were noisy 
scenes during zero hour, again followed by a walkout by the Opposition when 
Femandes started reading out a statement on the helicopter issue. 
The "inviolability" of question hour was violated once again on December 3, 2001 as 
opposition members in the Lok Sabha protested against Prime Minister A.B. 
Vajpayee's statement in Hyderabad on December 2 on the Prevention of Terrorism 
Ordinance (POTO). Accusing the prime minister of playing politics in the name of 
POTO, they said that his statements had hurt the feelings of the minorities. The prime 
minister refuted the charges and took Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav 
to task for disrupting question hour. "Heavens would not have fallen if he had raised 
the issue during zero hour. What is he doing if not playing politics by raising this 
issue during question hour?" Vajpayee asked. 
Members continued to obstruct proceedings, forcing adjournments on the following 
days too. While on December 6 it was the protest against the demolition of the Babri 
Masjid, on December 7 the issue was the apparent connivance of five cabinet 
ministers in the Vishwa Hindu Parishad's (VHP) programme of temple construction. 
Both the opposition and the treasury benches raised slogans, which ensured that the 
House was adjourned within minutes of assembling on December 7. The next day the 
Lok Sabha witnessed more unruly scenes as members almost came to blows after the 
House was adjourned following unprecedented uproar: it was not the opposition but 
members of the ruling coalition that flouted the Chair's ruling; they insisted on 
obstructing the speech by the Congress(I)'s Priya Ranjan Das Munshi. Even after the 
House was adjourned, members from both sides were seen menacingly gesticulating 
at each other, some of them even making offensive gestures and shouting each other 
down. 
The latest violation, interestingly, came barely 24 hours after the Rules of Procedure 
and Conduct of Business were amended to provide for punishment for unruly 
behaviour. Other rules in the code of conduct, such as the one requiring all members 
to be present when important debates or business is transacted are often flouted. For 
example, the much-demanded debate on the intrusion by VHP leaders into the 
69 Ibid. 
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sanctum sanctorum of the makeshift temple in Ayodhya saw only a handfiil of 
members present. 
The debate on farmers' issues, which took place earlier, saw very thin attendance. The 
absence mostly remained unexplained as was stated in the report of the Committee on 
Absences that was tabled in Parliament on November 22, 2001. The committee takes 
into account only those who judiciously apply for leave explaining the reason for their 
absence from their respective Houses. Those who willfully choose to stay away, or 
those who merely come to sign the register, far outnumber them. A recent case in 
point was an incident in the Rajya Sabha on December 7, 2001 when the post-lunch 
session, which was supposed to discuss frequent disruptions in the proceedings, was 
delayed by 15 minutes for lack of quorum. The issue of frequent adjournments was 
raised by the nominated member Dr. Raja Ramanna, who said it had become common 
to disregard the decorum of the House, forcing frequent adjournments. 
It becomes obvious that having a code is not enough to ensure decorum in the House. 
In order to maintain the sanctity of parliament and the legislatures, there ought to be 
the will to adhere to the code. A prime minister has rightly observed: "We should not 
only evolve a code of conduct but also adhere to it." Here the responsibility of the 
government is greater than that of the opposition. The Committee on Ethics has 
rightly observed that greater responsiveness and restraint on the part of the 
government and the treasury benches would go a long way in ensuring decorum in the 
House. 
Position of the Speaker in Recent Years 
The Speaker's office is one of much dignity, honour, prestige and power. The Speaker 
of the Lok Sabha enjoys vast powers to ensure the smooth functioning and orderly 
conduct of the business of the House.^' His foremost duty is to see that there is 
decorum and discipline in the House and that the business of the House is conducted 
in an orderly manner and in accordance with the wishes of the House. This is 
becoming increasingly difficult day by day because clashes between ruling party or 
parties and in the opposition parties are quite frequent. In addition to this, some of the 
members behave in a disorderly manner and refuse the authority of the Chair by either 
' ' Rule 378. 
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not leaving the House when asked to do so or stop speaking when so directed which 
hinder its smooth working. We can put some examples from Lok Sabha debates to see 
how the Speaker of Lok Sabha manages the frayed tempers of the parliamentarians 
and sometime he has feh helpless in controlling the proceedings of the House in 
recent years. During the Budget session of XI Lok Sabha, March 05, 1997, the debate 
was going on Special Mention ( A news item published in the newspaper detailing the 
derogatory remarks on the conduct of the House), there was so much interruption in 
the House that no one could hear anybody. The speaker requested members to sit 
down but nobody was bothered about what the Speaker was saying. This is what 
happened: 
Mr. Speaker: Kindly sit down. 
...(Interruptions) 
Mr. Speaker: Please sit down. I am coming to you. Can you listen to me first? Shri 
Rudi, can you listen to me first? 
...(Interruptions) 
Mr. Speaker: If you all stand up like this, nothing can be done. Why do you not sit 
coolly and calmly? I have got the whole list of honourable members who have given 
notice. I am going to call you all one by one. Please have patience. Please sit where 
you are; please keep quiet; everybody will get a chance. 
... (Interruptions)'''' 
Sometimes the situation so arises that Speaker has to threaten the members of 
parliament by saying that if they do not behave, nothing would be allowed to go on 
record and will be expunged. 
Mr. Speaker: Cameras will be put off and nothing will go on record. 
...(Interruptions) ... (Not recorded) 
Mr. Speaker: Let the cameras be put off and nothing will go on record. Now you can 
say whatever you want to say. 
''^  Lok Sabha Debates, Session IV (Budget), XI LS, Wednesday, March 05, 1997/ Phalguna 14, 1918 
(Saka). 
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...(Interruptions)... (Not recorded) 
Mr. Speaker: Nothing is going on record. You will not get any relief. All the cameras 
are off and nothing is going on record unless you all sit down. 
... (Interruptions) '^* 
During fourteenth Lok Sabha, situation had become even worse. At one place Speaker 
Somnath Chatterji had to say, "Let us take up the Question Hour 
please.. .(Interruptions)... For two days, there was no Question Hour. I m appealing to 
you that after the Question Hour, you can raise all these issues. We would be debating 
the Motion of Thanks on President's Address... (Interruptions)... You do not want me 
to run the House.. .(Interruptions)... You want me to resign now! .. .(Inerruptions).^^ 
NDTV Blogs (a website) gave its report on this parliamentary Budget Session in the 
fllowing words, "Parliament has become a circus. Everyday we can hope to see a 
tamasha. Our members are colourful, childish, and boyish. How relaxing! Somnath 
Chatterji must be feeling like a helpless schoolteacher. Once out of the Speaker's 
Chair, he may also feel like joining the tamasha. Shouting, boycotting rushing to the 
well, not allowing the speeches, more interested in disrupting than smooth 
functioning. Un-parliamentary behaviour is taken for granted, nay expected. We have 
. horse trading, whips everything. Floor crossing provides exercise." 
Now a days, this has become a usual trend. But when members of parliament do not 
want the House to run properly then it is the duty of the Speaker to see that those who 
behave in a disorderly manner are punished. Pulling up the members who misbehave 
and admonishing them can do this. If they still persist, they can be asked to leave the 
House and on their refusal to do so, the service of the Marshals can be obtained. 
In the House, the Speaker is the only authority to decide who will hold the floor and 
speak. No member may speak unless he "catches the Speaker's eye", a parliamentary 
term which means that unless a member is called upon or permitted by the Chair to 
speak, he cannot speak in the House. It is for Speaker to determine in what order 
'' Ibid. 
" Lok Sabha Debates, March 1, 2007, Fourteenth Series, Vol. XXV, Tenth Session. 
*^ Parliament, Tuesday, March 13,2007, NDTV .Com, Blogs & Space, www.ndtvblogs.com. 
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members would speak^^ and how long member should be allowed to speak. Therefore, 
every member of the House is dependent on the Speaker to get a chance to speak and 
this is the duty of the Speaker to see that all political parties get sufficient time to 
express their views so that dissatisfaction doesn't arise among the members. His 
authority in the precincts of the House and over the Galleries is final. No one can 
enter within the four walls of the House or Galleries without his permission. He 
decides when the Galleries should be cleared of the visitors and he House should meet 
in camera. 
Being presiding officer of the Lok Sabha, he decides what should appear in the 
proceedings, that there is faithful recording of the proceedings of the House and 
reports of the proceedings are made as quickly available to the people as it can be. He 
has also the right to expunge objectionable words, phrases and expressions from the 
proceedings. He can order a member to discontinue his speech or to withdraw words 
or expressions, which he feels are un-parliamentary or undignified. He may order that 
anything said by a member without his permission shall not go on record and that 
anything found un-parliamentary shall be expunged. Any word or portions can be 
ordered "not to be recorded" or expunged from the proceedings as being un-
parliamentary, cannot be published by the media or anyone else as there is no 
imlimited right to the publication of the proceedings of the Houses of the Parliament. 
Lok Sabha Speaker often uses • this device to control the undignified and un-
parliamentary behaviour of the members in the House. If we see the Lok Sabha 
proceedings we find that Speaker has to say so many times to members that if they 
won't stop interruptions nothing will go on record. This tendency is increasing day by 
day in Lok Sabha debates. 
In the House, if the Speaker is on his legs, all members are supposed to sit down and 
listen to him patiently. If any member continues to stand, it will be treated as an open 
insult to the Speaker's dignity. But in recent years, a trend has been noticed that 
members of the House violated this convention regularly. In March 1987, the Speaker 
made observations like this: "No talking in the air, I said", "Don't interrupt", "Sit 
down," "You have got no decency. I am on my legs. Please sit down, and finally 
" Rule 350. 
' ' Rules, 353, 356 & 380. 
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"Nothing goes on record, whatever they say."^^ These types of observations by the 
Speaker are heard daily in recent times during parliamentary proceedings. 
The presiding officer of the Lok Sabha is finding it difficult to comfortably occupy 
the lofty Chair. His difficulties are large and these are increasing everyday. To 
maintain decorum in the House is the first and foremost serious problem of the 
Speaker. For the first time, on August 30, 1962 there were unprecedented scenes of 
disorder in the Lok Sabha culminating in the suspension of a member of the House for 
persistently flouting the authority of the Speaker and casfing reflections on the 
impartiality of the Chair.^'' The same indiscipline was seen in the House again when 
the official Languages Bill was introduced in 1963 and one member of the House had 
to be bodily lifted and thrown out for being defiant.^' Defiance of the authority of the 
Lok Sabha Speaker is frequently observed in the House. In 1966 the Lok Sabha had 
to be adjourned 70 minutes ahead of the scheduled time because of unruly behaviour 
of the members of the House.^^ Marshals had to be called to remove defiant members 
from the House. On September 8, 1966 again a member was ordered to leave the 
House for obstructing its proceedings.^ "* In 1968 some members kept shouting slogans 
continuously in the Hose and prevented the prime minister from making a speech on 
an adjournment motion.^^ Then, as late as 1978, the Lok Sabha had to be adjourned 
under unusual circumstances and amid noise and confiision. On the occasion of the 
Golden Jubilee celebrations of the Indian parliament, the Speaker made the following 
observations: 
"We are presently celebrating the Golden Jubilee of the Indian Parliament. It is only 
appropriate that we re-dedicate ourselves to strengthen our parliamentary edifice. An 
important component of our endeavors in this direction should be to collectively 
ensure that the proceedings of the House are held in a smooth and orderly manner as 
per the rules and procedures we ourselves have framed in this regard. During this 
year, Budget Session, 287 hours and 54 minutes of sitting time, 66 hours and 35 
' ' The Times of India, New Delhi, Sunday, March 22, 1987. 
'" The Hindustan Times, August 31, 1962. 
*'Ibid, April 14, 1963. 
'^  Ibid, March 11, 1965; April 9, 1965; December 9. 1965. 
"ibid, March 3\ ,1%6. 
*'ibid, September 9, 1966. 
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minutes of precious time was lost due to disturbances leading to adjournment of the 
House. This comes to losing out an alarming 23.12 percent of the total time of the 
House. As you would agree, frequent and forced adjournments, besides leading to 
wastage of the precious time of the House tend to lower the dignity of Parliament in 
an 
the eyes of the public. " 
To maintain discipline in the House is a big problem for the Speaker. For maintaining 
discipline he has had to request members repeatedly. Similarly on many occasions 
Speaker has to request the members not to interrupt and disrupt other speaking 
members. The Chair is not shown proper respect very often. The presiding officer 
once had to say that the country had no king or queen now and the Parliament being 
sovereign, the members had to show respect to themselves. 
The Speaker is also faced with the problem of non-seriousness on the part of the 
members. He once complained that some of the members came to House after 15-20 
days of absence and wanted to speak immediately*' while some others used 
undignified language and shouted in the House. He also complained that some 
members gave running commentary and unnecessarily intervened in debates, while 
some others thought that the work in the House was much less important than that 
which awaited them outside. 
This is also a big headache of the Speaker that walk-outs are frequently staged in the 
House and that the members are not seriously interested in transacting the business of 
the House. It appears that walk-outs on every issue in parliament have become a trend 
to mark protests on a problem or an issue under discussion or a ruling of the presiding 
officer or to show resentment to the head of the state when he comes to address the 
joint session of parliament. 
Absenteeism on the part of members also poses a problem. Members give notices of 
their questions, adjournment motions and other motions, several of which are 
admitted. But, when the time for putting such questions comes, the Chair finds many 
members absent placing him in an embarrassing position. This also leads to wastage 
of time and energy. It also raises the serious problem of lack of quorum for 
*' Lok Sabha Bulletin - Part 1, Tuesday, July 16, 2002/Asadha 25, 1924 (Saka). 
'* Lok Sabha Debates, August 20, 1961 c 5206. 
" Ibid, March 29, 1985, C 3687. 
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transacting any serious business. Speaker Balram Jhakhar also very recently 
expressed his concern over absent members, when he found that several of them in 
whose names question stood were absent from the sitting of the House. 
Role of the Opposition after Nehru Period 
Going by the Dictionary of Politics, the term 'opposition' implies a loose association 
of individuals, or political groups, or a party or parties wishing to change the 
government and alter its policy decisions.^' In parliamentary democracy, opposition is 
a constituent part of parliament which has the primary objective to use the statutory 
procedures of parliament to keep the government accountable. In general, policy 
outcomes will reflect the government's position if the ruling party holds a large 
majority of seats in parliament. If the government is backed by relatively fewer seats 
then the opposition might be able to use its ultimate weapon of providing the option 
of a credible alternative in the next general elections. But in India it is often argued 
that the opposition uses its weapons of criticism and censure in parliament more to 
malign the credibility of government than to make the government accountable in 
order to secure good governance. Most commentators on parliamentary set up of 
government agree that opposition parties in parliament are relatively weak at making 
the government accountable for its acts. This has been the position primarily because 
of the fact that, for a larger part since independence, the opposition has been weak due 
to party position in parliament. Where governments have a comfortable majority, 
there is not much that the opposition can do to ensure its accountability. But it is 
noteworthy here that the ruling party has never received majority of more than 50 
percent votes polled. The nearest to the 50 percent mark has been touched only once, 
in the eighth general elections in 1984 when the Congress under the leadership of late 
Rajiv Gandhi got 49.6 percent of votes polled. 
Otherwise, under the prevailing 'one - party dominant system' since independence, 
the Congress party came to power with popular votes that varied between 47.8 percent 
(1957) to 40.7 percent (1980). In the year, 1991, the Congress formed the government 
with only 36.5 percent of the total votes polled, but this time, unlike the previous 
occasions, it was headed by the minority government. It is to be mentioned here that 
'" Hans Raj, Speaker in India, in 'Indian Parliament' edited by Dr, Phul Chand, The Institute of 
Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 1984, p. 161. 
" Penguin Dictionary of Politics, London: Penguin Book, 1086, p. 243. 
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since the ninth Lok Sabha (1989), India has been witnessing hung parliaments. V.P. 
Singh's Janta Dal, which led the minority National Front government, with outside 
support from the BJP, on the one hand, and the Leftist parties on the other, had got 
only 17.7 votes. The results of the U'*' general elections (1996) were even more 
interesting. The BJP emerged as the single largest party with 20.3 percent votes and 
161 seats, while Congress was second with 28.8 percent votes and 140 seats. 
However, the BJP minority government did not last more than 13 days. Eventually, a 
minority United Democratic Front of fourteen parties formed the government with 
outside support of Congress, first under the premiership of H.D. Deve Gowda and 
thenofl.K. Gujral.^ ^ 
The last three general elections have also produced hung parliaments. In 12"' and 13"" 
general elections, the BJP emerged as the single largest party with 25.5 percent votes 
in 1998 and 23.8 percent votes in 1999. But on both occasions, the Congress (the 
main opposition party) polled more votes than the BJP. Though in 1999, with just 114 
seats, the Congress got the lowest number of seats ever, its popular vote of 28.3 
percent was higher than that of the BJP. In 14"" general elections Congress party 
emerged as the single largest party. 
In a parliamentary democracy, the opposition has various ways to make its point 
through debates, question hour, adjournment motions, censure motions, walk-outs, 
committee system and no confidence motion against the government. In recent years, 
each of these devices has been used increasingly than in the past. For example, it is to 
be noted that the first vote of no-confidence against the government in independent 
India was brought about in the third Lok Sabha in 1963 (22 August 1963).'^ The 
fourth and fifth Lok Sabhas also witnessed two motions of no-confidence.^'' During 
the sixth Lok Sabha, two motions of no-confidence had come up before the House for 
discussion. One motion was rejected while the other saw an inconclusive debate 
because the government led by Morarji Desai, against which the motion weis moved, 
had resigned while the debate was still going on.^ ^ Ninth Lok Sabha, exceptionally. 
'^  Prakash Nanda, 'The Changing Role of Opposition in Parliament' in The India Parliament - A 
Comparative Perspective edited by Ajay K. Mehra and Gert W. Kueck, Konark Publications, New 
Delhi, 2003. p. 309. 
" The Times of India, August 23, 1963. New Delhi. 
'•* Prakash Nanda, The Changing Role of the Opposition in Parliament. Op. cit., p. 315. 
'^ Ibid. 
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did not witness any no-confidence motion. Seventli, eighth, and tenth Lok Sabhas 
discussed in all, seven no-confidence motions and all of them failed because the 
opposition was numerically in minority. The ll"^ Lok Sabha witnessed four no-
confidence motions. In the 12"^  Lok Sabha, the Vajpayee government fell by one vote 
while seeking confidence of Lok Sabha in the wake of the withdrawal of support by 
the AIADMK, then a constituent of the ruling National Democratic AUiance.^^ 
Similarly, during the first Lok Sabha, only 5 adjournment mofions were debated and 
voted upon. But this number on subsequent Lok Sabhas has progressively increased. 
For example, while no adjournment motions marked the first two Lok Sabhas, the 
third Lok Sabha received 776 notices, though eventually none of them was admitted 
for discussion. However, the subsequent tenures of the Lok Sabha have seen many 
motions being debated.'^ Along with this fact it is to be noted that the last four-five 
Lok Sabhas have been witnessing a disturbing trend of unmanageable unruly scenes 
and un-parliamentary behaviour of the members on the floor of the House. This is so 
disturbing that the Speaker usually has been forced to adjourn the proceedings of the 
Lok Sabha. Therefore, we can say that in the early days of parliament's origin, though 
opposition was numerically weak, but they were more effective and played its role 
brilliantly to influence government policies. There is no wonder in saying that this 
quality is often missing in today's debates by the opposition parties. Opposition 
parties are unable to extract correct information about governmental activities, which 
might allow them to take the executive to task through usual methods of adjournment 
motions; all opposition parties are reactive rather than proactive, reflecting the 
extreme organizational weaknesses of Indian political parties. Thirdly and obviously, 
opposition parties tend to focus on issues which, in their judgment, could be exploited 
to have pay-offs rather than on the over all fiinctioning of the government. 
Hence, opposition parties tend to, therefore, focus more of their attention on political 
and ministerial scandals such as financial scams and corruption cases against the 
government so that they are able to attack individual ministers and bureaucrats rather 
than to try bringing about institutional reforms and changes in the system. During the 
tenure of the BJP-led government from 1999 to 2004, the Congress-led opposition 
'' Ibid. 
"ibid, pp. 315-316 . 
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used all of its might to stall proceedings on various corruption scandals, but did 
almost nothing to protest against the systematic governance weaknesses plaguing the 
coimtry. When BJP moved into opposition benches after it lost the election in 2004, it 
began to behave exactly as the Congress had done. Even with an opposition, which is 
scandal centric, their focus on highlighting these scandals in parliament has yielded 
very few results and almost all of the parliamentary probes into these scandals have 
led to nowhere. 
Two conclusions emerge from a quick perusal of the role of opposition in parliament 
in India. First, the idealistic view of parliament as a deliberative body where all the 
pros and cons relevant to a proposed legislation are aired and discussed and the 
ultimate legislation ought to reflect, at least to some extent, the opinions of the 
members of parliament, however, the actual outcome is a far cry from reality. In 
India, the problem of unresponsive and irresponsible government is more acute, and 
has actually worsened in recent years. Parliament, in public mind, has become 
essentially a forum for adversarial combat rather than of deliberative clarity. It is for 
this reason that disruptive adjournments have become the main tool in the hands of 
the opposition rather than a device to force the government to have a reasoned 
argument. Secondly, the ability of the opposition to function as an independent 
mechanism for securing accountability of the government does not depend on the 
formal rules and procedures available to members of parliament. The real guarantee is 
actually the drive, energy, imagination and sincerity of purpose of the opposition in 
parliament. In the words of Prakash Nanda: "It is true that the opposition in India has 
been traditionally fragmented. But the difference between then and now is that there is 
no more any systemic constraint for the growth of opposition. There is no more a 
system of one-party dominance (of the Congress) that helped the dominant party to 
develop a remarkable capacity to articulate opposition inputs. The effortless ease with 
which the party-loyalties and the party-beliefs change these days, changing a 
government, the basic goal of any opposition, is always attainable. In a sense, 
opposition-unity is very easy and very difficult at the same time, everything 
depending on the chemistry between and bargain among the leaders. Ideological 
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convictions of the present day leaders, particularly those who are calling the shots in 
their respective parties, are only skin-deep. 
Criminalization of Parliament: With Special Reference to H"" Lok Sabha 
As Prof. Seshadri commented in one of his research articles, "political leadership has 
behaved in an irresponsible manner having no other aim except to gamer all sorts of 
votes by hook or by crook...The rules have become irrelevant in the contemporary 
situation when rowdies, history-sheeters, and criminals have become legislators and 
ministers. One can imagine the level to which the political parties have sunk when we 
notice that bandits are being nominated for legislatures...Anything, anybody or any 
means is acceptable if votes can be got".^ ^ 
This is an apt comment for Indian parliamentarians. We carmot say that all 
parliamentarians are involved in malpractices but it is also a fact that most of the 
contestants use muscle power and coercive tactics to win elections. The use of muscle 
power and other means to compel people to vote for them is not new to Indian 
politics. This has become a fact of political culture. Even in early years of India's 
independence (in fifties and sixties) some feeble allegations were made about the use 
of outlaws by the politicians to further their electoral prospects. However, the 
intensity and frequency of such allegations have increased in recent years to alarming 
levels. Persons with criminal past are becoming legislators and ministers very easily. 
This trend has become very common and is being openly defended by even party 
leaders. According to the 'National Commission to Review the working of the 
Constitution' (NCRWC), "A stage has now come when politicians openly boast of 
their criminal connections. A Bihar minister's statement in the assembly that he 
patronized and would continue to patronize gangsters to fight and win elections is a 
pointer to the growing phenomena where criminal background has become an 
invisible requisite to win elections."'°° 
Despite a number of efforts to control the menace and countrywide demand to rinse 
out the criminals from entering public life, the system has changed only to worse. In 
" Pakash Nanda, op. cit., p. 321. 
K. Seshadri, "Law of Political Jungle and Bureaucracy", published in The Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. XL, No. 3, July-Sept., 1994, pp. 287-289. 
"^ National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), A Consultation Paper 
on Review of the Working of the Political Parties Specially in Relation to Election and Reform Option, 
New Delhi, 2001:6.11. 
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the fifties there were sporadic complaints on the role of criminals, in the sixties the 
criminals were content to playing second fiddle to the politicians to enable them win 
elections and in turn to get protection from them. "The roles have now reversed. It is 
the politician now, who seeks protection from criminals. The latter seek direct access 
to power and become legislators and then ministers. The Election Commission's 
observations that nearly 40 members of the ll'' ' Lok Sabha and 700 members of the 
state assemblies had criminal pasts.""" 
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution pointed out that 
criminalization has become a worrying characteristic of India's politics and electoral 
system. According to unofficial studies cited by the Commission, in 1996 as many as 
39 members of parliament, including four ministers, faced criminal charges, which 
included murder, rape, dacoity, abduction, assault and breach of peace. An 
investigation into the record of 500 persons who were candidates in the Lok Sabha 
election of 1998 revealed that 72 of them had criminal proceedings pending against 
them."'^  
Appalled by this state of affairs. Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR)'°^ filed 
a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Delhi High Court in December 1999 asking 
for disclosure of candidates' background at the time of filing their nomination papers, 
for the information of voters to enable them to make an informed choice while casting 
their votes. On November 2, 2000, the Delhi High Court gave its judgment'"'' (in 
CPW No. 7257 of 1999 - Association for Democratic Reforms Vs Union of India and 
others) upholding the petition. The High Court also said that the Election Commission 
should gather information on candidates using the police, IB and other agencies of the 
Government, assess their suitability for holding public office, and widely publicize 
that information. 
Though the Delhi High Court had given directions only to the Election Commission, 
the Government of India filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court against 
the judgment of the Delhi High Court in January 2001. Several political parties 
"»Ibid. 
'"^  Sudha Chandran, 'India: The Crime of Politics' (Article), Online Asia Times, 
http.//www.atimes/South Asia/FB28DF04.htlm. 
"" Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) is a non-political and non-partisan organization set up 
in 1999 to improve democracy and governance in India. 
"*^  AIR 2001 Delhi 126. 
201 
became "interveners" to the case to oppose the Delhi High Court judgment. ADR 
supported the judgment and argued against the appeal of the Government of India. 
On May 2, 2002, the Supreme Court pronounced a judgment, which has been called, a 
"landmark" and a "historic" judgment'°^ (in Civil Appeal No. 7178 of 2001 - Union 
of India Vs Association for Democratic Reforms) directing the Election Commission 
to call for the following information from candidates in exercise of its power under 
Article 324 of the Indian Constitution by way of an affidavit to be filed by the 
candidate along with his/her nomination form: 
1. "Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/discharged of any criminal 
offence in the past. If any, whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine? 
2. Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the candidate is accused 
in any pending case, of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two 
years or more, and in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the 
court of law. If so, the details thereof 
3. The assets (immovable, movable, bank balances etc.) of a candidate and of 
his/her spouse and that of dependents. 
4. Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any over dues of any public 
financial institution or government dues. 
5. The educational qualifications of the candidate." 
The Supreme Court gave the Election Commission two months to implement the 
judgment. Since there was no extension of time by the Supreme Court, the Election 
Commission issued an order on June 28, 2002, implementing the Supreme Court 
judgment. After this judgment of the Supreme Court 'Election Watches' conducted in 
19 States and 5 Union Territories during 2004. Fourteenth Lok Sabha election was the 
first election after the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of India of March 13, 
2003 making it mandatory for candidates contesting elections to parliament and State 
Assemblies to disclose criminal cases pending against them, if any; their financial 
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assets and liabilities along with those of their spouse and dependents; and their 
educational qualifications.'°^ 
Table 1: Coverage by Election Watches 
Number of States 
Number of Union Territories 
Number of Constituencies in 
the States and UTs covered 
Number of Candidates in the 
States and UTs covered 
Number of Constituencies in 
all the States and UTs 
Number of Candidates in all 
the States and UTs 
Total 
29 
6 
458 
4344 
543 
5435 
Covered in 
Election Watches 
19 
5 
451 
3182 
451 
3182 
% 
65.51 
83.33 
98.47 
73.25 
83.05 
58.55 
Source: Election Watch Reports of 2004. 
Table 2: Findings of Election Watches 
Candidates with pending 
criminal cases 
Candidates with assets of more 
than Rs. 1 crore 
Candidates with "Nil" Assets 
Candidates with liabilities of 
more than Rs. 5 lakhs 
Candidates without PAN 
518 
304 
193 
245 
1105 
16.28%* 
9.55 % 
6.07 % 
7.70 % 
34.73 % 
•Percentage calculated with "No. of Candidates Covered (3182)" as the denominator 
Source: Election Watch Reports 2004. 
"^ Election Watch 2004, A Compendium of State Election Watch Reports of the 2004 Election in 
India, Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Ahmedabad. p. iv. 
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The above data shows that the percentage of candidates having criminal cases against 
them is 16.28%. And 30.4 percent of MPs between 36 and 45 years, elected to 
fourteenth Lok Sabha are facing criminal cases in different parts of the country. 18.3 
percent of them are facing grave charges. Their elders, aged between 55 and 65 years, 
have lesser criminal cases against them - 19.3 percent."'^ Nearly 100 members of the 
Parliament, which is about one-fourth of the total, elected to the 14* Lok Sabha, have 
been charge sheeted in criminal cases. Over 50 percent of serious criminal cases 
1 OR 
registered against MPs were mostly from UP, Bihar, Jharkhand, and MP. 
An analysis of the criminal background of the contestants, we can easily imagine the 
real picture of Indian politics and the rampant corruption. As we have mentioned it 
earlier, that the influence of criminals on electoral politics is not new to Indian 
political system. Since the first election itself, criminals have been playing an 
important role in deciding the fate of candidates. However, the role of criminals was 
limited to booth capturing and terrorizing voters, either to vote in favour of a 
particular candidate or not to vote at all. Since 1980s, the trend has changed and 
instead of working as agents of politicians, criminals themselves are entering into the 
electoral fray. And the most painful fact is that they are winning elections as well. 
'"^  Rakesh Bhatnagar, 'Many Lawmakers are Lawbreakers' Citizen's Report on Governance and 
Development - 2006, http://dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID= 1008519&CatlD=2. 
"" 'Politics-Criminalization', Outlook, New Delhi, January 19, 2006. 
http://www.outlookindia.com/ptinews.asp?id=349746. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
While adopting parliamentary system, the framers of the constitution assumed that it 
would fulfill the desires and aspirations of the people of India. They considered 
parliamentary system more appropriate for the country not simply due to the fact that 
we were somewhat trained in the intricacies of this kind of democracy and had 
become quite used to living under it, but the conditions in India at the time of partition 
were also instrumental for the adoption of this set-up in India. There was widespread 
discontent and discord among various sections of the community. The society was 
largely fragmented and sharp divisions could easily be seen based on caste, language, 
region and religion. Parliamentary democracy, it was hoped, could bring about unity 
in diversity. It was thought that frayed tempers, violence, arson and unrest among 
various warring groups would subside once the tried and tested representative 
government is installed. It was also presumed that it would be possible to settle 
conflicts amicably once a forum to discuss matters is established. A system 
flourishing in one country was more likely to succeed specially in a country that has 
been under its rule. The British experience was available with us and the mother of all 
parliaments was always at hand to guide and nurse the baby. There is no denying the 
fact that the most paramount feature of British political traditions is the ability of its 
political system to create institutions that become models for the entire world. 
Legislative and other democratic institutions in their modem from have grown 
gradually on the Indian territory. Basically, we owe much of this growth to our British 
cormection that lasted for more than two centuries. Fuel was added to fire when the 
freedom fighters started demanding establishment of more and more representative 
institutions. These concessions, though reluctantly granted by the British, had a 
lasting affect on the psyche of Indian masses and its leaders. The concessions through 
representations granted by various Acts of British parliament did resemble the British 
model, but in essence, they were hardly representative or democratic in character, 
initially. Nevertheless, they indeed were responsible for laying the foundations of a 
parliamentary democracy in India. 
Beginning of a central legislature for India can be traced to the Charter Act of 1833 
which initiated an element of institutional specialization in the government of the 
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British territories in India by differentiating the law making meetings of the 
Govemor-General-in-Council from his executive meetings. The Govemor-General-in-
Council was thus vested, subject to certain restrictions, with the exclusive powers of 
legislation for the whole of the British territories in India. The Council was then 
enlarged for legislative purposes by addition of some special members in 1853, who 
were known as 'Legislative Councilors' and were vested with the exclusive job of 
participation in law making. 
The Indian Council Act of 1861 is often considered the primary charter of the Indian 
legislature of the next century. This Act was responsible for the association of Indian 
people with the work of legislation by nominating them to the Governor General's 
Council. Later on, after the establishment of Indian National Congress which started, 
more emphatically, the movement for associating larger number of Indians with the 
governance of the country, the Indian Council Act 1892 was passed by the British 
Parliament. The object of the Act was explained in the House of Commons by 
Mr. Curzon as, "the intention of the British Government is to widen the basis and 
expand the ftinctions of the government in India; and to give greater opportunity to 
the non-official and native elements in Indian society to take part in the work of 
government." 
The Indian Councils Act of 1909 further enlarged the Council and made it more 
representative and effective by expanding their functions. The maximum number of 
additional members of the Indian Legislative Council was raised from 16 to 60. The 
Act also recognized the principle of indirect election. 
The Act of 1919 was cleariy an indication that the British were prepared to concede 
only "the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to 
progressive realization of a responsible government in British India as an integral part 
of the British empire" the first Legislative Assembly constituted under this Act came 
into being in 1921. It had 145 members, 104 of whom were elected. Responsible 
government was provided for by the subsequent Act of 1935. Under the Act, the 
Federal Legislature was to consist of his Majesty, represented by the Governor-
General, and two chambers known as the House of Assembly and the Council of 
State. The Assembly was to have a maximum of 375 members, 250 from British India 
and the remaining 125 fi-om Indian States. The government at the centre was not to be 
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a fully responsible government, as the principle of diarchy was introduced at the 
centre. Hence, beginning from the Charter-Act of 1833 to the Government of India 
Act of 1935, there was a gradual and slow growth of parliamentary democracy in its 
modem form, taking firm roots in the country. 
However, it should not be construed from the above discussion that India was entirely 
alien to the concepts of democracy and democratic institutions before the British 
advent in India. There are enough historical accounts to reveal that republican forms 
of govenunents, representative deliberative bodies and local self go\eming 
institutions existed in ancient India. Democratic perspectives could be found in 
abundance in different aspects of the life of people of India right from the vedic age. 
The Rigveda and the Atharvaveda mention the sabha (General Assembly) and the 
Samiti (House of Elders). Giriraj Shah in his Glimpses of Ancient Indian History 
mentions quoting the famous chronicler of ancient Indian history thus, "the genius of 
the people for the corporate action expressed itself in a variety of self-governing 
institutions with highly developed constitutions, rules of procedure, and machinery of 
administration which challenge comparison with modem parliamentary institutions. 
Reading of the election rules of these bodies, the division of villages and districts into 
electoral imits, their rules of debate and standing orders for the conduct of business 
and maintenance of order in debate and their committee system, one might wonder 
whether many standing orders of the House of Commons and the London County 
Council are not derived from the regulations of the ancient local bodies, ecclesiastical 
coimcils and village assemblies of ancient India." Not less astonishing are the facts 
that both Mahavira and Buddha came from republics. A study of the Buddhist Bhikshu 
Sanghas would show that not only there were parliaments (Sanghas) but Sanglias 
knew and observed a great many of the rules of parliamentary procedure known to 
modem times. Seating arrangements, motions, resolutions, quorum, voting of ballots, 
censuring the govenmient through motions were all firmly established. 
Nehru often wrote about democratic traditions and heritage of India. In his Discovery 
of India, Nehru noted that in the olden days, there was a widespread system of self-
govemment in towns and villages and the central government seldom interfered so 
long as its quota of taxes was paid. To quote Nehru: "A number of villages or small 
towns were joined together under a raja or chief, who was sometimes elected and 
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sometimes hereditary... It appears that the raja, although he was the chief man of his 
state, could not do just what he liked. He was himself subject to Aryan laws and 
customs, and he could be deposed or fined by his people... Thus, there was a kind of 
democracy in the Aryan settlements - that is to say, the Aryan inhabitants could, to 
some extent, control the government." 
With this background behind us, both of the ancient period and the more recent 200 
years of British rule over India, the tradition of democratic thinking and practical 
experience of parliamentary government had a deciding influence on the founding 
fathers of the newly independent state to choose parliamentary type of democracy for 
post independence political system. The Constituent Assembly too had fairly clear 
ideas about which political system would serve the people better when the reigns of 
government were handed over to the people of India. There was hardly a debate on 
the type of democracy we would have for our future governments, as parliamentary 
set-up was the obvious choice. The principle of the parliamentary executive being 
collectively responsible to the lower House of the parliament, as recommended by the 
Union Constitution Committee and as subsequently incorporated into the Draft 
Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was accepted by the Constituent 
Assembly. B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the Drafting Committee while introducing 
the Draft Constitution and recommending the parliamentary system in the Constituent 
Assembly on 4'*^  November 1948 said: "The Draft Constitution in recommending the 
parliamentary system of executive has preferred more responsibility to more 
stability." 
The concept of parliamentary type of government was accepted and passed by the 
Constituent Assembly with an overwhelming majority. Nehru, being an avid 
supporter, strongly pleaded for acceptance of parliamentary system, over presidential 
system. K.M. Munshi writes about Nehru's support in the following words: "As a 
middle-of-the-way socialist, impatient to transform India's life, Nehru favoured 
parliamentary supremacy." The parliamentary system was finally adopted by 
deliberate choice, in Nehru's words, "not only because, to some extent we had always 
thought on those lines previously, but because we thought it was in keeping with our 
old traditions also." 
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It was the good fortune of the Indian people that Nehru became the first prime 
minister and the leader of the House and of the ruling Congress Party in parliament. 
He was instrumental in establishing the cherished traditions of a parliamentary 
procedure and practices. He bowed to the chair gracefully as he entered the House and 
took his seat, attended the sessions of parliament regularly and made it a point to sit 
through the whole of the question hour, hardly used to miss any important debate, 
treated the presiding officer with extreme deference and, on the whole, endeavoured 
to build up parliamentary activity as an important part in the public life of the country. 
Nehru always tried to see that parliament performed a conflict resolution and national 
integration, and the role of conscience keeper, all rolled into one. Parliament was seen 
as a forum to be relied upon for grievance ventilation and redress and for resolving 
the multifarious difficulties and problems of the people. He always tried to put the 
parliament in high esteem and demanded the same from others. The high moral fibre 
and the effectiveness of the institution were convincingly vindicated on several 
occasions. 
He did not even spare his own party men if there was a question of parliamentary 
impropriety. In 1951, for instance, when a member of his ruling party tried to canvass 
support in favour of an association of which he was a member, Nehru intervened by 
recommending for an enquiry by a parliamentary Committee to be set up. While 
doing so, he said; "this is an unusual motion and I believe that it is the first time that 
such a motion has been placed before parliament. I hesitated for some time before 
doing so and gave careful consideration to the matter. The dignity of the House and 
the proper behaviour of every honourable member are dear to the House and I felt that 
any action taken by a member, which might not be in consonance with propriety and 
good behaviour and what is expected of him should be enquired into. That would be 
fair both to the House and the member concerned." He (Nehru) then did not hesitate 
to get the expulsion of the member passed after the enquiry committee recommended 
for it. However, the member resigned himself before expulsion proceedings could be 
initiated. 
During the course of debates in parliament in Nehru era, despite the absence of any 
worthwhile opposition, often tempers ran high and the ruling party had to face 
vehement criticism. Nehru remained steadfast in protecting parliamentary decorum 
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and dignity despite bitter criticism from many quarters. Nehru was so particular about 
maintaining the decorum of the House that he felt remorseful when a word used by 
him during a debate in 1951 session was considered un-parliamentary. Writing to a 
Chief Minister in 1951, soon after the incident, Nehru said, "the Constitution 
(Amendment) Bill gave rise to heated and sometimes passionate debate and I fear, 
tempers were frayed and hard wards said. I am sorry to confess that I fell from grace 
on one occasion during this debate and used needlessly strong language." 
It is also true that important legislation in those days was not passed in haste. There 
were detailed and wide ranging discussions on legislative proposals. For instance, 51 
hours were devoted to the discussion on the Press (Incitement to Crime) Bill 1951 and 
57 hours to the Preventive Detention Bill 1952. Nehru's approach and attitude were 
largely responsible for the growth of healthy conventions of parliamentary 
democracy. 
In spite of the best possible traditions and conventions instilled during the Nehru era, 
parliamenteiry procedures and practices were not free from usual pitfalls and dangers. 
As the saying goes, 'there is no structure which can not be perverted', parliament was 
no exception. Almost coinciding with the death of Nehru, or soon after that, a new 
chapter was written in the political history of India. The elections in 1967 saw the first 
non-congress government being formed in the country. It was hailed as a success of 
democracy where in all shades of opinion could coexist. It was said that, 'parliament 
is becoming truly representative of India's rich diversities.' 
However, the question that is often posed today and the matter that raises its head 
time and again in the minds of scholars is about the working of parliament in India 
and the reasons for the decline and degradation of its age old traditions and customs. 
The forum, which was supposed to provide opportunities to discuss matters and where 
all shades of opinion were to be given equal importance, has been gradually reduced 
to an assembly where everybody is out to shout down the other. Majorities are being 
used to steam-roll the minority or any conflicting opinion. Bills are being passed 
without meaningftil or fruitful deliberations. Discussions take place amidst ear-
splitting shouts and counter-shouts. Budgets go through the parliament in absolute 
haste, without discussion and even in the absence of opposition through walk-outs. 
210 
Defence minister is simply not heard when the opposition's demand to sack him does 
not get accepted, and this goes on session after session. 
Arun Shourie so aptly portrays the scenario: "Hours and hours are spent on 
adjournments over the headline of the day, and then the 'legislators' are corralled to 
constitute a quorum and the Bill is declared to have been passed... And at the end of 
the session, the presiding officer intones, "this was a very productive session'... the 
House passed 23 Bills." Shourie goes on to cite C.V. Madhukar's study on working 
of parliament and points out that, 'over the past seven sessions of the parliament, the 
time spent on debating legislative issues was approximately 20 percent in Lok Sabha 
and 23 percent in Rajya Sabha. In fact in the winter session of 2004, less than 15 
percent time was spent on legislation in Lok Sabha...' In fact, that vastly over states 
the deliberative effort of members. Madhukar points outs that in 2006 'over 40 
percent of the Bills were passed in Lok Sabha with less than one hour of debate.' 
It can easily be imagined how decorum and prestige of parliament must have suffered 
when as serious a business as legislation has come to be treated so casually. This 
decline in the working of parliament has continued since the passing away of the first 
prime minister of India- Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. While Mrs. Gandhi was at the 
helm, for about 15 years, she showed scant respect for parliamentary procedures and 
practices. She often abstained from the sessions of parliament, even during important 
and crucial debates.- The prime ministers who followed Mrs. Gandhi were no 
different. Most of them had come with thumping majorities which were used to crush 
any opposition. When India celebrated fiftieth anniversary of parliament in 2002, 
many scholars were openly criticizing the decline of parliament, the same assembly 
which was termed as "majesty" of parliament by Pandit Nehru. Meaningfiil debates 
have become things of the past due to utter rowdiness and disorderly behaviour by 
some of its members. People are now showing concems about parliament becoming 
"dysftinctional" for which a number of factors are held responsible including; falling 
standards in the conduct of legislators as evidenced by poor quality of debates, thin 
attendance, unruly behaviour of members, a general chaos in the two Houses, 
members with criminal history, role of muscle power and 'political turn-coatism'. 
There has been a radical change in the quality of debates in the last four decades or so, 
if we compare them with the debates of 1950s and 1960s. 
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We must always keep in mind that borrowing heavily from the customs and traditions 
of British parliament we have incorporated elaborate provisions in our constitution 
about the working of Parliament of India. Whether it is the question of the 
summoning, prorogation and dissolution by the President of India or his ordinance 
making power, even powers, privileges and immunities of members of parliament are 
extensively dealt with, legislative procedure is given in detail, and the matters 
regarding the passage of budget through the parliament has also been provided for in 
complete details in the constitution. However, there is no area, no practice, no 
provision regarding the working of parliament that has not been perverted. 
The question hour which is considered as the mirror of parliament has been de-shaped 
beyond recognition, the standard of questions-and their answers too, have come down 
drastically, poor participation of members in debates is alarming, the so called 'zero 
hour' has become a tool in the hands of the opposition that leaves no stone unturned 
to see that the proceedings of parliament are kept stalled for unending periods of time, 
adjournments and all other kinds of motions are resorted to just for the sake of it 
without an aorta of relevance. So much so that fingers are now being pointed at some 
Speakers for allegedly partisan conduct, and on the other hand they have also faced 
such unruly behaviour from members that often drives them to the verge of nervous 
break downs. On the contrary, we boast about the 'majesty of parliament', we spend 
crores of rupees on every session, elections to the two Houses consume enormous 
amounts of money, both of the government and the contestants. We also talk about the 
excellent traditions of parliament's working but the actual position is quite different. 
The deterioration in the standard of debates has not been sudden. There has been a 
gradual and slow corrosion which has come about without people realizing the gravity 
of the situation. There is no single factor that can be identified as solely responsible 
for it as there have been a combination of many factors whose interplay in the last 40 
years. 
What can be done to salvage the situation? Some Suggestions: 
If we sift through many factors that were responsible for the ugly situation that our 
parliament finds itself into, we may come up with some solutions and suggestions 
which may be put forward to uplift the downward trend in the working of parliament. 
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Firstly, times, since the constitution was framed, have changed. The circumstances 
under which the constitution was drafted forcing the framers of the constitution to 
create a strong centre in order to unite the country, no longer exist. Parliament's 
power to amend most parts of the constitution single handedly has given rise to 
authoritarianism among political parties that enjoy unassailable majorities. Within two 
years of the inauguration of parliament a Bill was introduced there to overcome some 
judgments of the Supreme Court. To counter complaints of members of parliaments 
that it is too early to start amending the Constitution, Pandit Nehru said: "A 
constitution to be living must be growing; must be adaptable; must be flexible; must 
be changeable... It is not like the unalterable law of the Medes and Persians that it 
cannot be changed, although the world around may change." 
The fact today is that the Constitution has been amended more than hundred times in 
about half a century. In some cases the amendments have completely changed the 
shape and the spirit of the Articles. Roughly speaking, Articles have been changed 
332 times. Many of these changes have affected the working of parliamentary 
democracy and the relationship of central legislature with the legislatures of states in 
our federation. 
The point is that when we had deliberately chosen parliamentary structure for the 
country combined with a federal set-up, there should have been enough safeguards in 
the Constitution to protect and to stabilize the relationship between central and 
provincial legislatures. It should also have been ensured that parliament is not able to 
make the sacred document a plaything at the hands of the ruling party. Therefore, the 
amendment of the constitution should be made more stringent along with 
empowerment of to play a more decisive role in it. 
Secondly, when parliamentary system was adopted, we knew fully well that it would 
be a new parliament with no traditions and precedents. It was, therefore, necessary 
that we followed the parliamentary practice of Great Britain from where we borrowed 
it and which is also considered as the mother of all parliaments. No doubt, it was also 
endeavoured by the leaders in the initial years of the working of parliament. Pandit 
Nehru was instrumental in establishing many good traditions modeled on the British 
legislature. The greatest contribution of Nehru was that he attached great importance 
to parliamentary practices and gave fullest respect to it. However, the legacy of Nehru 
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was not carried forward. Subsequent prime ministers of India failed to give the same 
respect as Nehru gave to parUament and in fact, some prime ministers were 
responsible for the sorry state our parliament finds itself today. 
It is, therefore, suggested that presiding officer and the leader of the House must work 
in unison to instill a sense of pride amongst the members of parliament and to make 
them realize the importance of following parliamentary practices that exist in other 
parliaments throughout the civilized world. 
Thirdly, efforts in right earnest must be taken to arrest the growth of unhealthy 
practice of returning persons of criminal background to parliament. Stringent 
measures must be taken to keep people with shady characters away from contesting 
elections. It should also be seen that no contestant for elections to the two Houses is 
able to take assistance of musclemen and criminals for canvassing or pressurizing 
voters for him. Establishing fast track courts to try election cases with time bound 
trials can do this. 
Fourthly, after each general election, members should be given compulsory training 
in the working of parliament by organizing mock parliamentary sessions, workshops 
on parliamentary procedures and practice, drafting of Bills or even the art of making 
speeches in parliament. This should be done for a considerable period of time and 
should be done like the completion of curriculum in educational institutions. 
Attendance at such training courses should be made obligatory and oath taking by 
members should remain suspended till such time the course content is completed. 
Fifthly, when we have adopted universal adult franchise, we have also brought it 
upon ourselves the fact that many members of parliament may emerge from illiterate 
class. Law making is a serious business, which involves many intricate and complex 
matters, and elaborate procedures have to be followed. A member who cannot read or 
write often finds himself in a position where he has to either support or oppose the 
business at hand in parliament. Though it may sound undemocratic, but it remains 
important for the success of our parliamentary system that all its members are able to 
understand the proceedings of the House to which they belong. For this purpose, 
universal adult franchise should remain intact but some basic educational 
qualifications must be prescribed for people who would want to contest elections. 
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Sixthly, more teeth should be given to the presiding officers of the two Houses so that 
members whose only contribution to the proceedings is to disrupt them are dealt with 
sternly. We cannot blindly follow the traditions of British parliament as the economic, 
social and educational background of the members there is entirely different. An 
illiterate person can hardly dream of becoming a member of parliament in Britain as 
the electorate there is politically more conscious, educationally advanced and aware 
of his duties. On the other hand, the composition of electorate in India gives immense 
opportunities to the uneducated candidate to successfully contest elections to both 
Houses of parliament. Putting curbs here would mean improvement in the standards 
of debates and better decorum in the House, creating conditions conductive for better 
control by the presiding officers. In the event of continuous disruptions of the 
proceedings, the presiding officer should be given a blanket power of naming the 
members and on repetition of the same unruly behaviour should attract automatic 
suspension. This can be done, however, only when the Speaker of the Lok Sabha 
follows the tradition of severing all his political ties with the party he belonged to 
before his election as Speaker and also the British convention that a sitting Speaker is 
returned without a contest from the constituency of his choice. 
Seventhly, the problem of scant attendance during debates in parliament should be 
dealt with urgently. Members are expected to raise issues in parliament, participate in 
debates and contribute positively to the law making process. Figures showing 
members continuously absent during debates and very-very thin attendance during the 
proceedings are alarming. It has often been reported in newspapers that on few 
occasions during a session, only 15 members were present during a serious debate out 
of the total membership of 543 in Lok Sabha. 
Regular absentees from session should be identified and also those who come to 
parliament each day but prefer to stay in canteens and lobbies throughout, so that such 
members can be served a notice of non-performance, warned and then suspended, 
either for a temporary period or for the entire duration of the session of parliament. 
Eighthly, it has been very often reported that some members of parliament seldom 
speak in the House, or there have also been cases where some members have been 
found to have remained absolutely silent during their entire tenure of five years. 
Parliament is a body for discussions and deliberations. If a member does not take part 
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in debates and never speaks, that should be tantamount to non-performance again for 
which he should be identified and his inability brought to the notice of the members 
of his constituency who may keep it in mind this 'qualification' at the next general 
election. 
Ninthly, In a situation where the govenmient lacks comfortable majority on its own 
strength and has formed an alliance with other parties to form the government, and if 
the opposition too is largely fragmented to pose as an alternative, the parliament 
would be bound to remain less effective. This is what happened during the 1989-
1999 decade. Members, irrespective of their party affiliations, became fodder for 
horse traders in order to share the spoils. Politics and membership of parliament has 
emerged as a full time career, highly lucrative and also a hereditary profession. 
Following the frequently occurring fluid majority of the successive parliaments, 
devaluation of all the old values was faster and a drastic increase in disorders and 
pandemonium on the floor during the so-called "Zero Hour" and at other times has 
been witnessed. There has been a general apathy among members, ministers and 
public at large towards the work of parliament. Absenteeism aimong members has 
assumed aleirming proportions and defections for money and office have now become 
a norm. 
Several of the archaic practices and time-consuming procedures most unsuitable for 
present-day needs must be discontinued. Legitimacy of government and of 
representative institutions under the system are inextricably linked to free and fair 
elections and this would be possible only when the system is able to bring to power 
persons who truly represent people's will and have the necessary abilities to govern. 
Recent efforts notwithstanding, due to the role of mafia gangs, muscle power and 
money power, free and fair elections continued to be difficult in some parts of the 
country thereby affecting the representative credentials of our elected representatives. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to reform the electoral system and the multi-party 
system if we are really serious about parliamentary reforms. 
Tenthly, Building a better image of parliament among the people both inside and 
outside the country is a necessity. Parliament is the communication link between the 
people and the government. Reports of unruly behaviour of members during 
parliament sittings results in its poor image among citizens of the country. People talk 
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of happenings in parliament and of its members as if they are talking not about their 
own people but aliens from outer space. It is necessary to first establish a rapport 
between the people and the members of parliament so that members realize the risks 
involved if they lose the support of the people. The two must be brought closer to 
each other and should acknowledge the specific role assigned to them. Parliament 
belongs to the people as it consists of their representatives, unless this is ingrained in 
the minds of members, they would continue to lambaste the electorate and also the 
decorum of the legislative body. The common man must be empowered enough so 
that he may feel that he is a participant in the decision-making and legislative 
processes and that through parliament his voice can reach the government and that, it 
counts. Parliament must be sensitive to public opinion and public members of 
parliament must always remain accessible to people. If corruption is suspected inside 
the portals of the legislature then the press and the public must be free to question it 
and expose it without being threatened under the rule of violation of parliamentary 
privileges. In its own long-term interest, parliament as an institution cannot afford to 
place itself above any kind of scrutiny. There is also a dire need of a parliamentary 
ombudsman. If stories that are currently in circulation attributed to members of 
Parliament about payments demanded, offered or paid for favours like gas 
connections, telephone connections or even for asking questions during Question 
Hour etc. One feels disgusted to hear cases of MPs subletting their official residences, 
or of misuse of free coupons and passes for rail/air travel and the like. These types of 
allegations need to be thoroughly investigated and, if found to be untrue, then they 
must be publicly contradicted, and if they prove to be true then harshest punishment 
must be awarded to the culprits. 
Deliberate and concerted efforts are needed also at the professional level to rebuild 
parliament's image as the supreme institution of the people. The people should know 
what their representatives are doing for them. Better press and public relation jobs for 
image building of parliament are not only legitimate but also necessary for raising the 
confidence of people on their representative body. For this purpose there should be no 
hesitation in using the latest tools and techniques. The mass media, radio, television, 
newspapers, films etc. - should all be suitably harnessed to the service of parliament 
so that people remain vigilant. These, particularly the print and electronic media, can 
play a vital role in building a healthy image of parliament. 
217 
Eleventh, improving the quality of members, both educational and political levels are 
also an absolute necessity if we attempt to raise the standards of debates in 
parliament. Educational attainments of members are the most important variable in 
the working of any parliament inasmuch as a parliament would be what its members 
make of it. It is the primary duty of every member, irrespective of his party 
affiliations, to maintain and project a good image of parliament by his conduct, both 
inside and outside the Houses of parliament. Corporate image of parliament is bound 
to remain poor unless the quality and conduct of individual members improve and 
every member is imbued with a sense of purpose and responsibility. Also, every 
backbencher should be sensitized to understand his role as a member of parliament 
where the members of his constituency send him. Members of important 
parliamentary committees need to lay down a strict code of conduct for them, never to 
ask the senior government officers appearing before the Committee for personal 
favours, avoid Committee tours unless really necessary and never accept any gifts, 
dinners, free transport, five star hospitality and the like while on tours. 
Twelfth, The recently introduced 24 hours parliamentary channels that continuously 
televise the Question Hour and other important debates have taken the parliament to 
the very doorsteps of people. Even if the level of debate has not improved much, 
parliamentary politics has become more alive. Members find it difficult now to be 
absent specially during the Question Hour because they are conscious of the fact that 
people are watching them,. Another change that has been obser\'ed after the 
proceedings started to be televised is that members are better dressed and more 
careful about their behavior before the camera. An important danger of televising the 
proceedings is to see that it does not turn some members into demagogues playing 
more and more to the gallery and to the vast number of viewers and listeners all over 
the country. 
It is necessary that the press and public relations in parlijiment are suitably reoriented 
and developed as a highly specialized and dynamic service charged with the 
responsibility inter alia of educating public opinion in regard to parliament and its 
activities through publication and distribution of handy monographs, folders and 
handouts, managing publication of write-ups in newspapers and periodicals, arranging 
interviews, talks and discussions on radio and T.V., using audio-visual aids like audio 
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and video cassettes to publicize the work of parliament, having regular briefing 
sessions for the press, as is done in some western countries. 
During the last about 60 years, the structure and functions of parliament had 
developed under the shadow of the Fabian slogans of democratic socialism, economic 
democracy and distributive justice. The information explosion, the technological 
revolution, the growing magnitude and complexities of modem administration and the 
concept of welfare state cast upon parliament vastly extended responsibilities of social 
engineering through legislation and of managing the lives of citizens from the 
bedrooms to the cremation or burial grounds. Inadequacy of time, information and 
expertise with parliament resulted in poor quality legislation and unsatisfactory 
parliamentary surveillance over administration. As B.K. Nehru once said, during the 
entire period of nearly 200 years of their rule in India, the British passed only some 
400 laws while in the first 40 years, parliament had passed nearly 4000. The big 
difference was that the 400 laws were obeyed or had to be obeyed due to the nature of 
coercive British administration while all the 4000 pieces of legislation were not 
obeyed. One of the reasons offered for this disobedience to laws is often on the 
ground that those to whom many of these laws relate did not even know or understand 
them. 
Little effort has been made to develop the essential prerequisites for the success of 
parliamentary polity - discipline, character, high sense of public morality, 
ideologically oriented two party system and willingness to hear and accommodate 
minority views. Reforms and urgent remedial action seem imperative for making 
parliamentary institutions and processes effective. For parliament, it is of the utmost 
importance to constantly review and refurbish its structural-functional requirements 
and from time to time to consider renewing and reforming the entire gamut of its 
operational procedures to guard against putrefaction and decay. The case for 
reforming parliament is unexceptionable and, in a sense, has always been so. The real 
question is of how much and what to change to strengthen and improve the system. 
We have to be clear about the precise needs, direction and the extent of the reforms 
that would be desirable at present. It is obvious that mere tinkering first-aid repairs 
and trifling cosmetic adjustments would not be enough anymore. What is needed is a 
full-scale review. We have to be prepared for fundamental institutional - structural. 
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functional, procedural and organisational - changes. The overriding guiding norm and 
purpose of all parliamentary reforms should be to make both government and 
parliament more relevant to meet the challenges of the times and the changing 
national needs. 
To sum up, it can be said that we can legitimately be proud of the reasonably 
successful working of parliament during the last six decades. Parliament is still 
relevant as a dynamic institution, ever adjusting its functions and procedures to the 
changing needs of the times. If democracy and freedom are to endure, if 
representative institutions are to be made impregnable, it is essential to restore to 
parliament and its members their traditional esteem and honour in the affections of the 
people. Reforming the parliament in essential respects is already a categorical 
imperative. An integrated approach to political and economic systems reform is 
necessary. No single reform can provide a miracle cure. Also, parliamentary reforms 
cannot be brought about in a hurry. We must proceed with care and caution and begin 
by setting up a parliamentary reforms commission or a 'Study of Parliament Group' 
outside parliament, as was done in United Kingdom, before initiating procedural 
reforms. Finally, of course, the Rules Committee or a Special Procedure Committee 
of the House should report on the matter. 
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